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Cheney Comments on Arms Agreements on U.S. TV

LD2903121889 Moscow TASS in English 1149 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Washington March 29 TASS—U.S. Defence Secretary Dick Cheney said he favoured reaching an agreement on cutting conventional arms and armed forces in Europe and arsenals of strategic arms in an interview on Tuesday with American TV companies.

He said that the achievement of agreements on conventional arms cuts and possibly on strategic weapons would make it possible to cut U.S. armed forces, which is one of the ways of reducing the country's defence spending. Unless there are results in these fields, the United States would not be able to lower its combat readiness, Cheney stressed.

The defence secretary confirmed that he should submit to President Bush his proposals on cutting U.S. military expenditures by 6.3 billion dollars in the 1990 fiscal year, which begins on October 1. President Bush has urged a cut in defence spending, envisaged by the previous administration, by roughly 60 billion dollars in the next five years.

Cheney denied reports that he had already endorsed proposals on specific programmes to be curtailed.

Asked if Reagan's request for funding the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in 1990 will be reduced, Cheney said that SDI allocations were yet to be determined. But he said the Reagan administration often oversold the SDI concept.

Grinevskiy Holds News Conference on Vienna Talks

Lists Points of Agreement

LD2903135389 Moscow TASS in English 1333 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—The Vienna conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) talks have got off to a vigorous start, graphically demonstrating both disagreements and common points, according to the leader of the Soviet delegation.

Oleg Grinevskiy was commenting at a news conference here today on the results of the first round of the talks.

Speaking of the common ground, he made the following points:

—Firstly, both the Warsaw Treaty and NATO attach priority to cuts in the classes of arms which could be used to mount a surprise attack or conduct large-scale offensive operations,

—Secondly, they are prepared to reduce such arms to equal levels, below their lowest levels at present,

—Thirdly, both sides declare an intention to avoid barren debates on numbers, which have previously deadlocked negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in central Europe.

—Fourthly, they agree on the need for stringent international verification, including on-site inspections.

While the common ground is "fairly wide", Grinevskiy continued, there are also "quite a few" points of difference.

He described NATO proposals for limiting cuts to tanks, artillery and infantry fighting vehicles, while sidestepping the issue of troops, frontline (tactical) warplanes and combat helicopters, as being "obviously not enough" to remove the risk of a surprise attack in Europe.

NATO's approach to scaling down weapons in individual European regions, in particular central Europe, is likewise "causing concern", he added.

The talks of 35 nations on confidence-building measures have also revealed both points of convergence and difference, Grinevskiy went on to say.

NATO countries, Warsaw Treaty members and neutral and non-aligned states want to enhance the Stockholm accords and make military activity more open and predictable, he noted.

But whereas NATO countries propose simply revamping the Stockholm agreements, socialist nations suggest working out a new generation of confidence-building measures on land, at sea and in the air, Grinevskiy explained.

"The Soviet Union," he stressed, "is for active and dynamic talks and for an above-board accord based on a balance of interests to the detriment of no negotiating party, no European state."

Delegate Tatarnikov Comments

LD2903150689 Moscow TASS in English 1445 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—The news-conference, held today at the press-centre of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, was devoted to the first round of the Vienna talks on conventional armaments. It was addressed by Oleg Grinevskiy, leader of the Soviet delegation to the negotiations. He said that their vigorous start had not only brought out in relief the stands of the parties involved, but revealed their similarities and differences, too.

The main thing is, he stressed, that both the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO attach priority importance to the reduction, first and foremost, of armaments that provide the potential for a surprise attack and for carrying out broad-scale offensive operations. The point of the matter is to reduce such armaments to equal ceilings, which would be below the present lowest levels of the states taking part in the negotiations.

At the same time, the Soviet diplomat believes, NATO's proposals to reduce the matter merely to a reduction of tanks, artillery and armour cars, leaving aside the question of the number of troops and tactical frontline aircraft, as well as of helicopters, obviously do not suffice to do away with the danger of a surprise attack in Europe.

Asked to clarify this point, Major General Viktor Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation who was present at the news-conference, said that if an artillery piece was to be taken as the initial unit of measurement, a tank would be worth 4-5 units, a helicopter—from 6 to 9 units, an attack plane—from 10 to 12 units. He said that NATO representatives had announced their readiness at the end of the first round to consider the question of air force. This, the major general believes, is a good sign.

Asked by a TASS correspondent about NATO's attitude to the Soviet Union's unilateral reduction of armed forces, Viktor Tatarnikov said that both alignments now had approximately the same number of troops in Europe. The Soviet Union had decided to start a unilateral reduction in order to facilitate the difficult dialogue process. This step could be regarded as an "advance contribution". "It is wrong to say, as some do in the West, that the Soviet Union will still wield superiority after the reduction of its forces", he pointed out.

It was noted at the news-conference that according to the negotiations mandate there would be no direct discussion of tactical nuclear weapons at Vienna. However, the Soviet Union is prepared to start discussing the problem parallel with the Vienna talks at any time in the nearest future given the consent of NATO states.

Karpov Urges Talks on Tactical Nuclear Weapons
AU2903155789 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 24 Mar 89 p 1, 2

[Interview with Viktor Karpov, USSR deputy foreign minister, on the Vienna talks, by NOVOSTI commentator Vladimir Markov: "The Vienna Talks—Positions and Perspectives"; date and place not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Moscow is proceeding from the realistic possibility of working out in 1 or 2 years agreements on the reduction of arms and troops, and on supplementary measures to increase trust in Europe. These agreements would play a decisive role in overcoming differences in Europe. Viktor Karpov, USSR deputy foreign minister, said this in a conversation with the NOVOSTI commentator, Vladimir Markov.

[Markov] What does a comparative analysis of the positions of the Warsaw Pact states and the NATO countries, which were formed at the talks in Vienna, demonstrate?

[Karpov] First of all, I will mention the concurrent elements. Both sides are prepared to discuss primarily a reduction in the most dangerous types of offensive weapons. Both sides consider it necessary to reduce the level of troops and armaments in Europe by 5, 10, or 15 percent—as you can see, there is a difference here, but a negligible one—in comparison with the lowest level of these indicators in NATO or in the Warsaw Pact. Most common approaches, then, exist with regard to aspects of the first reduction stage. The differences concern, first and foremost, the groups of weapons which are contained in the reduction. For us, the reduction concerns several types of weapons: In the future we also want to reduce tactical offensive aircraft, helicopters, and the number of armed forces. The NATO countries talk only about reducing three types of weapons: tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. Meanwhile, the West is silent about such an important component as the number of armed forces which, we believe, must be limited. NATO would like to put off the issue of aircraft until a later stage. If we manage to overcome these differences, it will be possible to relatively quickly harmonize the volume of reductions, the dates, and also the principles for verifying levels.

[Markov] Are more favorable perspectives for disarmament in Europe opening up in the present than at any other previous time?

[Karpov] Yes. New principles have become the basis of the talks, which are taking place in an improving international situation. East and West are talking about their endeavor to eliminate the potentials for a surprise attack and for large-scale offensive operations; they are trying to get them at a level that is sufficient for defense. Both sides are prepared for greater openness, for more effective control than previously. A lot of work awaits us which will be more successful the more consistently both sides proceed in accordance with the following conclusions: Security and stability in Europe cannot be guaranteed with the aid of increased military potential but only by the political means of reducing military opposition and by restructuring NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces to a truly defensive level.

[Markov] The USSR has proposed the start at the earliest possible date of separate negotiations on the reduction and complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. What considerations guide it?

[Karpov] When working out the mandate of the Vienna talks, the NATO countries refused to incorporate into them tactical nuclear weapons, which are among the most destabilizing offensive devices. The subject for negotiations in Vienna will be the means of dual use: aircraft and artillery which are also capable of serving as conventional weapons. This is a step in the right direction, but it is not sufficient to create a security plan for Europe on a firm basis, ruling out in principle the possibility of a surprise attack and the conducting of large-scale offensive operations. Therefore, together with negotiations on conventional weapons, negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons are necessary. Such negotiations would incorporate both tactical systems, which are specially made for nuclear weapons and, therefore, do not belong to the category of equipment of dual use, as well as the combat supplies for tactical systems themselves. Maintaining the potential of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, not to mention increasing them, would, of course, limit the reduction in conventional weapons. Incidentally, within the framework of the unilateral Soviet reduction, combat rocket launchers for tactical missiles will disappear.

[Markov] In NATO the discussion on the possible modernization of tactical nuclear weapons, partially deployed on FRG territory, is continuing. How do you evaluate these plans of NATO?

[Karpov] NATO measures for the modernization of tactical nuclear equipment would have, of course, a negative influence on the prospects for the Vienna talks. This would mean that in spite of the reduction in conventional weapons and armed forces, NATO is continuing to rearm and strengthen its nuclear potential. The NATO countries ought to refrain from this modernization. NATO representatives are mentioning the possibility of "a second twin track decision" because the first such decision on the deployment of new American intermediate range missiles in Western Europe coincided chronologically with the start of talks. Eventually an agreement on intermediate range missiles was reached. But at the time when the twin track decision was taken the Soviet Union continued to develop SS-20 missiles. At present, the Soviet side provides no grounds for the accusation that by its activity it is forcing NATO into a race in developing tactical nuclear weapons. We are not modernizing tactical nuclear missiles. NATO is also obliged to put an end to activity which would mean continuation of the arms race in the sphere of tactical nuclear weapons. Then, the situation will indeed be favorable for reductions in conventional weapons. At issue are objective processes which cannot but influence one another. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the tendency to increase NATO's tactical nuclear weapons would be contradictory to the agreements on reductions in conventional weapons.

[Markov] In what way can it be verified that the USSR is not modernizing its tactical missiles?

[Karpov] We guarantee that we are not carrying out the modernization of Soviet tactical nuclear missiles. By the way, with the aid of national technological means countries can verify without any particular effort that the modernization of these nuclear weapons is not being carried out. If doubts should arise we can come to an agreement on reciprocal inspections. The Soviet side is prepared to discuss even this possibility.

Sides' Confidence-Building Stances Contrasted

PM2903142989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 89 First Edition p 3

[Commentary by Colonel V. Nazarenko, candidate of military sciences: "The Vienna Talks: Through Trust to Security"]

[Text] The first session of the Vienna talks on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe has completed its work. From 9 through 23 March, delegations from the 35 countries signatory to the Helsinki Final Act held a number of plenary sessions.

The position of the socialist states is defined in the document submitted at the talks, "On a New Generation of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe." In order to place barriers in the way of an unchecked increase in military activity on the continent, the following is proposed: to restrict the scale of exercises subject to notification and the redeployment and concentration of the armed forces of the sides to a level of 40,000 personnel; not to simultaneously conduct in the territory of each signatory-state more than three measures subject to preliminary notification or more than two notifiable measures annually, if more than 25,000 personnel are involved in each of them; to limit the duration of notifiable military activity to a period of 15 days.

There is a certain flaw in confidence-building measures developed in the past: They do not affect naval activity and only partially affect the activity of air forces. Consequently, the socialist countries' document raises the question of extending confidence- and security-building measures to naval forces, which now have a clearly expressed offensive potential. "The appearance of long-range cruise missiles on ships, which, even when not equipped with nuclear warheads, are capable of performing strategic tasks, gives fleets the possibility of becoming an even more powerful strike force than they are at present," E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister, said. "Ships and submarines are becoming an ideal offensive weapon, best equipped of all for a surprise attack."

It goes without saying that it is not so simple to solve the problem of extending confidence-building measures to naval forces. But we could start, for example, by giving notification of naval exercises, inviting observers to them, and establishing a procedure for monitoring the redeployment of warships from one region to another. As is well-known, all these measures have recommended themselves well with regard to the activity of ground forces. So why not extend them to naval forces, taking account, of course, of the specific features of this branch of the armed forces? In an effort to reduce the danger of armed conflict arising in the sea (ocean) region adjacent to Europe, the socialist countries have proposed, in particular, that the scale of large naval exercises be limited to a level of 50 warships and their duration to a period of 10-14 days, and also that each side notify the other of the redeployment of groups of ships comprising more than 10 units (with a displacement of more than 1,500 tonnes apiece) and marine infantry forces of 3,000 personnel or more, of exercises involving more than 20 ships, and so forth.

A similar range of confidence-building measures is proposed for the activity of air forces—a powerful means of carrying out a first strike. In addition to this, the document contains proposals connected with creating zones of confidence and security on the continent. They all aim to minimize the danger of military confrontation in the region and prevent the possibility of a surprise attack.

As one of the information measures, it is proposed that consideration be given to the regular (not less than once a year) exchange of information on the numerical strength, structure, and deployment of military formations, down to the regiment (brigade) in ground forces, squadron (regiment) in air forces, and operational tactical group (brigade) in naval forces.

The document, as we can see, not only envisages broader confidence-building measures but also lays the foundations for making the transition away from such measures in individual spheres of military activity and toward an extensive policy of trust. Implementing the socialist countries' proposal to form a center for the reduction of the danger of war and the prevention of surprise attack would have great significance.

The nature of the military doctrines of the sides must become a subject for businesslike exchange of opinions. This is another promising area for increasing openness and glasnost in the military sphere. Speaking in Vienna, West German Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher announced a joint FRG-Polish initiative, the main point of which is to hold a meeting of experts from the Warsaw Pact and NATO states in the summer of this year—a meeting that would also include neutral and nonaligned countries—to discuss their military doctrines and other questions of military strategy. I must remind you that the Warsaw Pact member states spoke in favor of such consultations as early as 1987. But, the NATO countries were evidently still not ready for this at that time. And now—a step forward. I am sure that work in this direction will impart new qualities to efforts to ensure greater predictability in the military activity of the blocs.

So, the socialist countries' proposals aim to solve urgent tasks and simultaneously outline ways to do this. This unfortunately cannot be said of proposals by the NATO countries. Not one of the above cardinal problems of developing confidence- and security-building measures is properly reflected in them. Essentially the NATO proposals amount to nothing more than elaborating accords already reached at the Stockholm conference. The fact that they need to be improved is not in question. There is indeed a need to reduce the parameters of ground forces' activity liable to notification, under certain conditions, and to broaden the possibilities for the work of observers and so forth. But this is clearly not enough for the purpose of putting together a full package that meets the requirement—quite clearly stated in the final document of the Vienna meeting—to draw up a new range of complementary confidence- and security-building measures. The question arises: How is greater openness in practice in the activity of each member-state's military forces to be achieved if verification and observation measures do not extend to naval and air forces?

Another point: The NATO countries are proposing, for example, a system of selective evaluation of yearly information on armed forces achieved by visiting the places where military units are permanently deployed. They give no concrete indication, however, that the sides' air and naval bases in the zone where the confidence-building measures apply will also become the subject of inspection. They also do not envisage any measures to reduce the scale of military activity in Europe and adjacent waters. It seems to me that the NATO countries interpret new confidence-building measures as meaning the old Stockholm agreements cosmetically retouched.

The one-sided, narrow nature of the measures proposed by the West—even despite the certain coincidence of views in the positions of the sides—does not make it possible to solve the problem of reducing military confrontation in Europe without violating the principle of equal security for all member states. This certainly does not mean, however, that the sides should not seek compromise solutions.

The talks of "the 35" are being accompanied by the talks of "the 23," also currently in progress in Vienna—on reducing conventional arms and armed forces in Europe. Progress at one set of talks will have a positive impact on the course of the other set of talks. That is because disarmament engenders confidence, while confidence, in its turn, leads to security by promoting disarmament. We must hope that events at the difficult and complex Vienna forums will develop in line with this formula.

Reassessment of Military Postures Urged

PM2903142189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with O.N. Bykov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by A. Kuvshinnikov under the rubric "Viewpoint": "Changes Are the Guarantee of Stability"; date and place not given; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] "The outcome of the Vienna meeting is something new not only for us. And it sets big goals with regard to self-improvement by no means only for us. The priority of values common to all mankind finds it hard to make headway both in the Western political system and in ours too. Both there and here the birth of the new thinking is accompanied by torment." This was the unacademic way in which O.N. Bykov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and expert in the sphere of international and military-political problems, began the discussion of the results of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the CSCE participant states.

[Kuvshinnikov] The preamble to the first section of the Vienna meeting's final document mentions the word "detente." But is it appropriate to use this concept today, associated as it is with a very definite period in international relations, to characterize a totally new situation in Europe?

[Bykov] The phenomenon of international life with which we are now dealing is considerably broader, deeper, more capacious, and, most importantly, more promising than the traditional understanding of detente.

The very notion of detente makes you think of something transient. And, perhaps, not very stable. First tension, then detente, and then the logical guess is the possibility of a new cooling of the political climate.

The process which is developing now seems incomparably more stable. It is connected with changes in ways of thinking and acting and in the shaping of a unique mentality geared to partnership. And changes of this kind must be quite stable.

European states of various political orientations have recognized the need to formulate a system of international standards of conduct and development common to all mankind. And they have quite deliberately raised it to such a qualitatively new height that it is now possible to reach the "bar" only through a joint effort, by urging each other on and helping and pulling each other up.

[Kuvshinnikov] Confidence- and security-building measures and some aspects of security and disarmament in Europe are at the center of the Vienna accords. The appendixes to the final document define quite specific prospects for European disarmament. Talks have already begun on these issues. What is required of their participants to put the concord achieved in Vienna into practice?

[Bykov] The key word here is exceptionality. What was needed to achieve the accords was, above all, exceptional thinking and exceptional decisions. You do not have to look far for examples of what the traditional approach leads to. The delegations at the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe spent 15 years milling the wind to no avail.

And during that time they were unable to take even the first step on the negotiating path—exchanging initial data on the corresponding group of arms. And this is, if you like, the arithmetic without which it is impossible to get started. How can you negotiate if you have no idea of the forces actually deployed on each side?

We have taken the first step—the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee statement "On the Correlation of Strength Between the Armed Forces and Arms of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe and the Adjacent Sea Areas" has been published. But it cannot serve as a document on initial data—far more detailed data are needed to hold talks successfully, and they must be tied to the specific disposition. To make military-political decisions it is necessary to assess not the abstract correlation but the actual opposition of forces. Special features of geography, communications, combat readiness, and so forth must be considered. It is a question here of equations with many heterogeneous values. And it is not arithmetic but algebra that is needed to resolve them.

But the talks in question are not taking place in a vacuum, you know. They too are just one element in global world politics which include, in addition to the arithmetical and algebraic components of disarmament, a mass of other constituent parts—economic, social, legal, philosophical. It is a question, in the final analysis, of a kind of higher mathematics—and it is hard to make progress without mastering it.

Unfortunately, the attraction of ordinariness still makes itself felt. We took a very important and truly exceptional step: We announced a unilateral reduction of armed forces and conventional arms, not a cosmetic reduction but a very deep one. After that many people both here and in the West proclaimed: It is now up to the West. According to the old yardsticks, this would seem logical. But a return to this kind of rigid cause-and-effect linkage could reduce the whole initiative to naught. Its purpose is not to force through in a somewhat modified form the traditional negotiating formula of "tit for tat." The purpose is to shift from the balance of forces to a balance of interests, which certainly does not necessarily require arithmetically or even algebraically understood military parity. Apart from anything else, our military machine is so huge that even a series of unilateral reductions will not turn us into a second-rate military power. Yes, it is up to the West, but it is also up to us. This is the only way. We must not be constantly looking around at the West. The time has come to act, proceeding above all from our own internal political and economic interests.

The exceptional nature of the international situation requires appropriate initiatives in the military sphere. The profoundly asymmetric reductions under the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles were the first example of the extremely high effectiveness of exceptional decisions. But it is necessary to go further.

[Kuvshinnikov] In addition to the external, international dimension, military detente on the territory from the Atlantic to the Urals also has a domestic dimension for us. It can play a very important role not only in the matter of strengthening all-European security but also in resolving a key problem of our internal restructuring. The Soviet economy owes its present state to the inordinate burden of military spending.

[Bykov] I would put the question somewhat differently: How well do the demands of our restructuring sit with the process of strengthening military-political stability in Europe? It would really be interesting to investigate this.

It is perfectly obvious that we have to spend on defense proportionately incomparably more than the other side. The NATO countries have a population around 50 percent larger than the Warsaw Pact countries. This means that each of us is saddled with an additional military burden. And if you compare GNP, we lose out in a ratio of approximately one to four. You can see even from these figures what tremendous damage would be caused to our economy by the need to maintain parity even at an unchanged level. And yet the real arms race is a tight spiral. Inordinate unproductive military spending shackles restructuring. Within the economic mechanism there is preserved a giant, uncontrollable enclave which functions according to its own logic and devours colossal resources. As a result, the excessive burden of military spending fetters the vitally necessary modernization of the economy's productive sectors.

Military technology is quite specific. And the return on it in the civilian sphere is insignificant. To saturate the market with baby carriages it is quite unnecessary first to rush to build another missile plant and then to set it a plan for consumer goods. It would be far more efficient from an economic viewpoint to start by building a baby carriage plant.

[Kuvshinnikov] There is, by the way, feedback here. An efficient economy makes it possible to sharply increase the efficiency of military sectors too. A kind of paradox: A partial reduction in the volume of military production does not weaken but, in fact, in the final analysis sharply strengthens the country's defense capability, because it helps to develop it primarily along qualitative lines.

[Bykov] To overcome the economic crisis in which we find ourselves we must, above all else, take decisive action with regard to the military element of our economy. Without restructuring that story of our house it is impossible to imagine restructuring at all. The key here is the radical restructuring of the whole system of our defense, so as to make it a modern and efficient mechanism consonant with the real demands of security and restructuring.

Unfortunately, this is very difficult. The inertia of the old thinking—both political and military—operates. Many structures have become so firmly rooted over the decades that they are not susceptible to modernization. Attempts are being made to protect narrow departmental interests. Material resistance is encountered. But now the provisions of the Vienna documents give us a kind of lever capable of augmenting the strength of supporters of reform. The Vienna accords make it possible to combine the process of international disarmament with the internal process of restructuring, reducing, and reorganizing our military machine.

To begin with, we should earnestly assess the reality of the military threats directed against us, without going to extremes. I must say bluntly: In my view, there is now no need for us to be frightened. The present situation in Europe is radically different from the situation in the early forties or the mid-fifties. The world has changed.

[Kuvshinnikov] The breakthrough that occurred at the Vienna meeting in the sphere of military security and confidence is undoubtedly impressive. But the Vienna accord on humanitarian problems and the proclamation of the human dimension of the all-European process were also major international events. It did not take place in a vacuum—the road to Vienna began in Helsinki in 1975. It was then that the foundations of the edifice which now, almost 15 years later, has been named the "all-European home" were laid.

[Bykov] Foundations is probably too grand a word. Before starting to lay them, we had to thoroughly prepare the European construction site, which was overgrown with tall weeds, and then fill in the holes, make good breaches and voids in relations, and uproot the stumps of stereotypes. The participants in the all-European process began constructing the foundations proper considerably later.

The spirit of confrontation was still clearly in the air at the Helsinki conference, and the mutual desire of the two main groupings to infringe each other's interests was manifest. As a result, the degree of accord reached then was not very great. And far from all the provisions of the Final Act were observed subsequently. And some of the accords in the human rights sphere in practice proved simply frightening to our then leadership.

However, despite the limited nature of the accord reached during those years, they marked the start of a potentially very promising process. The Vienna documents have been not just its quantitative development but a qualitative feature, a breakthrough into a new dimension of accord.

They have registered the firmly established realization that the balance of stability in each individual state is becoming a very important condition of international stability. Any kind of instability—whether in the form of internal political instability, economic upheavals, or interethnic clashes—is dangerous, dangerous both for each individual and for everyone.

But stability is not equivalent to stagnation. On the contrary, in the modern world it is ensured precisely by changes. A contradiction? Not at all. It is dialectics!

[Kuvshinnikov] The starting point for analyzing the Vienna accords in the humanitarian sphere is, once again, exceptional: For the first time 35 states agreed to recognize the supremacy of international law over domestic law and declared their readiness to begin bringing their own legislation up to a jointly chosen ideal. But won't the business of the Helsinki accords not be repeated?

[Bykov] If you recall the start of the Helsinki process, it must not be forgotten that at that time the West was deliberately and purposely endeavoring to put us in a difficult position. This was one manifestation of confrontation politics. We for our part set somewhat similar tasks.

There may be friction between the demands of the Vienna documents and our domestic legislation—both existing and even future legislation. It is impossible to deny the considerable asynchronism in the development of the democratization processes in our country and in the world as a whole. Let us be frank: We will have to make a considerable effort to correspond to the spirit and letter of the Vienna accords. But, note, we now have to cope with the dialectical difficulties, with the difficulties of life.

But, on the whole, if we compare the processes of the democratization of all international life and the processes of internal democratization in our country, they seem to me not only perfectly compatible but also in many respects complementary, mutually supportive, and mutually strengthening. A positive impact from outside is capable of urging on our internal process, while it in turn can give a new boost to international development.

Way Out of 'Circle of Deterrence' Suggested

PM3003094789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Mar 89 Second Edition p 5

[Aleksandr Lopukhin "Viewpoint": "In the 'Deterrence' Impasse"]

[Text] There would seem to be some point in asking certain Western leaders the following question with disarming simplicity: How can their contradictory claims that nuclear war is an evil, yet nuclear weapons are a boon, coexist with each other? Today, alas, this kind of artless attempt would seem naive. While acknowledging the threat of nuclear self-destruction, at the same time many political and military leaders in Western Europe, for instance, still believe and are trying to prove that it is nuclear weapons that have givenEuropeans the "longest period of peace" this century and promise the best guarantees for the future. People in the White House hold the same view.

A great deal of invective could be directed at people who consider nuclear brinkmanship to be a reliable means of ensuring security. However, in my opinion, you cannot get results by moral accusations, appeals, and exhortations. It is far better to analyze everything calmly.

At the beginning of the nuclear age Albert Einstein warned that "everything but man's thinking changed" with the appearance of the atom bomb. Notions of war and peace that had been acquired at the cost of tens of millions of lives were cheapened in the twinkling of an eye. Relying on nuclear weapons today for self-defense is equivalent to surrounding one's home with a wire linked to a powder magazine in the basement that will explode if a potential robber or...a chance passerby touches it.

However, when it comes to real policy, although many Western leaders and strategists acknowledge the suicidal nature of nuclear weapons, they still pin their hopes on the principles of the prenuclear era, reject moral arguments as utopian, and cite the experience of the last 40-plus years without world cataclysms. But past experience is not always the best counselor for the future, especially in strategic matters.

Admittedly, it cannot be said that the views of NATO leaders have not changed, for instance. They also reject nuclear war as a means of achieving political ends and give assurances that nuclear weapons will only be used as a retaliatory measure. However, their use is quite permissible under the "doctrine of flexible response" operating in NATO, moreover, permissible even in conflicts using conventional arms. Western countries still refuse to follow the USSR's example and pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Thus, despite the demands of the new political thinking, they cannot conceive of security without stockpiling nuclear weapons. With this approach, the simple and lofty aim of ensuring mankind's survival is lost amid countless calculations of balances, which has long been pointless. What does it matter if one side can destroy a potential adversary 7 times over while the other can only destroy an adversary 5 times over? Nevertheless, the plans of NATO strategists still endeavor to obtain overwhelming superiority here too, despite the obvious uselessness of such superiority.

The persisting belief in the position-of-strength policy gives rise to the most paradoxical conclusions: The Soviet Union is supposedly taking part in arms reduction talks solely because NATO persistently flexes its military muscle. Since obsolescent nuclear weapons will be unable, British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe believes, to guarantee "deterrence," they must be modernized. This seems to sound reasonable, but only within the framework of the suicidal logic based on the threat of mutual assured destruction. The following viewpoint also exists in the West: Since it is acknowledged that nuclear weapons are a gun that, despite A.P. Chekhov's well-known words, must never be fired, they are regarded solely as a political weapon in military-strategic calculations. But if that is the case, there is no justification for attempts to circumvent the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles under the guise of modernizing nuclear arsenals in Europe. Since they have ceased to be real weapons in the eyes of strategists and their use is absolutely inadmissible, it should also be acknowledged that there is no point in stockpiling and improving these weapons, especially now that intimidation with the "Soviet threat" is becoming less and less convincing and talks on arms reduction are under way.

It seems to me there is only one way out of the vicious circle of "deterrence." That is concrete actions: The Soviet-U.S. accords that have been secured, the as yet unilateral steps on the part of the USSR and its allies to impart an exclusively defensive character to their military doctrine, and the reduction of their armed forces and arms are showing mankind the way to building a universal system of security. The world is becoming increasingly stable and interdependent. As more and more people come to realize this, it will be easier to make joint efforts with the West to find a way out of the impasse of "deterrence" in order to ultimately rid mankind of the threat of nuclear self-destruction.

Gerasimov on U.S. Central America Policy
PM2903180589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 4

[G. Charodeyev report under the rubric "From Our Own Correspondent at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center": "We Cannot Agree With This"]

[Excerpt] It has become known that a few days ago the President and the leadership of the U.S. Congress signed an agreement on the general guidelines of U.S. policy in Central America. It follows from the remarks of the secretary of state and congressmen at a 24 March news conference that the G. Bush administration's approach to the peace process in the region will be characterized by certain new features which are in line with the international community's expectations that the Central American conflict should be unblocked at the earliest possible opportunity. G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, who conducted the briefing, said in this context:

"We have noted that, first, the U.S. Administration 'does not plan to request appropriations for military aid to the contras,' and that, second, it 'will promote diplomatic efforts' aimed at resolving the problem of the contras stationed in Honduras. At the same time it is hardly possible to regard the accord achieved between the President and the leadership of the Congress on granting 'humanitarian' aid to the contras 'at the previous level' until the general elections in Nicaragua in February 1990 as in keeping with the decisions of the meeting of Central American presidents in San Salvador, and specifically, the decision on the elaboration within 90 days at the latest of a joint plan for the demobilization, repatriation, or voluntary return to Nicaragua of the Nicaraguan contras and their families. Furthermore, the sincere desire of the Nicaraguan Government to find mutually acceptable solutions for a settlement of Central American problems was again demonstrated at this meeting.

"It was quite natural to expect that Washington would take an understanding view of current tendencies in Central America aimed at putting an end to the complex and protracted regional conflict. However, this has not happened. Coupled with the efforts undertaken by the U.S. side to secure the continued stay of the contras on Honduran territory until the aforementioned date, this behavior is in any event aimed at postponing the adoption of concrete measures to disband the contras.

"Neither can we agree with the claims which rang out during the press conference and in President Bush's special statement, claims which distort the essence of the USSR's policy in Central America and the nature of the USSR's relations with Cuba and Nicaragua. The attempt to call into question the manifestations of the Soviet side's new political thinking in its approach to the elimination of the hotbed of tension in Central America is totally unjustified.

"It is indisputable that considerable differences exist in the stances of the two sides on a number of aspects of the peace process, and specifically on concrete measures of collaboration between the USSR and the United States to facilitate a political settlement in the region, measures which are concerned primarily with reducing military deliveries to Central American countries. The Soviet side hopes that the exchange of opinions with the current U.S. Administration which was initiated by the recent meeting between E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker in Vienna, will take place in an atmosphere of constructive and well-weighed discussion of existing differences on the aforementioned questions." [passage omitted]

Western Media React to Election Campaign
PM3003083389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 1

[B. Ivanov review: "Symbol of Change. Foreign Mass Media on Elections of USSR People's Deputies"]

[Excerpts] "The first real election campaign. In fact, a 'first' for the Soviet Union. Its main result is that Soviet people have begun to learn the art of election debate. The elections will be the freest elections in the whole of Russian history. They have awakened Soviet society's interest in political life, shown people's concern with urgent issues, and revealed their desire to solve them as soon as possible." These words were recently written by the Paris newspaper LE MONDE. These lines reflect the basic thrust of the responses by foreign mass media to this most important event in our political life. [passage omitted]

Virtually all foreign journalists who have worked in our country have stressed in one form or another that "the Communists are no longer given a credit of trust in perpetuity, and so, for the first time in the course of debate, they have had to defend their political platform." And this in turn results from the fact that the choice of candidates, to quote London's THE GUARDIAN, is now far broader than ever before. The nomination of candidates in the course of a free, wide-ranging discussion is a guarantee that the Congress of People's Deputies, in the opinion of REUTERS' Moscow correspondent, "will lead to real debates among the deputies, because if they do not put up a good enough fight for the implementation of their programs they will have a hard time of it in the next elections."

While noting that the election campaign as a whole has been characterized by extraordinary enthusiasm, dynamism, passion, and even drama, foreign correspondents have also given attention, nevertheless, to negative features holding back the process of democratization in our country. In particular, although the present elections have been staged on a multimandate basis, in almost one-fourth of all electoral okrugs only one candidate has been nominated per seat—which, in the view of the Italian newspaper L'UNITA, is dictated by the "reflexes of the past." Actions like these give the trump card to those who intend to "interpret the Law on Elections in a

spirit of overseeing rather than developing initiative." The people's efforts to play a part in sociopolitical life, a correspondent with the French newspaper L'HUMANITE believes, are encountering "bureaucratic obstacles" in a number of cases. There are still very "strong fears of possible victimization as a result of criticism or the open expression of one's opinions." Yes, that is so, but something else is also true: We have all seen how, in recent months, these fears have diminished with amazing rapidity. Not without reason did a Moscow correspondent with the American CBS television company remark in one of his reports: "The differences of opinion between candidates in the elections can be seen every day on the television screens during debates whose openness makes people of the older generation clutch at their hearts."

In an interview with ABC television, U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker said of the 26 March elections: "I conclude that changes are taking place in the Soviet Union, very major changes. We also conclude that the changes taking place in the USSR will probably be long-term changes. As I have already said, the United States hopes that restructuring will be successful, because we believe that this will be useful for the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. Consequently, we wish Mr Gorbachev success in this." At the same time, the U.S. State Department chief pointed out that his country "should continue to show common sense and realism in its approach to the Soviet Union, because it is still a strongly armed superpower."

So, the elections are now behind us. We know that the election law is not perfect and needs some finishing touches. But we are also aware of something else: It is an enormous step toward socialist people's power and a rule-of-law state. The first step, because what took place on 26 March is only the beginning.

China Accepts Lilley as New U.S. Ambassador

OW3003000489 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0300 GMT 25 Mar 89

[Kleznov commentary]

[Text] The Chinese Foreign Ministry has agreed to the appointment of James Lilley as U.S. ambassador to China, according to reports from Beijing by Western reporters. James Lilley will succeed Winston Lord, who has served in this post since 1985. The following is an article by station commentator Kleznov on James Lilley and the current Sino-Soviet relations.

To James Lilley, China is not a strange country. He had served in the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing between 1974 and 1975 before China and the United States established formal diplomatic relations. At that time, the head of the liaison office was George Bush, now the President of the United States. James Lilley has served in the U.S. representative office in Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand at different times. Between 1985 and 1986, he served as deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. He served as U.S. ambassador to South Korea not very long ago.

Frictions have surfaced in Sino-U.S. relations as China agreed to the appointment of Lilley as U.S. ambassador to China. In his report to the Chinese National People's Congress in Beijing, Premier Li Peng discussed Sino-U.S. relations and warned Washington not to interfere in China's internal affairs.

Our listeners know what the specific instances of U.S. interference in China's internal affairs were. Recently the incident taking place in Lhasa, the center of China's Tibetan Autonomous Region, became the excuse under which the United States acted to interfere in China's internal affairs. The U.S. Senate said in a resolution that the Chinese authorities took disruptive actions in Tibet in violation of human rights. An official Chinese document pointed out that the accusation made by the U.S. legislature was groundless. In the past few days China has lodged solemn protests over the U.S. action on more than one occasion. Currently, the U.S. Congress is discussing the question of family planning implemented in China, which is also China's internal affair. The U.S. Senate also planned to discuss the status of Hong Kong before the end of this year. In 1997, China will regain its sovereignty over Hong Kong. According to sources from Washington, some of the articles in the Hong Kong Basic Law are not to the liking of some U.S. legislators. (?Lott), a Republican senator [as heard], proposed that the Chinese side make clear the time and method of election for Hong Kong's legislative and executive branches. It is obvious that the new U.S. ambassador will have to use his rich diplomatic experience to prevent the action of the U.S. legislators from sharpening the frictions in Sino-U.S. relations.

United States & Canada

Opportunities for Better U.S.-USSR Ties Seen

PM2803115389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Mar 89 Second Edition p 7

[Correspondent V. Linnik dispatch: "Time To Set the Sails; a Discussion on U.S. Foreign Policy"]

[Text] New York, March—The U.S. mass media are noisily claiming that the policy of the new administration is drifting—bobbing up and down on the waves of events rudderless, without sails, and without a proper sense of direction. Is Bush another Carter? THE NEW YORK TIMES asks rhetorically. And in the United States this is no compliment, since Carter has become the symbol of a "drifting" president whose reign was characterized by inconsistency, half-measures, and lack of a clear perception of goals and ways of achieving them. Carter drowned in detail in his effort to attend even to the smallest matters, right down to compilation of the schedule for use of the White House tennis court. Bush is adding his notes to papers on the layout of the White House "horseshoes" pit. ("Horseshoes" is a game not unlike the Russian "pitch-and-toss," except that no money is involved.)

Incidentally, it is possible that higher expectations are held for Bush in view of the fact that he is no novice in Washington. After all, this is not his first, but rather his third term in office. However that may be, his record to date is inferior to Reagan's in the corresponding period, not to mention Roosevelt's, under whom the tradition of looking back at the first "100 days" was introduced.

So, until very recently, dozens of appointments to key posts in the foreign policy and defense spheres had not yet been endorsed by the Senate. The abortive, protracted battle for Tower's appointment to the Pentagon only exacerbated this situation. The date for the resumption of Soviet-U.S. negotiations on strategic arms reduction has been postponed. A sort of 3-month moratorium has been declared in order to elaborate a general outline of U.S. defense policy and priorities in military building and, consequently, arms control, NATO strategy, and general trends in the development of Soviet-U.S. relations. The U.S. press has noted dejectedly: The administration has no policy of its own on regional conflicts. Essentially, it also lacks an elaborated policy on relations with the Soviet Union.

What does this indicate? A desire to impart a systematic character and consistency to Reagan's shifts in Soviet-U.S. relations which, though positive, smacked of improvization? Or, on the contrary, an attempt to slow the pace of normalization that has begun to emerge over the past 3 years? Or misgivings on whether Reagan overdid it prior to leaving his post by warming toward the "evil empire"? Or the latest onslaught of the right, which did not dare pressure Reagan, but is now thirsting to get its own back from Bush? Or fears on whether the West has gone too far it its euphoria about restructuring and the new political thinking that have fashioned a new image of the USSR in the eyes of Western public opinion? In any event, many people here are alarmed at the results of public opinion polls which show a sharp decrease in the number of people who support increased defense spending (only 15 percent in all). I believe that the "time-out" taken by the new President is to be explained by the presence of all these viewpoints within the administration and the clash between them.

The administration's silence also indicates that one should not succumb to any great illusions about the manner in which the continuity of power is assured in the United States. While the tradition of the transfer of power at the personal level is characterized by enviable stability, the same cannot be claimed for the continuity of policy. It would seem that there should be no question of any moratoriums for the elaboration of a foreign policy strategy if the White House is taken over by a representative of the same party who has spent 8 years as the number two man in the state hierarchy. Yet now it appears to be necessary.

Incidentally, the current foreign policy hiatus could have been foreseen, up to a point, back during the presidential campaign last year. There was virtually no discussion on foreign policy issues between the two presidential hopefuls. Statements on foreign policy either took the form of the vaguest declarations or crude attacks on the opponent.

In the most general terms, this is evidence of the meager rations, starvation rations to be frank, on which the intellectual foundations of U.S. foreign policy have been kept in the current decade. The basis of this policy was essentially formed by a single, utterly simple idea—the idea of applying strong-arm pressure to the USSR along the whole front. Some people continue to see advantages in this policy, claiming that it was precisely this course that enabled the United States "to win the 'cold war'" and which "brought about the restructuring in the Soviet Union." Most people nonetheless recognize that under the new rules of the game governing international relations, "cold war" tactics are not just an anachronism, but are damaging to the interests of the United States itself. The ideological anemia affecting U.S. foreign policy is at the root of lamentations in America claiming that the United States has essentially been reduced to the role of responding to the USSR's foreign policy initiatives. "Conceptually, Gorbachev has outstripped us all," the influential Democratic Senator S. Nunn has said with part admiration, part vexation.

It is true that in an effort to justify themselves, people are claiming that certain of the USSR's current ideas have originated in the West. Even if this is partly so, they were taken from the pool of ideas that may have been current in U.S. political science but never formed the basis of official U.S. policy. Bush said in his speech during the swearing-in ceremony: "America's eyes are on the future;

the eyes of the world are on America." This thesis is far removed from the idea of an interdependent world, not to mention the concept of the primacy of universal human interests.

Speaking about the administration's current foot-dragging, it is impossible to deny the presence of objective reasons for it stemming from the momentousness of the current times. As to its radicalism, the current upheaval in international relations is comparable only to the turmoil that accompanied the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance. The structures and concepts of the postwar confrontation between East and West are collapsing; the times categorically demand new approaches and ideas. Thanks to the changes in our foreign policy, a realistic issue has been placed on the agenda—the transition from the hostility and confrontation of the "cold war" to the creation of a new world with civilized relations between the states comprising it. Proving oneself equal, intellectually and psychologically, to this main challenge of the present times is not a simple task. In any case, Bush and his crew, replying to the accusations of "foot-dragging" leveled at them in the press, plead difficulties of precisely this nature. Bush understands "the complexity of the present-day world," Vice President Quayle has said, and therefore he is preparing an "agenda for the 21st century." Pray God he may succeed, as they say.

The "slow start" of the administration regarding questions of Soviet-U.S. relations could be explained by yet another, not insignificant, circumstance. The White House is spending much time and effort trying to forecast the future of restructuring in the Soviet Union. Judging by Bush's remarks in Houston, the administration has already managed to reach the conclusion that the changes in the Soviet Union are of a fundamental nature. The Soviet Union will never again revert to what it was in the past. The question as to what the Soviet Union will be like is tormenting U.S. foreign policy planners in earnest. The concrete U.S. course with regard to the Soviet Union will depend largely on what answer the administration arrives at.

However, either contrary to its wishes or because this is in keeping with its true and secret intentions, the administration is being drawn into a debate about the future character of Soviet-U.S. relations. It is regrettable that this is happening now when a bipartisan basis has emerged for the implementation of U.S. foreign policy and consolidation of the positive changes in Soviet-U.S. relations that have characterized the recent past. The influence of right-wing forces in America must not be underestimated, and therefore it is not difficult to foretell right now that the administration will have to spend much time and resources on fighting a rearguard action against them.

It is fairly obvious what the basis of the right wing's approach to Soviet-U.S. relations is at this stage. The tremendous popularity of restructuring in the West and the momentum of the positive changes in Soviet-U.S. relations are preventing the right-wing forces from implementing the U.S. foreign and defense policy course that would best suit their views. Therefore, they consider preventing a departure from the "cold war" policy as their main task today.

What arguments are used as a basis for this? The number one thesis could be summarized in the well-known saying: The more that changes in the Soviet Union, the more it remains the same. "Despite the widely advertized new thinking, the essence and strategic goals of Soviet foreign policy remain unchanged—combating the political and economic interests of the West," Professor R. Pipes of Harvard University writes in the journal POLICY REVIEW. "Neither in arms production and deployment, nor in the buildup of the nuclear potential are there any signs of a deceleration, not to mention a 'freeze.'"

We must decide, Pipes goes on to say, "whether our aim is to topple the Bolshevik regime, or merely stem the current expansionism of the USSR, or support the forces struggling to turn the Soviet Union into an open society, or whether we should pursue all these aims at once... President Bush must make use of moral and **all other possible forms** (my emphasis) of support to back anticolonial and national liberation forces inside the USSR."

It is not difficult to ascertain that all these recommendations directly echo the document that formed the basis of the official policy of "cold war"—National Security Council Directive 68, signed by H. Truman in 1950. Incidentally, such parallels do not in the least embarrass either Pipes or H. Ellison of Harvard University, for instance, who went as far as to claim in one of his articles that restructuring in the Soviet Union confirms that the aims set in that directive were sensible. If one recalls that together with the directive, its compilers at that time also put together half a dozen plans for nuclear bombing attacks on the Soviet Union, one can only be amazed at the imperial ease with which these gentlemen are now elaborating the "strategy of promoting" further evolution on our country.

In this context, some of the most recent remarks of the new incumbent of the White House cannot but also put us on our guard, remarks in which he declares his conviction that "peace will be assured by strength" and that "in the coming years the United States will be able to set the tone...in laying the foundations for a new American age." Even putting aside for the moment the arrogant tone in which such declarations are made, we must ask: What, precisely, are the assets that enable the United States to make such claims? After all, right now 54 percent of Americans regard Japan, rather than their own country, as the leading economic power in the world.

Many important U.S. economists believe that the longest economic boom in modern U.S. history is on the wane, and that soon America will have to begin repaying the $2 trillion given to the Pentagon during this decade.

All these are arguments against America's very ability, as it were, to conduct its former imperial policy as advocated by the right. In addition to this, there are also such concepts as the responsibility of governments to the peoples of their countries to ensure their security and lower the levels of military confrontation, which remain high, and to resolve global ecological problems which no state in the world can tackle singlehandedly. Fortunately, there are people in America who are aware of the new nature of the changed world and who believe that it requires new constructive approaches rather than endlessly replaying the worn records of the "cold war" times.

"The correct response to a proposal is to enter into negotiations," Fulbright has said. The Soviet Union's intention to eliminate as many as possible of the obstacles that have hampered Soviet-U.S. relations in the past has provided the United States with the best opportunity in the last 70 years to establish normal, constructive relations with the USSR, G. Kennan, the patriarch of U.S. Sovietology, says. The United States, he believes, could eliminate from U.S. foreign policy those features that date back to the obsolete ideas of the "cold war." In the sphere of trade and economic relations, one such relic of the "cold war" is the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. In the disarmament sphere it could be a question of concluding a treaty on a total nuclear test ban and 50-percent cuts in the Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals. Nothing, he concludes, would reduce the U.S. federal budget deficit more than a cut in appropriations for the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe, which swallow up to 40 percent of the Pentagon's appropriations.

And so the administration has plenty to choose from; the recommendations are wide-ranging. It is important only to ensure that in making its choice it does not become a hostage of the past but approaches, without prejudice, the unique opportunities for improving relations between the USSR and the United States that have now opened up.

The agenda for the brief 11 years that remain before the turn of the century, and for the next century has essentially already been drawn up. Its essence lies in the creation of a world where the security of each individual country, and of all of them together, is being increasingly safeguarded by economic and social rather than military means, a world where the security and stability of one state serves as a guarantee of the security of all.

Policy, as is known, does not tolerate a vacuum. Here, just as in chess, the loss of even one move is fraught with serious consequences. Therefore there is no time for drifting. The time has come to set the sails.

Soviet, U.S. Trade Consortia Sign Agreement

LD3003082189 Moscow TASS in English 0743 GMT 30 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 30 TASS—TASS special correspondent Andrey Orlov:

A general agreement on cooperation between the Soviet foreign economic consortium and the American trade consortium was signed in the Kremlin on Thursday. The document lays down financial and administrative foundations for relations between firms and organisations of the business circles of the two countries in setting up joint venture projects on Soviet territory. The American consortium comprises six large firms—ADM, Nabisco, Chevron, Eastman Kodak, Johnson & Johnson and Mercator, the Soviet consortium some 30 Soviet enterprises.

The agreement provides for creating some 25 joint Soviet-U.S enterprises in the next few months in the fields of agriculture, energy, pharmaceutical industry, medicine, oil and others. The volume of investments in several years will amount to 5 to 10 billion roubles.

"The signing of agreements opens a new epoch in business cooperation of the two countries," chairman of the Soviet foreign economic consortium Vladimir Drovosekov said at the signing ceremony.

The general agreement is a breakthrough in trade and economic relations between the USSR and U.S., stressed James Giffen, president of the American trade consortium. It shows that perestroyka can bring success in the field of bilateral business links as well. The time has come to give up hostile rhetoric of the past and replace it with cooperation in the name of future, the American businessman said.

Pentagon Announces 'Delta-183' Experiment

LD2903111289 Moscow TASS in English 1031 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Washington March 29 TASS—Pentagon spokesman Dan Howard has described the current Delta-183 "Star Wars" experiment as "the most ambitious of the Delta shots today".

The Delta-183 deployed in orbit a satellite capable of detecting missile launchings.

Howard said during the first orbit the satellite equipment should detect a brief burn of the motor of the jettisoned second stage of the booster rocket.

All this should be done very quickly, Howard said. The lenses of cameras and various sensors of the satellite are protected with special flaps during blastoff. One of the flaps opened slower than planned. As a result, the rocket stage was not tracked properly. The sensors detected a brief burn of the motor during the separation of the rocket stage but they failed to detect yet another, 10-20-second-long, burn of the rocket stage motor.

The spokesman said he might not get into details of where, what, when and how it happened but the fall of the rocket stage was not monitored because the flap did

not open at the needed time. The Pentagon spokesman said that a comparatively small amount of information, which was to be obtained as a result of the experiment, had been lost.

U.S. Air Force B-1B Bomber Grounded

LD2903063689 Moscow TASS in English 0633 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Washington March 29 TASS—The U.S. Strategic Air Command has suspended the training flights of B-1B strategic bombers as a precautionary measure, Pentagon spokesman Dan Howard announced at a briefing on Tuesday [28 March].

The flights were halted after a fuel tank puncture had been discovered on Monday during a pre-flight inspection of one of the bombers at Dyess Air Force Base in Texas.

The crew of the swing-wing bomber was testing movement of the wings when one wing swung too far forward and an internal fuel tank was apparently punctured.

At this time, the Pentagon spokesman pointed out, there are no indications that the malfunction is connected in any way with the B-1B accident at the Dyess Air Base on November 8, last year, or any other incidents.

He emphasised that the temporary ban on training flights would not tell on the combat readiness of 97 strategic bombers.

B-1B is the newest nuclear-capable strategic bomber. Originally 100 aircraft of this type were built. Three bombers have crashed over the past two years.

U.S. Opposes Najibullah Offer to Rebels

LD3003084789 Moscow TASS in English 0828 GMT 30 Mar 89

[Text] Washington March 30 TASS—The United States has again spoken out against Afghan President Najibullah's attempts to stop the war and achieve reconciliation in his country. His proposal to give the rebels autonomous rights if they stop fighting was described as an attempt to split the Afghan resistance by a U.S. State Department spokeswoman on Wednesday.

A State Department briefing was told that the United States continues to support the Afghan struggle for independence and for a broad-based government against the "illegal" Kabul regime. The spokeswoman declined to answer a TASS question on how the United States can continue funneling military aid to the Afghan opposition through Pakistan if this is a direct violation of the Geneva agreements.

Expressing the U.S. official position, the State Department's representative expressed opposition to a United Nations Security Council meeting to discuss violations of the Geneva agreements and to the increasing of UN supervision. The State Department revealed that the U.S. thinks that the UN goodwill mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan fulfills its duties according to the Geneva agreements and that there is no need to widen its activity. The spokeswoman said that there is a mechanism to solve questions dealing with violations and that there was no need for the Security Council to discuss the situation in Afghanistan now that Soviet troops have been withdrawn.

Northeast Asia

Japanese Citizen To Join 'Mir' Space Mission

Agreement Signed in Moscow

LD2703142889 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 27 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 27 TASS—The first non-government commercial agreement on a joint Soviet-Japanese space flight was signed in Moscow today. In keeping with this document a Japanese citizen will be sent into outer space not later than mid-1991 as mixed crew member of the Soviet orbital station "Mir". The agreement was signed for the Soviet side by Aleksandr Dunayev, chairman of the Chief Administration for the Development and Use of Space Engineering in Economy and Research (Glavkosmos), and Valeriy Ignatov, chairman of "Licensingtorg"; for the Japanese side by Kiichi Nakamura, president of the TBS [Tokyo Broadcasting System] television network, and Hiroshi Ota, president of TBS News.

The flight will be preceeded by the selection and training of candidates. Already this April a group of Soviet medics will pick four candidates out of forty TBS workers, including six women. They will come to Moscow this May. Only two of them will qualify for the next stage. They will receive comprehensive training for the forthcoming flight at Zvezdnyi (Star City) near Moscow.

The flight programme is calculated for eight days. The Japanese cosmonaut will spend six of them on board the orbital "Mir" station. The agreement provides for a series of direct television broadcasts from the research module, and also for a short programme of experiments, which is expected to be drawn up on suggestions of TBS viewers. TBS representatives will cover all the selection and training stages.

"The idea of sending a Japanese pressman into outer space as member of a Soviet crew on board the 'Mir' station originated last year when TBS shot a film about the Soviet space programme," Aleksandr Dunayev said. "Friendly relations have developed between Glavkosmos and TBS during the filming. They are based on mutual business interests. The agreement signed today will doubtlessly promote the development of Soviet-Japanese cooperation, in-space exploration included,"

the Glaskosmos chairman noted. Valeriy Ignatov believes that the agreement opens up good prospects for further developing technological exchanges between the two countries.

Kiichi Nakamura expressed the hope that the joint space flight would contribute to the strengthening of friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the first space flight of a Japanese pressman is scheduled for TBS' fortieth anniversary.

Soviet, Japanese Officials Comment

OW2903084689 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 28 Mar 89

[Text] A joint Soviet-Japanese manned space flight will be conducted not later than the first half of 1991. A related accord was signed in Moscow on 27 March between Chairman Dunayev of Glavkosmos and Chairman Ignatov of the Licensingtorg trade association for the Soviet side, and TBS television network President Nakamura and TBS News President Ota for the Japanese side. Radio Moscow correspondent (Bolaviyov) covered the signing ceremony and the subsequent press conference and filed the following report:

[Begin recording] [(Bolaviyov)] News of the Soviet-Japanese joint space flight came as a complete surprise not only to Soviet but also to Japanese journalists because not a single detail was leaked before the agreement was reached. This space flight will be conducted on a commercial basis. Both sides have not disclosed the total cost involved in the contract, Dunayev said to the crowd present:

[Dunayev, in Russian fading into Japanese translation] I think today we have entered an unprecedented stage in our friendly relations with the Japanese people. We are aiming at conducting an actual Soviet-Japanese joint space flight based on our mutual interests. We now have an obligation to send a TBS employee, a Japanese national, into outer space not later than the first half of 1991. I hope that the easing of tension beginning between the USSR and Japan will bear fruit in concrete and solid form in the realm of working-level cooperation. I believe that with the signing of this contract, the Soviet Union and Japan will establish working-level relations in space and further develop cooperative relations in the future.

[(Bolaviyov)] Those were Dunayev's remarks. President Nakamura of TBS made the following statement on the space flight to the reporters present:

[Nakamura] TBS will select a cosmonaut from among its employees. It has already begun the selection process. Two candidates will be selected after passing various medical examinations to undergo training in the Soviet Union. Ultimately, only one of the two candidates will actually travel to outer space with two Soviet cosmonauts. The three will use a "Soyuz" spaceship on the space trip to dock with the space station "Mir." This will be the first space flight by a journalist in the world. The trip will take 8 days. Both the United States and the USSR are conducting space flights with various countries, but these are all contracts between states. Our project will be the first contract with a private company.

[(Bolaviyov)] During the news conference, many questions were asked by both Japanese and Soviet reporters. Moscow Radio correspondents asked the following questions: Why did TBS sign the contract with the USSR and not with another country, for instance the United States? How do Japanese experts assess the present level of Soviet rocket and space technology? To these questions, TBS President Nakamura replied:

[Nakamura] A similar plan is going on with the United States on the governmental level. Looking at the success of Soviet space exploration.... [changes thought] The United States still does not sign contracts at the private level. That is how it is. There has been a serious launching accident in the United States whereas there has not been any accident in the Soviet Union in the past few decades. In that sense, I think its launching technology and space technology have made brilliant and reliable progress.

[(Bolaviyov)] Those were the remarks of President Nakamura of TBS. [end recording]

Rogachev-Kuriyama Talks, Japan Ties Viewed

OW2903122589 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 28 Mar 89

[Vyacheslav Tikhonov commentary]

[Text] Listeners, at the recent Soviet-Japanese deputy foreign ministerial consultations in Tokyo, the Soviet Union and Japan studied in depth the various aspects of current important international issues and questions relating to their relations. With regard to these consultations, which were held on 19 and 20 March, Radio Moscow commentator Vyacheslav Tikhonov has the following to say:

At the consultations between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev and Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Kuriyama, frank opinions were exchanged on politics, economics, and the various situations existing in the Asia-Pacific region, including their military aspects.

The consultations also touched on various problems with regard to Soviet-Chinese relations, the Cambodian issue, and the Korean peninsula situation. Both sides expounded on their respective positions on global issues, including East-West relations, Soviet-U.S. relations, disarmament, and the Middle East.

Under current circumstances, it is only natural that primary attention was focused on international issues during these talks. The Soviet Union and Japan play

important roles in world affairs, as well as in events in Asia and in East-West issues. Keeping these facts in mind, the Soviets tried positively and patiently to lead the dialogue at the Tokyo consultations in the direction of discovering mutual points of contact. This approach was based on the belief that such action could lead to effective mutual cooperation in resolving such issues as those related to world peace and security, and could bring fundamental stabilization to the Asia-Pacific area.

During the course of the recent Soviet-Japanese consultations, it was learned that both sides' fundamental views on certain aspects of the current world situation are close and, on occasion, quite similar to one another. We must take note of this point with particular satisfaction. For example, both sides agreed that the desirable trend of replacing confrontation with dialogue is clearly here in resolving international issues. The Japanese side gave a positive evaluation of the important role of the new principles actually practiced by the Soviet Union in its foreign policies.

The stand of the two nations on the crucial issue of banning and abolishing chemical arms was also similar. Japan expressed its concurrence with the Soviet view on the Korean peninsula question, emphasizing dialogue between South and North Korea.

On the other hand, it must be noted with regret that the Japanese side avoided discussing some of the issues raised by the Soviets. One such issue was the Soviet proposal to lower the level of military confrontation in the Far East and create a mechanism in the region for consultations on this question. It is beyond our understanding why Japan should reject participation in jointly drawing up measures aimed at securing peace and security for the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's grounds for this action are alleged to be differences between the situations in Asia and Europe.

We would like to note that a series of preconditions have been prepared and added to make the solution of these important issues possible. Among them are the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the encouraging signs toward normalizing the situation in Cambodia, and the Soviet action to reduce missiles in the Far East.

It is also regrettable that the Japanese could not refrain from making a statement again at the talks insinuating that Japan remains exposed to latent threats from the Soviet Union. Such a statement comes from ignorance of the actual situation and does not conform with even basic logic. Would it not make more sense if Japan, if it really does believe in a Soviet threat, came forward and agreed to review the Soviet proposal to investigate all possible ways of accommodating the views of the two countries? But Japan will not do this.

The Soviet Union does not think that all the potential for mutual cooperation with Japan, which can be used to resolve international issues, has been fully explored. What is important is not putting blame on the other party, but displaying a cool and considerate approach in judging the situations arising in the world today, including those in the Asia-Pacific region. If this approach is taken as a starting point, then the inevitable conclusion reached is that Japan and the Soviet Union must accelerate cooperation in order to change instability to stability and confrontation to dialogue. We, on our part, are willing to do this. We hope Japan will come to feel likewise.

U.S. Exercises Set in Japan Despite Protests

LD2503071489 Moscow TASS in English 0709 GMT 25 Mar 89

[Text] Tokyo March 25 TASS—By TASS correspondent Nikolay Geronin:

U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers from U.S. Air Force Base Misawa in Aomori Prefecture will hold exercises from March 27 to 30, the U.S. military command announced.

Fifty nuclear-capable aircraft will practice combat actions over Hokkaido Island and the northern part of Honshu. Provision is made, in particular, for the delivery of strikes against ground targets.

The exercises will be held in defiance of protests by local residents who oppose the practicing of combat missions by U.S. aircraft in direct proximity to their houses, which may lead to irremediable consequences.

It has become known that on March 16 an F-16 plane in Aomori Prefecture accidentally released a bomb in an area which was not intended for bombing practices. Only by a lucky coincidence none of residents were hurt.

A bomb crater appeared not far from the site where a nuclear fuel storage facility is to be built. This fact angered the Japanese public. However, the command of Misawa Base limited itself to an "explanation" that the incident had occurred because the pilot had pressed the button too early.

U.S. Eyeing Philippine Bases Move to Okinawa

OW2803121089 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 26 Mar 89

[From the "Current Events and Commentaries" program; Alekseyev commentary]

[Text] We have every reason to believe that, in the near future, Japan's Okinawa Island may become the United States' major military strategic outpost in the Far East. This speculation has appeared repeatedly in the Japanese press recently. In this connection, station commentator Alekseyev has the following comment:

What we have in mind here is that the two largest overseas military bases of the United States may be moved to Japan's Okinawa Island. These two bases are Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines. Washington is forced to move these two bases. The current situation runs totally counter to what the U.S. Government actually wants. The point is that the treaty on leasing the land for the two bases will expire in 1991.

As matters stand, the Philippine Government will likely refuse to extend the treaty. Philippine President Aquino recently informed Washington that the Philippine Government plans to rescind the treaty 1 year before it expires. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that the U.S. military will move its bases from the Philippines.

What can be considered [words indistinct] is that they have never thought of the possibility of the United States reducing its military involvement in the Asia-pacific region as a contribution to enhancing peace and security in this region. Regrettably, Washington, as it has always done, considers problems only from the military point of view. It (?has) decided to move the two bases to Okinawa. Incidentally, a group of pursuit aircraft will soon be transferred from the Philippines to Okinawa.

Why has Okinawa drawn so much U.S. attention? First of all, it is because the Japanese Government has agreed to provide the United States with favorable conditions to turn the island into its major military strategic outpost in the Far East. A military observer of the Japanese RYUKYU SHIMPO pointed out that other reasons for the Pentagon's selection of Okinawa are that the island is very close to South Korea, the Japanese archipelago, and the Philippines. It is also not far from the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and the DPRK.

Currently, about 2,000 U.S. army soldiers are stationed on the island. In addition, there are many Air Force and Navy personnel there. If the Pentagon's major strike force in the Asia-Pacific region, now stationed in the Philippines, is moved to Okinawa, the U.S. military involvement in this region, and tensions in the Far East as a consequence, will increase sharply.

Soviet Withdrawal From Mongolia Viewed

OW2803003089 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 16 Mar 89

[Shalygin commentary]

[Text] Various Moscow newspapers today carried reports that Soviet troops would withdraw from the Mongolian People's Republic as agreed on by the governments of both countries. Our station commentator Shalygin comments:

First, it was in response to the Mongolian Government's request that Soviet troops were stationed in that country to help strengthen its defense capability. Now that tension in this region is easing, the Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Mongolia are returning home. The current withdrawal is the second reduction of Soviet forces in Mongolia and will begin next May. A tank division and support units will be withdrawn in August, including an air group. From 1989 to 1990, three fully equipped divisions, including two tank divisions, as well as three Air Force divisions and several support units will be withdrawn. Is this a major or a minor withdrawal? Can it be described in percentage figures?

Let me quote the words of Gorbachev. While meeting representatives of the Soviet-Mongolian Committee, as well as well-known figures from the U.S., West European, and Japanese political and industrial circles at the end of January, he mentioned that the Soviet Union would reduce its forces in Mongolia. He said Soviet troops stationed in Mongolia would be reduced by 75 percent. He also said that all Soviet Air Force units stationed in Mongolia would be withdrawn.

I think it is a very specific answer and sufficiently shows that the withdrawal will be a sizable one. But, I would also like to describe the Mongolian withdrawal in relation to the Soviet Union's even broader measures. The Soviet Union announced at the 43d UN General Assembly that it would reduce its Armed Forces by 500,000 men in the next 2 years, of which, 240,000 men will be from the Soviet European region and 200,000 from the eastern Soviet region. In 1991, six tank divisions and all airborne assault troops, as well as some other units and all their equipment, will be withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact member countries, including the GDR, CSSR, and Hungary. The Soviet Union is also cutting its arms by large margins. Moscow has taken unilateral arms reduction measures. It is hoped that the European and Asian nations will take similar measures in arms reduction.

Near East & South Asia

Opposition Field Commanders Talking With Kabul

PM2903155589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by special correspondent A. Ivanko: "Afghanistan: Who Are the Field Commanders With?"; all names as published]

[Text] Kabul—The recent radio broadcast by Afghan President Najibullah to the field commanders of the armed opposition has shed light on a problem whose solution, in the opinion of many Afghans, the country's future depends. Who will they follow? What is their political orientation? The situation in the Jalalabad region has "poured oil on the fire": Some commanders' refusal to take part in storming the city has substantially affected the military situation.

"The field commanders do not support the government in Kabul," Khamid Rokh, chief editor of the newspaper HEYWAD, believes. "But still less are they prepared to support a government of the 'Seven,' and they have an extremely negative attitude toward Pakistan. We are holding talks with some of them on letting motor transport with civilian freight through to Kabul, particularly across the Salang Pass. The goodwill of many commanders has saved Kabul from inexorable economic blockade."

The economic welfare of the commanders and the detachments under their command now rests on the war. The government understands that. The most interesting proposals have been put forward by the country's president and have been supported by many Afghans. It is a case of giving the field commanders full autonomy inside the regions where they are operating, both economic and political autonomy.

On the economic plane, there are plans to create unique free trade zones. The state will help with materials, equipment, and funds. On the political plane, the government will not interfere in a region's affairs without consulting with its leaders. Here the authorities are prepared to recognize the creation of new parties and the existence of their own newspapers; the authorities are also prepared to return the former rights and privileges to those from whom they were taken after the April revolution.

Naturally, not everyone will follow Kabul. There are also intransigent elements. They have abandoned neither the shelling of cities nor acts of terrorism. But the future does not belong to them. It is primarily the commanders of small detachments, and they are in the majority, who have grown tired of the fratricidal war. They are ready to agree with the government's arguments.

The opinion of Liz Dyuset, the BBC's well-informed Kabul correspondent, is of interest:

"Although I believe the war will drag on, individual groups at the local level will agree with the government on ending hostilities. Big commanders like Ahmad Shah Mas'ud will not enter into contacts with Kabul, but in my opinion they will adhere to the principle of 'neither war nor peace,' at least for a while."

Much depends on which side the big commanders sympathize with. Various opinions are expressed on this score. Some informed Afghans with whom I have spoken believe that Turan Ismail, who operates in Herat Province, supports the Kabul government, while Ahmad Shah Mas'ud will take a neutral position. So far there is no confirmation of this. At any rate, the editorial office of the Afghan newspaper AKHBARE KHAFTA contacted Ahmad Shah to grant an interview. The report on this was published on the front page.

"There is one condition," Zakher Tanin, the newspaper's chief editor, said: "a guarantee of safety for our correspondent. We await a reply...."

The political compass in Afghanistan may point to "stable" largely thanks to the policy of many field commanders who realize that the country's problems cannot be resolved by military methods. The next step is on the agenda: for them to put down their submachine guns and embark on creative work. That is what ordinary Afghans are waiting for.

Afghan Premier Says Herat Rebels 'Cooperating'

PM2903141389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 89 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with S.A. Keshtmand, chairman of the Afghan Council of Ministers Executive Committee, by correspondent V. Snegirev: "Readiness for Dialogue. Interview with Afghan Prime Minister"; date and place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] For a few weeks now world attention has been fixed on events around Jalalabad, where hardline opposition forces have been waging bloody battles. What is the situation in Afghanistan's other regions? What is life in the country like, the war aside? Our correspondent V. Snegirev put those questions to S.A. Keshtmand, chairman of the Afghan Council of Ministers Executive Committee. This is what he said:

[Keshtmand] The situation in the country is determined, first, by the absence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and second, contrary to all logic, by the stepping up of interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs by Pakistan and other states. There is a very complex situation now in the south and east—the Pakistani border area—where extremist activity has intensified.

I would include cities and certain rural areas in the north and west of the country—particularly in Balkh, Jowzjan, and Herat provinces—as zones of relative calm. The conditions shaping peaceful life there include, above all, the sensible activity by local organs of power, which are taking account of the people's interests and traditions.

Attempts to make contact with the opposition and involve it in peaceful dialogue are being carried out on a nationwide scale, and in some places armed detachment commanders are showing a readiness to compromise. For instance, some field commanders in Herat Province are now actively cooperating with the local authorities.

As for the north, life there has traditionally been largely determined by its proximity to the Soviet Union and its close cooperation with its great neighbor. The people, engrossed in creative labor, did not come as strongly under the influence of the counterrevolution.

I would particularly dwell on the position in central Afghanistan, the so-called Hazarehjat. I must say that the opposition groups there have not displayed any aggressive intentions—they have been more concerned about matters of self-defense, that is, they have been defending themselves. It is in this area that the most noticeable trends toward cooperation are evident.

[Snegirev] One would like to know a little more about life in the Hazarehjat, which covers vast mountain regions in the very center of the country. The world doesn't know very much about what is happening there. With whom are the Hazara siding? How do they see the future Afghanistan? What is their attitude toward Kabul's political course? I think you can understand why I'm asking you this....

[Keshtmand] Yes, I am an ethnic Hazara and have always attentively followed what happens to the west of the capital. The people there, it seems to me, are ready to support our government's constructive proposals. The policy of the reactionary "Alliance of Seven" leaders does not accord with Hazara aspirations or traditions.

These people were subjected for many years to persecution and discrimination and were among the most disenfranchised and oppressed. What rights and benefits are the "Seven" promising them? None! Therefore, people in the Hazarehjat are approaching the plans of the Peshawar opposition leaders with great caution, to put it mildly. Yes, there are weapons there, but they are intended more for protection against extremist incursions. [Keshtmand ends]

S.A. Keshtmand went on to dwell on the state of the country's economy, which is now perhaps going through its most difficult period.

[Keshtmand] The four state farms near Jalalabad—the pride of the many years of Afghan-Soviet cooperation—have, to a considerable extent, been destroyed. After capturing them, the insurgents chopped down trees, destroyed buildings, and scattered or killed livestock. Even Western journalists called this vandalism. This was a very visible manifestation of the extremist creed based on destruction rather than creation.

Six months ago the gas deposits in the north were temporarily mothballed because it was impossible to guarantee safe supplies. This is particularly regrettable because gas exports were our main source of foreign exchange, and now the balance of payments deficit is increasing. The irregular work of ground transport has given rise to major problems. Freight is building up, while there are shortages of basic necessities and foodstuffs in a number of areas. There have been difficulties with housing, fuel, and electricity.

But, at the same time, a whole series of enterprises have been working and producing output despite the complex situation. These include, first, all plants in Kabul. They include major textile factories in Qandahar and Herat. They include the Mazar-e Sharif Nitrogenous Fertilizer Plant. Incidentally, the latter is operating at full capacity while at the same time being successfully modernized by Afghan specialists.

You know that Soviet specialists and advisers used to work at many enterprises, helping our workers and engineers assimilate technology and run production. Now they have all left. But their teaching has not been wasted: As a rule, production targets are being successfully fulfilled, and we will always value your fraternal aid very highly.

[Snegirev] It is no secret that many people, even those sympathetic to you, were very pessimistic about the Afghan Government's chances of staying in power after the Soviet troop withdrawal. However, 15 February has become part of history, the republic is alive and well, and at any rate Kabul citizens—it seems to me—are by no means growing flowers to present to opposition detachments should they attempt to take the capital. What can you say on that score?

[Keshtmand] I, personally, and all my comrades in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Central Committee Politburo were confident that the people's power would be able to defend itself. Needless to say, this does not mean that Afghanistan no longer needs the Soviet Union's help. We do need such help. The realities of the present day are such that without such help Afghanistan will be unable to remain a progressive, independent, and nonaligned state.

Afghan Council Appeals to Rebel Commanders

LD2903194989 Moscow TASS in English 1845 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Kabul March 29 TASS—By TASS correspondent Andrey Greshnov:

Irreconcilable opposition units fired in the past 24 hours some 800 missiles, shells and mines at Jalalabad, administrative centre of the Province of Nangarhar, as a result of which five civilians were killed and 11 injured. Government artillery dealt a retaliatory blow at the rebels' areas of concentration killing 137 and wounding 56. There were four Saudi instructors among the killed, the BAKHTAR news agency reports. During combat operations, 15 enemy missile launching installations, several artillery pieces and mortars were put out of action.

The irreconcilable brought under heavy artillery fire the cities of Khowst, Ghazni and Herat. Four children were killed. The Supreme Emergency National Reconciliation Council of Afghanistan issued an appeal to commanders of opposition groups operating in the country.

The appeal said that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan had removed all the reasons for continuing bloodshed. However, Pakistan is grossly violating the Geneva accords and is continuing its interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. With the assistance of Pakistani secret service a so-called transitional mujahidin government was created in Rawalpindi which did not include representatives of the Iran-based Eight-Party Alliance and field commanders. With the support of the Pakistani military, irreconcilable opposition units are trying to capture Jalalabad. The rebels sustained enormous losses in manpower and materiel, the appeal said, but they did not draw any lessons from the developments in Nangarhar and even launched an offensive on Qandahar where they are also sure to be defeated.

The Supreme Emergency Council urged commanders of the armed units to heed the voice of reason, stop unnecessary bloodshed and take part in the restoration of the war-ravaged native country.

The Afghan Foreign Ministry sent to the UN Mission in Kabul another three notes citing new facts of the violation of Geneva accords by Pakistan.

USSR Envoy Urges Greater UN Afghan Role

LD2903223289 Moscow TASS in English 2102 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] New York March 29 TASS—Soviet UN Ambassador Aleksandr Belonogov urged the international community to realise its "special responsibility for preventing the escalation of military actions in Afghanistan and its possible spillover into a regional conflict fraught with unforeseen dangers".

At a news conference at the UN Headquarters Wednesday he drew the attention of the international community to a disquieting deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, caused by gross violations of the Geneva accords by Pakistan, and by the refusal of the irreconcilable opposition, bent on toppling the Government of Afghanistan by force, to embark on the road of peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Belonogov said that "The UN cannot remain on the sidelines when it comes to such important problems as establishing peace in Afghanistan and putting an end to the death of thousands of innocent people".

He said it is the duty of the international community to call violators of the [words indistinct] order and compel them to observe all the obligations Pakistan assumed in Geneva.

"Flagrant violations of the Geneva accords have a distinct negative effect on the international climate, they cast a shadow on the prospects for the settlement of other regional conflicts, and undermine an important element of an agreement—the credit of trust," the ambassador said.

"A realistic programme of achieving a comprehensive Afghan settlement was set out by Mikhail Gorbachev in his address to the UN General Assembly last December," he went on.

"All our proposals, including the idea of an international conference on Afghanistan, remain on the agenda."

Belonogov said that at its 43rd session the UN General Assembly "unequivocally instructed the UN secretary general to take active measures to assist Afghan political groups in setting up a broadly-based government".

"The role of the United Nations and its agencies in rendering humanitarian assistance to the Afghan population is also important," he continued.

Under the present-day circumstances, he said, the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanisan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) has to react in a much more efficient manner to the evolving Afghan situation.

"For the UN control mechanism to be able to perform its functions, it is necessary, as it was proposed by Afghan President Najibullah, to set up permanent points for UNGOMAP on the Afghan-Pakistani border, above all in Towr Kham where the road to Jalalabad starts.

"In the new circumstances when there are no Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the peace-making and humanitarian role of the UN secretary general special representative and of UNGOMAP is becoming ever more prominent, as is their responsibility for monitoring compliance with the Geneva accords," the ambassador said.

"It is high time to implement the relevant provisions of the Geneva accords on organising, with the assistance of the UN secretary general, regular meetings between representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and Pakistan for looking into facts of violations and working out mutually acceptable solutions.

"We do not also exclude that in the conditions of continuing violations of the Geneva accords a meeting of the security council that would look into implementation of these accords could prove to be useful."

Belonogov pointed out that "now when the trend to increase the peacemaking role of the United Nations in the settlement of regional conflicts is gaining momentum, there is all the more reason for this organisation to be more actively involved in facilitating a peaceful solution of the Afghan problem".

"Steps made in this direction would strengthen the well-deserved prestige of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security," the Soviet ambassador said.

Rumors Spread on Soviet Troops in Afghanistan
LD2903194489 Moscow TASS in English 1924 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Kabul March 29 TASS—By TASS correspondent Yuriy Tyssovskiy:

Leaders of the Peshawar irreconcilable forces which are making futile attempts to capture Jalalabad, administrative centre of the Province of Nangarhar, are preparing a new provocation.

Nabi Amani, head of the Press Centre of the Afghan Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing for local and foreign journalists here on Wednesday [29 March] that, according to special bodies, Yunis Khalis, leader of the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan", is going to move to Nangarhar from Pakistan several Soviet soldiers who were taken prisoner, to dress them in the uniform and shoot dead. Later on it is planned to put the dead bodies near the wreckage of a warplane or helicopter with the identification marks of the Soviet Armed Forces and to show them to Western journalists as proof of a "direct participation" of the Soviet Union in combat operations near Jalalabad. A reserve plan was also drawn up—to show to journalists only the bodies of Soviet soldiers allegedly brought from Afghanistan.

Nabi Amani said that at present the extremist-minded leaders of the "Alliance of the Seven" are trying to explain in some way their failure near Jalalabad. They put forward as the reasons for it the insufficient coodination in the course of combat operations, the hasty preparations for the operation and even mistakes of Pakistani advisers who planned the combat operation in a wrong way.

The purpose of the provocation is to revive the "Jihad against the giaours" [infidels] slogan which lost its topicality after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, to make field commanders again join the struggle against "Soviet aggressors". Several days ago the propaganda bodies of the "Seven" tried to spread rumours about the alleged presence of 900 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan and perhaps decided to substantiate it with some "material evidence". In their opinion, this will force the four parties of the "Alliance of the Seven" which stayed away from fighting so far to join the battle for Jalalabad.

Mujahidin Kill Women on Afghan-Pakistani Border
LD2903184189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Now listen to a report on the barbaric actions of the armed Afghan opposition in the vicinity of Jalalabad. Here is our Kabul correspondent Aleksandr Shkirando.

[Begin Shkirando recording] There have been huge material losses as a result of rocket artillery bombardment of Jalalabad and its surroundings. A series of villages have been completely wiped from the face of the earth. Many peaceful residents have been killed. However, the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, with the support of the local population, are putting up firm resistance to the rebels. According to information received in Kabul, they have lost more than 7000 killed and wounded in this period.

The activeness of the extremists has slowly begun to fall. Signs of demoralization have appeared. To raise their fighting spirit and to show strength, one of the groups of rebels carried out an attack on a column including peaceful residents going from Jalalabad to Kabul. They coldbloodedly shot straight at old men, women, and children. In several seconds they killed twenty people and wounded more than thirty. Jalalabad residents told me this sad story in the Kabul hospital.

The Afghan extremists committed another crime on Pakistani territory, but against their fellow countrymen, moreover, women. When the rumor about huge losses by the so-called fighters for the faith on the Jalalabad front spread in the refugee camps outside Peshawar, a group of women left for the Pakistani-Afghan border to fetch the bodies of those close to them. However, on the border, fighters from the national liberation front met them with gunfire. Eight women were shot at point-blank range. These facts once more bear witness to the fact that mujahidin such as these are, in fact, quite simply murderers and cutthroats, who forgot a long time ago about human morality and conscience. [end recording]

Western Countries Impede UN Aid to Afghanistan
LD2903171389 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 29 Mar 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Our correspondent in Kabul tells about the problems of and prospects for rendering economic and humanitarian aid from the UN to the Republic of Afghanistan.

[Begin recording] [Shkirando] It would be no exaggeration to say that these days Kabul International Airport is working intensively. To the domestic and international flights, which, incidentally, still continued even in the conditions of an exacerbation of the military situation, were added a large number of flights via the recently resumed air bridge linking our country's border areas with the Afghan capital.

Il-76 Aeroflot transport aircraft are landing literally every 2-3 minutes, bringing vital commodities and produce to the Afghan population, including those provided by the UN's economic and humanitarian aid program to Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, up to now, other countries, especially Western countries, referring to the dangers, are not only hindering the arrival of the UN aid to Kabul, but are also intimidating those airlines that are expressing a readiness to deliver foodstuffs, commodities, and medicines,

which are very vital to the Afghans. As a result, the aid not getting through to Afghanistan is piling up in neighboring countries. For example, more than 300,000 tonnes have already accumulated in Pakistan alone.

However, it would appear that this reference to danger is just a pretext for refusing to send aircraft to Kabul, the capital where, notwithstanding all the West's expectations, the legitimate Afghan Government remains in power.

The hope is being expressed in Afghanistan that eventually the UN aid program will begin to be implemented in full. Possibilities exist for delivering this aid by air. The arrival of aircraft via the International Red Cross may serve as an example of this.

[Lange, International Red Cross crew commander, in English fading into Russian translation] We arrived in Kabul from Peshawar. Our international crew, which comprises representatives from Norway, Sweden, and Canada, delivered 3,500 tonnes of medicines and medical equipment for an Afghan hospital. Considering the importance of such aid, I hope that henceforth our flights to Kabul will be regular.

[Skhirando] In your opinion, have there been any serious dangers in such flights to Kabul?

[Lange] Well, you know, if I am honest, the most dangerous part of our trip here was in the car on the road from the hotel to the airport in Peshawar. [video shows Aeroflot and other planes landing at Kabul airport; goods being unloaded from planes; interview with Lange] [end recording]

* Official Urges Negotiations for POW's

WA18010532 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 12, 22 Mar 89 p 9

[Interview with V.V. Mariy, secretary of the Coordination Committee of the Soviet Society for the Liberation of Soviet Servicemen Captured in Afghanistan, by Aleksandr Istomin: "For Them the War Has Not Ended"; date and place not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] **The last Soviet military serviceman left Afghan territory a month ago. Our correspondent was told about the activity under the new conditions by V.V. Mariy, secretary of the Coordination Committee of the Soviet Society for the Liberation of Soviet Servicemen Captured in Afghanistan.**

[Mariy] I wish to emphasize that it is especially pleasant to give an interview on this subject to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA since it was one of the initiators of the committee's creation and continues to be an active and consistent participant in this social movement.

In all the negotiations being conducted along the line of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the matter of captives must be raised. I think that there is now an urgent need to conduct a separate round of negotiations on captives at the highest level, negotiations like the Geneva negotiations. These should be special discussions concerning a single issue—the release of Soviet military servicemen. The position of Pakistan and the United States is incomprehensible. The solution to this problem depends largely on the leadership of these countries. One can say that they do not consider it so important in the complex of all the problems related to Afghanistan. But it is very painful for the Soviet people to put up with such a situation. It is necessary to stand back from global interests and look at the situation from the standpoint of the simple person.

[Istomin] How are your relations developing with the International Committee and other social organizations?

[Mariy] The exhibition of Mikhail Shemyakin, the chairman of the International Committee (New York), should open at the end of March in Moscow. We shall exchange information with him and I think that he will tell us about his activity in detail. Additionally, we are awaiting the arrival of representatives from Amnesty International. I must say that in practically all cases our appeals for help have met with support from international organizations.

[Istomin] Do we have military prisoners taken during combat or are all of them under the control of the Afghan Army? Could this not be an obstacle to negotiations?

[Mariy] As far as I know, we have no military prisoners. Here one can speak only about captives taken by the Afghan Army. We are counting on the understanding of the Republic of Afghanistan on this issue, and we do not think that this will be the main obstacle to sending our boys back home.

[Istomin] Do all the international organizations with which you are cooperating have lists of missing Soviet servicemen?

[Mariy] Only the International Red Cross committee has such a list.

[Istomin] Have you managed to arrange contacts with our compatriots who did not come home out of captivity but ended up in the United States and Canada?

[Mariy] No. We are raising the issue of having the U.S. State Department and the Canadian Government give representatives of Soviet institutions diplomatic access to these people. We want to know at least that they are alive and well. No one intends to tie them up and take them across the border in trunks of cars. And, ultimately,

I am not sure that these people are aware of the USSR procurator general's statement that says that no criminal or other prosecution will apply to them upon their return.

In turn, I suggest on behalf of the committee that we show goodwill and make it possible for any of them to return home. Here they will be given the opportunity to evaluate the situation independently, communicate with their peers who have returned from Afghanistan, with former captives and with close friends, and then go back. The Coordination Committee would guarantee the safety of this act. I think that then they would have real freedom of choice.

PLO's Mahmud 'Abbas Received by Shevardnadze

LD2903141189 Moscow TASS in English 1400 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—Eduard Shevardnadze, a CPSU CC Politburo member and Soviet foreign minister, received today Mahmud 'Abbas, a member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation who attended a meeting of the Soviet-Palestinian Committee on the Middle East, held in Moscow yesterday.

During the conversation, which passed in a warm and friendly atmosphere, they discussed in detail the situation in the Middle East from the angle of the need to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The sides stressed that such a settlement ought to provide for the establishment of a just and lasting peace on the basis of safeguarding the rights of all states and peoples of the region to equal security, independent existence, and development. This applies to both the Arabs, including the Palestinians, and Israel.

Eduard Shevardnadze reiterated the Soviet support for the PLO's constructive and realistic position which is in line with the principles of the new political thinking and the positive trends gathering momentum in international relations. He pointed out that the peaceful Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories raises imperatively the urgent need for practical steps to put in place the process of a Middle East settlement and for solving within its framework the pivotal problem, that of Palestine.

The Palestinian representative praised the active Soviet policy vis-a-vis the affairs of the Middle East, and stressed the significance of the USSR's role in deblocking the conflict between the Arabs and Israel. He said that the recent visit of the Soviet foreign minister to the Middle East gave a substantial impetus to the collective quest for peace in the region, and that the constructive ideas and proposals, put forward during that visit, met with a positive response in Arab countries and in the world community at large.

It was pointed out that favourable conditions had now matured for making headway toward a genuine Middle East settlement, based on a balance of interests, and the need was stressed for an early convening of an international conference on the Middle East with the participation of all the directly concerned parties, including the PLO and the permanent members of the UN Security Council. The chief emphasis now ought to be placed on intensifying the efforts to prepare the conference, using for the purpose all the channels and means, including the the UN Security Council framework.

Special attention was given to the factor of inter-Arab coordination in the matters of a settlement. Eduard Shevardnadze pointed to the importance of restoring the Syrian-Palestinian interaction as a key element in working out a common Arab position.

Both sides expressed a profound concern over the deterioration of the situation in Lebanon, which seriously destabilises the regional situation. They stressed the need to attain a national consensus and to preserve the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. Within this context, the interlocutors expressed their support for the peacemaking mission of the "Committee of Six" of the League of Arab States [LAS] on Lebanon and for its activity in favour of an intra-Lebanese settlement. The sides welcomed the LAS appeal to the opposing Lebanese factions to effect a ceasefire and to start a peaceful dialogue.

During the conversation the sides reaffirmed respectively the USSR's and the PLO's intention to deepen their cooperation and interaction with a view to resolving the conflict situation in the Middle East and securing a just settlement of the Palestinian problem, which includes safeguarding the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

Talks Focus on Mideast Conference

LD2903153189 Moscow TASS in English 1516 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—The convocation of an international conference on the Middle East requires much preparatory work to be done, and that was the topic of our meetings in Moscow, including with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, which were held within the framework of the work of the Soviet-Palestinian Coordination Committee, said Mahmud 'Abbas, member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization. He spoke at a news conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry's press centre on Wednesday.

The situation on the Israeli occupied Arab lands was considered in the course of the Moscow consultations. The Palestinian uprising, intifadah, has been continuing

for 16 months now, said the PLO Executive Committee member. It has become the Palestinian people's way of life, and it will continue until the end of the Israeli occupation.

In the West Bank of the River Jordan and the Gaza Strip the Palestinians are subjected to the most sophisticated repressions: killing of civilians, arrests, destruction of dwellings, blockade of whole residential districts have become a common practice.

Instead of trying to stifle intifadah, Israel should think of ways of bringing peace to the Middle East, 'Abbas said. "Unfortunately, the Israeli leadership has not yet comprehended the idea of establishing peace in the Middle East, but it is already in the minds of the broad strata of the Israeli public", he said.

"We are conducting dialogue with all parties, interested in peace in the Middle East and we are striving to create an atmosphere of confidence. It is exactly with this view that we are maintaining contacts with a number of Israeli leaders and are conversing with representatives of European states, and also the United States", said the PLO representative. He stressed that contacts with American diplomats were so far of a fact-finding character.

The PLO has done its utmost for its stand to be fully in accordance with international law, 'Abbas said. "We should like to see Israel raising to the level of recognising that. Then security and the right to exist would be ensured to all parties to the conflict in the Middle East", he said.

In conclusion 'Abbas expressed satisfaction with the existing cooperation between the PLO and the Soviet Union.

Mubarak, Husayn, 'Arafat Discuss Peace Process

PM2903141789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Mar 89 First Edition p 5

[TASS dispatch: "A Conference Is Necessary"]

[Text] Cairo, 26 Mar—A meeting between President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, King Husayn of Jordan, and Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, was held in the Egyptian city of Ismailia Saturday.

After the meeting a press conference was held. President H. Mubarak noted that positive changes with regard to a possible settlement of the Near East problem have taken place in the international arena. He expressed the hope that Israel will respond to these positive elements. The Egyptian president described efforts for convening an international conference on the Near East as the main task of his talks with the leaders of other states. The agenda of such a conference must, he said, be geared to achieving a final solution of this problem.

Jordan supports the PLO with all its potential, King Husayn said in turn. "We will continue cooperation with the PLO until the Palestinian people's rights are fully realized," he said.

Touching on the possibility of direct contacts between the PLO and Israel, Y. 'Arafat pointed out that he "welcomes any talks capable of leading to a just and comprehensive solution of the Palestinian issue and the Near East problem as a whole. Such talks must take place within the framework of a UN-sponsored peace conference with the participation of all permanent members of the Security Council and all parties involved in the conflict in the region, including the PLO."

PLO Nominates 'Arafat President of Palestine

LD3003032389 Moscow TASS in English 2221 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Tunis March 30 TASS—The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Executive Committee nominated Yasir 'Arafat as president of the state of Palestine, a PLO spokesman said Wednesday.

Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman said the nomination will be put to vote at a meeting of the PLO Central Council on March 31 in Tunis.

The state of Palestine was proclaimed by the Palestine National Council at its 19th emergency meeting in Algiers last November.

Yazov Returns to Damascus, Hosts Talas

LD2903214589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Army General and Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov ended his tour of Syria and returned to Damascus on Wednesday.

The Soviet defense minister, who is on an official visit to Syria, visited one of the Syrian military units where he inspected its combat hardware and talked to its personnel.

In the evening Comrade Yazov held a dinner in honor of Lieutenant General Talas, Syrian minister of defense, at which speeches were exchanged.

Bessmertnykh Receives Iranian Ambassador

LD2903122289 Moscow TASS in English 1129 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, received on Wednesday Naser Heirani-Nobari, ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the USSR, at the latter's request.

They discussed bilateral Soviet-Iranian relations as well as international and regional issues.

Iran's Ayatollah Montazeri Resigns

LD2803205589 Moscow TASS in English 2051 GMT 28 Mar 89

[Text] Nicosia March 29 TASS—Ayatollah 'Ali Montazeri, who was elected in 1985 a successor to Ayatollah Khomeyni, leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has turned in his resignation.

Khomeyni on Tuesday accepted his resignation, IRNA news agency reports.

Indian Ocean Demilitarization Proposed to U.S.

LD3003035389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1902 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Sochi (Black Sea Coast), 29 Mar (TASS)—TASS special correspondent Sergey Karmalito reports:

The Soviet Union considers it its task to promote stabilization of the military-political situation in the Indian Ocean and subsequent reductions in the naval presence, or better still, a complete withdrawal of the navies of noncoastal states from that region, said Admiral Nikolay Amelko (Ret) in talking to a TASS correspondent. The well-known Soviet military expert is taking part in an international seminar in Sochi on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

Nikolay Amelko recalled that the USSR has proposed a number of specific proposals for turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of friendship and cooperation in the interests of all countries. The USSR is ready at any time to begin talks with the United States and other noncoastal states with permanent naval forces in the Indian Ocean concerning significant reductions of naval strength and operations. The countries using the waters of the Indian Ocean could hold talks and conclude agreements on confidence-building measures in the military field and work out guarantees of security of maritime lines of communication, including in the Persian Gulf and in the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca.

The objectives and tasks of the presence of the U.S. and USSR navies in the region are "absolutely different and opposite," emphasized the admiral. In the area of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf there are permanently up to two U.S. carrier strike groups. They contain one or two strike carriers with up to 180 aircraft, up to 80 of which are nuclear-capable. Every carrier has 100 nuclear weapons. There are 30 U.S. military bases in the Indian Ocean zone.

The group of Soviet Navy ships in the Indian ocean, the military expert noted, consists of four to six warships, one to two submarines, and several supply ships. The Soviet Union has no bases in the Indian Ocean. "The tasks of the Soviet naval group in the Indian Ocean are exclusively defensive," emphasized Amelko. "It has no forces or types of weapons for operations against land territories. The group carries out its task through patrolling and approaching carriers and submarines capable of delivering a strike against USSR territory."

A solution to the problems of the Indian Ocean, emphasized Nikolay Amelko, can only be achieved in a peaceful way, at the negotiating table.

USSR-Morocco Political Consultations in Rabat

LD2803095789 Moscow TASS in English 0848 GMT 28 Mar 89

[Text] Rabat March 28 TASS—Soviet-Moroccan political consultations have been held in Rabat. The parties to the consultations were Deputy Head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Middle East and North Africa Department M. Tsvigun, Soviet Ambassador in Morocco M. Fazylov, head of the Moroccan Foreign Ministry's General Directorate for Political Affairs M. Skaliy, and other officials. The situation in the Arab Maghreb region and the Middle East, the situation around Afghanistan and Soviet-Moroccan relations were considered.

The USSR Foreign Ministry's representative dwelt on the results of the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's recent Middle and Near Eastern tour.

The Moroccan side expressed support for the Soviet initiatives aimed at attaining fair peace in the Middle East and welcomed the Soviet Union's active participation in Middle Eastern affairs and in settlement of other regional conflicts.

The two sides favoured continuation of regular political consultations and development of Soviet-Moroccan cooperation in different areas.

PRAVDA Deputy Editor Begins Trip to Morocco

PM3003095389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Departure From Moscow"]

[Text] A CPSU delegation headed by L.N. Spiridonov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and first deputy chief editor of PRAVDA, left for Morocco 28 March at the invitation of the leadership of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces to participate in that party's fifth congress.

CPSU Greets Moroccan Socialist Party Congress

PM3003121189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Mar 89 Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee undated greetings message to the Fifth Congress of the Moroccan Socialist Union of Popular Forces]

[Text] To the Fifth Congress of the Moroccan Socialist Union of Popular Forces [USFP]

The CPSU Central Committee greets the delegates to the Fifth USFP Congress.

We note with satisfaction the friendly character of the ties between our parties and the proximity of our approaches to such key problems of importance to all mankind as how to prevent nuclear and environmental catastrophe, solve regional conflicts, overcome underdevelopment, and eliminate racism and apartheid. People in the Soviet Union value the USFP's positive contribution to the development of Soviet-Moroccan relations.

We wish the congress fruitful work for the sake of peace, progress, and prosperity for the friendly people of Morocco.

[Signed] The CPSU Central Committee

East Europe

Hungary's Grosz Highly Assesses USSR Visit

LD2903161689 Moscow TASS in English 1550 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Budapest March 29 TASS—Karoly Grosz, general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, has highly assessed the results of his working visit to Moscow and the negotiations with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Speaking at a plenary meeting of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Central Committee on Wednesday, he stressed that the meeting had been useful and efficient. It even more strengthened the confidence and mutual understanding between the two parties. As was noted at the negotiations, the Soviet Union is interested to see to it that Hungary should resolve its problems through better using the possibilities of socialism, through preserving stability and dynamic continuation of reforms.

The meeting showed that the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and the CPSU hold common view on the key international issues, they agree on the need for modernising the Warsaw Treaty system and enhancing its internal democratism.

The negotiations promoted consolidation of relations between the two parties and opened up new possibilities for development of cooperation also in other areas, said the Hungarian party leader.

Notes Agreement in Talks

LD3003101289 Moscow TASS in English 0949 GMT 30 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 30 TASS—Hungarian leader Karoly Grosz highly assessed the results of talks with Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during his working visit late last week.

The general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) gave an interview to the weekly magazine NEW TIMES before his departure for home.

Karoly Grosz said that the meeting with the Soviet leader was marked by "an atmosphere of sincerity, understanding and comradeship". There were no issues in the three-hour conversation, "on which our views did not coincide or our interests differed".

Karoly Grosz said that, like the perestroyka reform programme in the Soviet Union, the renewal processes in Hungary put forward new problems. "Tasks emerge which we encounter for the first time. In this context, meetings, like the current one, live contacts and an exchange of experience at all levels are especially expedient."

"On the whole," the Hungarian leader said, "we have positively assessed the state of our cooperation. I would like to take note of the high level of ties between Hungary and the USSR in the political sphere." As for bilateral economic relations, Karoly Grosz said, "there are large untapped reserves here."

Replying to a question by the NEW TIMES correspondent, the HSWP head expressed the conviction that "the one-party or multiparty system is not the most important thing for democracy." "There should be no illusions on this score", he said. "Democracy can be found wanting in countries with the multiparty system as well." "I briefed Soviet leaders on our attitude to the multiparty system in Hungary. They regarded it with understanding and in a business-like manner. At the same time it was noted that the same political aims could be pursued in the USSR within the framework of the one-party system."

On the events in Hungary in 1956, Karoly Grosz said that that subject was touched upon during his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. He noted that "our views coincided in the assessment of the situation, its most important moments." An agreement was reached to continue a joint search for the causes underlining developments at the time. "Only genuine documents, rather than subjective views, can serve as a basis for profound analysis."

CSSR Demands FRG Extradite Hijackers

LD2903173689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1628 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Prague, 29 March (TASS)—In connection with the hijacking of the "Malev" airline's aircraft from Prague to Frankfurt-am-Main, Pavel Sadovsky, CSSR first deputy foreign minister, today summoned the FRG's ambassador in the CSSR to the Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As the CTK news agency reported, the question was examined of mutual assistance of the sides in connection with the situation that has arisen.

The Czechoslovak representative demanded that the terrorists be handed over. As has become known here, the terrorists first attempted to force the crew to set course for the United States. Barcelona was then chosen as the point of destination. In the end, the "Malev" airline's aircraft landed at the Frankfurt-am-Main airport.

Johanes Addresses CSSR Federal Assembly

PM2803095989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent L. Kornilov: "CSSR Federal Assembly Session"]

[Text] Prague—Foreign Minister J. Johanes spoke at a CSSR Federal Assembly session about the creation of a zone of confidence, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO states. The minister stressed that the implementation of this proposal, put forward by M. Jakes, general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee, would be a specific contribution to the building of a "common European home."

The minister announced that there had been great interest in proposals relating to this zone, such as the pooling of efforts in the fight against terrorism, the creation of duty-free economic zones, the joint construction of turnpikes, the linking-up of power systems, and cooperation in nature conservation.

Matters of relations between the CSSR and the Soviet Union featured prominently at the session. "We sense a mutual need," J. Johanes said, in particular, "to know more about one another's lives, without unnecessary ceremony and formalities and without rushing at it."

There was particular interest in the speech by CSSR National Defense Minister M. Vaclavik. He told deputies that a document entitled "CSSR Military Doctrine" had been prepared and would be published after it had been passed by the country's Defense Council. Talking about the reorganization of the Army, M. Vaclavik noted that it would affect around 30,000 servicemen and civilians. Many of them will have to learn new skills. Construction subunits will be stationed in 17 garrisons and railroad units in 2 garrisons.

Poland's Mlynczak Views Constitutional Reform

PM2803103189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Mar 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Polish Sejm in Session"]

[Text] Warsaw, 22 Mar—A package of draft laws of importance for Poland's future political development have been submitted for examination at a 2-day session of Poland's Sejm, which opened here today. W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] Central Committee and chairman of the Polish State Council, is taking part in its work.

Putting forward the draft law on changes to the Polish Constitution, T.W. Mlynczak, deputy chairman of the Polish State Council, stressed that its provisions will help the process of democratization in Poland and the cause of national accord.

The speaker described the creation of a second parliamentary chamber—a senate—while preserving the Sejm's role as the supreme organ of state power, as one of the main constitutional changes. The Senate's main task will be to take part in the legislative process.

The institution of president of the country is to play the role of authoritative arbiter in the event of political conflicts and be a factor to ensure the stability of the foundations of the state system, guarantee democratic reforms, and defend civic rights and liberties. The president is vested with broad powers, including the right to dissolve the Sejm and the Senate in the event of a government crisis or disputes between the government and the parliament and the right to restore to the Sejm its right to add finishing touches and subject laws to repeated examination. As head of state the president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chairman of the country's defense committee. The president is elected at a joint session of the Sejm and the Senate for a term of 6 years with the opportunity to renew his mandate for a second term.

Draft laws on elections to the Sejm and the Senate, on associations, and changes to the law on trade unions, and on individual peasant farmers trade unions were also submitted for Sejm examination.

Draft Laws on New Polish Senate Discussed

PM2903092189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Mar 89 Second Edition p 4

[Dispatch by TASS correspondent V. Volkov and PRAVDA correspondent A. Starukhin: "Restructuring Structures"]

[Text] Warsaw, 25 Mar—In the past few days, Poles' focus of attention has shifted from the old house of the Council of Ministers on Warsaw's Krakowskie Street where the "roundtable" talks have been continuing for nearly 2 months to the domed building of the Polish Sejm on Wiejska Street.

A package of draft laws designed to change the very structure of state power and political and social life in Poland in the direction of expanding political and trade union pluralism has been submitted for examination by the Sejm deputies. If they are approved, these legislative acts will also form the basis for the creation of a broad coalition of the country's influential forces, including those standing on a position of constructive opposition, for the joint solution of Poland's most serious economic problems, the halting of crisis tendencies, and the easing of social tension.

The main draft law concerns the alteration of Poland's Constitution. As has already been reported, the country's fundamental law will include new articles connected with the creation of a second chamber of parliament—the Senate—and the post of president of the country.

The Senate, with 110 seats, will include 2 representatives of each of Poland's 49 voivodships (the largest, Warsaw and Katowice voivodships, will be represented by 3 senators and a further 10 senators are to be elected on a national ticket). It is important to note that nominations for the Senate will only be made by groups of citizens—at least 5,000 signatures must be collected for registration. The elections will be held throughout the country without any restrictions at the same time as the Sejm election.

What is within the Senate's competence? This question is still being actively debated in the commission, but one thing is already clear: The main task of the parliament's second chamber will be active participation in the legislative process.

The country's president, who will replace the State Council, the Sejm sessions noted, will not play merely a presiding role. He is invested with broad powers: the right to dissolve the Sejm and Senate in the event of a government crisis or a dispute between the government and the parliament; the right to return laws to the Sejm for further work and reexamination; the right to publish decrees and rulings; the right to convene sessions of the Council of Ministers to discuss important matters and to preside over these sessions. As head of state he is commander of the Armed Forces and chairman of the country's defense committee. The president is elected at a joint session of the Sejm and Senate for a term of 6 years with the possible of a single extension of his mandate.

The Sejm's discussion of the package of draft laws was of a lively and constructive nature. They received support in principle from the representatives of the deputies' party clubs of independent deputies who spoke. Specific comments and proposals were voiced which will be examined by the commissions which have been created.

Moscow's Zaykov Receives Yugoslav Industrialist

PM3003092189 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Mar 89 p 1

[MOSTASS report: "Cooperation Is Getting Stronger"]

[Text] L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and first secretary of the Moscow CPSU City Committee, received V. Brankovic, general director of Yugoslavia's "Galenika" chemical-pharmaceutical factory, on 21 March. During a businesslike and comradely conversation they discussed questions of the further development of mutually advantageous economic cooperation between the USSR and the SFRY, including the expansion of direct ties between Moscow and Belgrade enterprises.

West Europe

Thatcher Interviewed Prior to Gorbachev Visit

PM2903154589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher by I. Laptev: "Margaret Thatcher: We Are Moving Toward a New Era. IZVESTIYA Interviews British Prime Minister" ;date and place not given]

[Text] [Laptev] Esteemed Mrs Prime Minister, first of all thank you for kindly agreeing to this interview. My first question is: How would you describe the changes in the modern world over the past 3 or 4 years? What do you see as the main factors behind and reasons for these changes?

[Thatcher] I think there have been three changes worth noting. The first, of course, is the fact that there has been a very noticeable growth in the Western world's prosperity and living standards.

This has been achieved through the enterprise, talent, and abilities of the peoples, and in a political atmosphere conducive to this enterprise. At the same time we have all been striving to ensure that our economy is fundamentally healthy, and we have achieved this. This means that we were exact about the way we handle our finances and did not promise more than we could deliver. If you spend more than you earn or if inflation starts, it means that you will have problems. Consequently, it is far more preferable to handle finances firmly and sensibly than to try to achieve enormous production growth by leaps and bounds, which often leads to retrenchment later on. This rise in prosperity and living standards has allowed us not only to earn more, but has also created sufficient wealth to improve social welfare standards.

In principle this is the same plan which I know you are trying to introduce in the Soviet Union. After all, it is clear that governments do not know how to run businesses—that is why we do not participate in the affairs of businesses themselves. But entrepreneurs and businessmen, who over the years have grown accustomed to doing these jobs, spotting changes, and producing new goods, know what people need. Those are the people we are leaving to run industry.

In my opinion, the second important great change has been the immense improvement in East-West relations. I think this has been achieved first and foremost thanks to the breadth of views held by Mr Gorbachev and the people alongside him. Not just views on what you want for your country, but ideas about how to bring it about, ideas which, it seems to us, are absolutely correct and

take in the efforts of your people themselves, their responsibility, their choice, and the mobilization of their talents. This is absolutely in line with what we believe; and it is this, along with the fact that similar people—Mr Gorbachev, President Reagan, and, perhaps, myself also—came to power at an opportune time, that has made East-West relations much closer.

It is important that this has not just happened in the defense sphere. It is a question of far more than mutual respect by both sides for their right to security, or attempts to reach agreement on arms reduction to provide for defense and security at a lower level of arms. The changes go significantly deeper: Trade has grown, cultural exchanges and exchanges between people have expanded, and more people have started traveling to and from the Soviet Union. That is, the changes have been comprehensive. They have been accompanied in your country by greater freedom of speech, freedom to worship, and freedom to start a business and run it independently. It is simply astonishing to watch all this.

The third important change is that the number of issues which transcend state borders—such as the environment, for instance—has increased. Environmental issues know no frontiers. We must all be concerned about the earth's fundamental systems and its entire atmosphere. As you know, the greenhouse effect and the state of the ozone layer are being widely discussed today. If somebody damages the ozone layer it will affect each one of us. If we all do not participate, we will be unable to keep everything unharmed and operating in such a way as to support life. That is one problem. Then there is the pollution of the seas and major rivers, acid rain, and, unfortunately, much else besides. All these are things that affect everyone. Furthermore, we must give common thought to problems of human nature itself: Why do certain people become drug addicts or drink too much? These are also problems which know no frontier. I fear that terrorism too knows no frontiers and, if you think about it, this too is a kind of "human pollution" of the environment in which we live. We must join forces to fight it.

[Laptev] People in the Soviet Union have, of course, paid attention to your response to M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the United Nations. The way we understood it, the "prototype" of the future as depicted by him proved close to your ideas about the future. What similarities and differences do you perceive in our two countries' philosophical approaches toward the shaping of this future, and what role do you assign in this context to the new political thinking?

[Thatcher] Let me put it this way: I see very clearly from Mr Gorbachev's speeches that his intentions are the same as mine—it is necessary to rely more on people and involve them in the political process, it must be remembered that freedom entails responsibility, and so on.

But here is what I want to say: It is easier to create new towns, buildings of brick and mortar, new colleges, new homes, new roads—than to change human mentality and people's awareness. People get used to behaving in a certain manner and will always resist change. Nonetheless, without change it is impossible to share in the great achievements which the rest of the world can offer you. This is a very complex process, and at times I feel that you in the Soviet Union are trying to achieve in, say, 5-10 years things which took us more than a century.

Here (in Britain—Editorial Office note) the great Reform Act of 1832 marked the beginning of a process whereby more and more new groups of people were given the right to vote. But this did not happen suddenly. It started with people who held the leadership of the country in their hands. The next stratum then declared: "No, we also want to participate!" Then the next stratum below declared: "No, we also want to participate!" And so on. It was really quite a long time until everyone had the right to vote. We approached this gradually, while steadily giving more responsibility to industrialists, giving more responsibility to leaders, and explaining more and more the meaning of such responsibility.

The basic freedom of which I have heard Mr Gorbachev speak is freedom of choice. You choose what job you will do. You work long and hard, earning as much as you can, and then choose what to buy with your money while someone else produces the necessary goods. Our problem is not how to fill the stores; we can fill them time and again. People must choose what they buy, and if they decide not to buy something, that item simply remains on the shelf. Its producer finds himself in difficulty—he has failed to understand what is required and has produced something completely different. He will suffer for this; he will incur a loss. In this way choice, responsibility, and freedom mean that you must perform your duties. Freedom entails responsibility.

I also think—and this is my second point—that our views have drawn closer in the defense policy sphere. Every state must protect itself and has the right to live in security. What I see as having changed in the Soviet Union is the fact that you have switched to an approach that is closer to ours—defense sufficiency offers protection against attack. Weapons not for attack but for sufficient defense. In other words, only weapons that are sufficient to protect oneself from any attack, known or unknown: That is what must be provided for.

It seems to me that we are also drawing closer in our approach toward some long-existing international problems, for example Angola and Namibia. The Cubans are now planning to leave Angola. The people in Namibia will be given an opportunity to elect their own government. We have done joint work on some problems of relations between Iran and Iraq, even though, as you know, we recently diverged on one or two questions regarding Iran.

In my opinion, we have managed to begin the process of increasing trust between us. Of course, it will take quite a long time to establish trust; it has to be worked at. It seems to me that both our people and the Americans have a natural inclination toward amicability. For we are all representatives of the human race. This was manifested, in particular, in the way our people responded very quickly to the consequences of the earthquake in Armenia, because we all realized that, if such a natural disaster occurs, help is needed. Then all the barriers come down, and you go and give this help.

But I emphasize what I began with: In politics it is hardest of all to change people's character and views. You have to be very patient. You have to explain your view of the future to people all the time and persuade them to share that view. You know, our religion says that the people perish when such a vision is lacking. So people must understand and see the future, and we must not seek to get there with giant leaps—that's not the way life works. Progress comes day by day, week by week, month by month, not as the result of miracles but thanks to constant, persistent, selfless efforts. It seems to me that to achieve this you need certain workers who are capable of exercising leadership at each individual level. I say all the time: No general can win a battle if he does not have colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, sergeants, and corporals—each has his role in leadership, and all of society is built likewise. The people must have their leaders at every level—leaders who can inspire people to go further. And even if things become increasingly difficult, all the same you must continue moving toward the set goal.

[Laptev] My next question, Mrs Prime Minister, is of a different kind. You know, of course, that some time ago the fate predicted for Europe was that of an "aging" political center. But today's realities show that politically Europe remains a strong and, moreover, a growing force. How do you see the future of Europe? How strong, from your viewpoint, are the integration processes in Europe, which could open up ways to build a common European home?

[Thatcher] Of course, the concept of "Europe" is far older than the EEC. When we speak of the European ideal, it is far more than the EC and goes historically far deeper. If we look at this wider Europe, in which the capitals of certain Warsaw Pact countries are just as much a part of Europe as certain Western ones, if we look at this historically, we will see that Europe obviously was the first place where the great religions of Judaism and Christianity really took hold. It was from here that the idea came—the secular idea—that every individual, every person means something. This is where human rights come from, in actual fact! Every individual has significance. It is not the system that is important but each individual. In Europe this idea really was the chief basis that led to the development of democracy and served the development of great cultures, of that fantastic art that we all know and that is constantly developing and changing. Goodness gracious, it was your Russian industrialists in tsarist times who understood modern art; they saw Matisse and realized that something remarkable was happening.... The great artistic revival in Europe and the great patrons of artists, who saw their fantastic talents, potentials, and abilities, they left us a magnificent legacy—great architecture, the handicrafts which developed at that time, and goodness knows what else. You know all this, because the Hermitage is one of the world's treasure houses, and some of your famous buildings embody the architecture of that time.

I often talk about it. Whatever country I go to—if it is to India, then I offer threefold greetings to the Moguls—they built wonderful things. If it is to the Soviet Union—then I extend threefold greetings to the tsars—they left fantastic monuments, a wonderful heritage, they were the patrons of great art and—you remember Faberge—of great objets d'art. They were created by bold people with imagination and self-confidence. We who are alive today have received this heritage, and we try to ensure that what used to be a privilege and a luxury for a few becomes a daily necessity, accessible everyday to many people. That is the second point.

The third thing I would say about the European ideal, which includes us all, is what is served by science. Scientific methods were first applied in Europe: There is a hypothesis about some phenomenon or other, it is checked with the aid of observations, and then scientific laws are deduced from the results of the experiment; if they do not coincide with the hypothesis, one has to change one's ideas. This entire method was developed in Europe, in the physical and medical sciences, and—here is what I would very much like to emphasize—only in Europe was science was turned to benefit people. In other parts of the world discoveries were also made, in China for instance, but people there did not seek to apply knowledge. That is why the great industrial revolution was first accomplished in the West and not in the East or in India.

We thus have an amazing heritage—in philosophical and political culture, in art, and in science—a heritage which has gradually extended to all people, and it gives people greater possibility of choice—choice of the government under which they live and the choice of their own path. Possessing all this, we must indeed be capable of choosing the road of friendship and cooperation. We must not build the walls of a fortress around Europe but make Europe an example of cooperation for the rest of the world! Because, as I have already said, a large proportion of problems in relations between countries which we are discussing today affect all peoples.

It is in this spirit that we will develop the EEC. Of course, we will have a basic, deep-lying, and committed friendship with the United States which, as I often say, in a certain respect represents a European people on the

other side of the Atlantic. They are just as much a European people; it is simply that they have sailed across the ocean, gone from here to there. That is why our ties are indestructible.

Next, all of us must think about other parts of the world. Thus, truly gigantic problems exist in Africa. Erosion of the land is taking place there, forests are being cut down, resources are not being cared for, famine and drought arise. Yet in Africa people look at some Western countries and believe they should have just what we have. That will take a lot of time, but we are trying to help them. It is not enough to up and provide them with goods and food; in that case they will simply remain dependent. They must have dignity and independence in understanding how to do business and how to create an industry for themselves. We can offer them stable assistance in this.

[Laptev] I think we will not be exaggerating if we say that your meeting with M.S. Gorbachev at Chequers in 1984 was a kind of turning point in modern relations between our countries....

[Thatcher] We will never forget it, we—my husband and I—will never forget that meeting. We realized immediately that an exceptional man with a very strong character was before us. We had a talk of the kind that rarely takes place between politicians. It was very frank; each side wanted to understand the other, and this discussion was unusually constructive and warm, lively, and based on deep mutual respect....

[Laptev] Thank you for your warm words for our leader, Mrs Prime Minister, but I will end my question like this: Inasmuch as it was indeed a turning point in our relations, what impelled you personally to this turn? What forced you to promote changes in Anglo-Soviet relations? How do you assess their state today, and what is your opinion of their future?

[Thatcher] I am not entirely sure how you do things in the Soviet Union, but here, in this room, in this house, in Parliament, we constantly turn our thoughts to the future—to the future of our country, the future of Europe, the future of East-West relations, the development of ecological problems.

The East-West problem existed. In many ways it was based on questions of defense and arms control. We believed this could no longer be allowed to be the basis. We tried first of all to expand contacts in implementing the Helsinki process, the 1975 Helsinki accords.

We began to ascertain whether we could achieve broader contacts between East and West and whether we could establish better relations between us and really discuss our different systems. And I did two things. I made up my mind to visit those East European countries with which we had a longstanding relationship; after all, we entered the war because of Poland, when Hitler invaded that country. We also have a longstanding relationship with Hungary. So I traveled to Hungary, while my foreign secretary visited a number of other countries, as you find out more about people if you talk to them.

Then we realized that the time was coming when there would obviously be some changes in the Soviet leadership. We decided to try to get to know the people who we thought were bound to play an influential role in the future, working on the assumption that our ties would be pretty constant. These were positive, constructive efforts. We defined a new strategy in foreign policy and advanced this strategy. This was totally positive. We always said that our best friends were in America, but it is precisely because you have best friends that, while holding onto these old friends, you can broaden friendly relations with new ones. These were conscious efforts. I organized several roundtable conferences and seminars; we involved academics, and so forth.

Approximately twice a year I take a more detailed look at a specific problem. Perhaps it will have something to do with foreign policy, East-West relations, European affairs, aid for the "Third World," or environmental problems—in other words, a problem that concerns all of us. Or sometimes it will be an aspect of domestic policy: Perhaps the opportunities to gain an education, preparation for new technological changes, or the impact of new technologies on people's lives. We take one of these issues and try to predict its development in order to prepare ourselves for what we can foresee.

[Laptev] Perhaps I am already taking up too much of your time?

[Thatcher] Then I will briefly answer your questions, because there are a lot of them. Our trade relations are expanding. Mr Gorbachev and I have set a target which I believe we can attain—an increase (in trade—editor's note) to R2.5 billion. A British Week is going to be held in Moscow very soon, as well as a British-Soviet trade month in Moscow. Then, in 1990, there is going to be a British Week in Kiev, which we are very much looking forward to. Of course, a lot of visits by cultural figures to our country are also planned. Your students are visiting our country and ours are visiting yours. This has enormous significance, because it is often the case that a solution to the problems of the future lies in contacts between people.

[Laptev] Yes, a vast amount of work is being done, and we can already see its results. But I have another question to ask: All of us—and we journalists, in particular—have worked very hard to create an "enemy image," both here in the West and in the Soviet Union. This "enemy" was the chief hero of the "cold war." Now this hero is gradually disappearing from the stage. Can we also now say that the "cold war" itself is disappearing?

[Thatcher] I have already said that the "cold war" is undergoing a very serious thaw, but we must remember that the real cause of the "cold war" was the extremely rigid Stalinist system. It seemed to us that communism did not offer that individual freedom and that importance of the individual which have absolutely fundamental significance for us. There could not have been the progressive improvement in relations that we are now witnessing without path-clearing reforms [razblokiruyushchiye reformy] and breadth of vision and if Mr Gorbachev and your other leaders had not realized that your old system gave neither the prosperity you would like for your people nor freedom of choice. Everyone has certain talents and abilities, and when they are put to use, quite different possibilities and prospects arise and life becomes much better. But one has to work for this. Life does not become better from empty dreams, but as a result of energy, persistence, and commitment to one's goal.

The 1975 Helsinki accords opened up these possibilities, but they were not really applied until Mr Gorbachev arrived on the scene. Until that time, we felt that freedom of movement of people and ideas was not guaranteed as we would wish. It seemed to us that you wanted to hold onto people, while our problem is that so many people want to come to us we cannot take them all. All these possibilities opened up by the Helsinki accords were not realized until Mr Gorbachev made it so.

We are now moving along a road leading into a new era. That is really how it is. It is a new era. It is nothing less than a new era! It is really worth working to achieve the prospects that have opened up before us.

Thank you very much. I would like to say, through you, that the visit I made to Moscow 2 years ago really was one of the highlights of my life. I really felt the warmth and soul of the Russian people. I will never forget this, and I hope to visit your country again some day.

[Laptev] Allow me to say in reply that you are very popular in Moscow and the Soviet Union and are deeply respected.

[Thatcher] We very much look forward to seeing Mr Gorbachev, to welcoming him and renewing our talks and cooperation.

[Laptev] Thank you, Mrs Prime Minister. I wish you all the best.

Shevardnadze Expected To Visit Turkey

NC3003111389 Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 26 Mar 89 p 9

[Text] Ankara (ANKARA NEWS AGENCY)—USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Ankara, which has been on the agenda for more than 1 year, is expected to take place before July 1989.

According to an ANKARA NEWS AGENCY [ANKA] correspondent, Shevardnadze informed USSR Ambassador in Ankara Albert Chernyshev during a telephone conversation a short time ago that he "wishes to visit Turkey during the first 6 months of 1989." It has been determined that Shevardnadze's wish has been conveyed to Turkish Foreign Ministry officials.

Shevardnadze's visit is of significant importance from the view point of political relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. It has also been reported that Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov may visit Turkey by the end of the year if Shevardnadze visits Ankara during the first 6 months of 1989.

Meanwhile, an official has informed the ANKA correspondent that, contrary to what has been said so far, a visit to Turkey is not on Gorbachev's program.

Soviet, French Envoys Hold Talks in Berlin

LD2903145689 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1437 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Berlin (TASS-ADN)—Vyacheslav Kochemasov, USSR ambassador to the GDR, today received S. Boidevaix, French ambassador to the FRG, in the latter's capacity as head of the French military administration in Berlin (West).

The meeting proceeded in an open and businesslike atmosphere. During the talks, questions of mutual interest were discussed.

* Management Students Begin Classes in FRG

WA18070570 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 12, 22 Mar 89 p 9

[Valentin Zapevalov report: "Managers From Reinecke Castle"]

[Text] Bonn—In Reinecke Castle (in the FRG) a "university of economics" has opened and enrolled its first student group—16 future Soviet managers, leaders from machine-building plants in various cities in the USSR.

"This is the first group, there will be 12 of them, but all together 240 junior Soviet managers with an average age of 40 will be coming here," I was told by Hans-Juergen Allert, leader of the program and an associate at the Bonn Khatezaul Company, which specializes in manager training. This training center is also located in Reinecke, which it acquired several years ago.

The company has a good reputation. Its chief, Wolfram Khatezaul, was among a delegation of West German business circles who accompanied Chancellor H. Kohl on his visit to Moscow.

"The idea of such contacts arose in 1983 but only the policy of restructuring has made it a reality. And the decision to send leading specialists to us was made on a timely basis, in only 14 days," Herr Khatezaul told journalists.

This is not the first attempt to "learn" from the Germans, who are thorough and understand what is happening in the organization of production. Soviet specialists went to training centers in Baden-Wuerttemberg Land, and quite recently graduates from the higher trade school in Moscow spent time in Bonn at the Otto-Bieneke Foundation. Up to now, however, everything has been limited to a primitive scale: lectures by experienced West German teachers of economics and brief excursions to companies.

"We want to go further and have theory combined with practice directly," Herr Allert explained. "We plan for five training stages. At first the Soviet guests will spend 3 weeks in the FRG. The first 3 days of each week will be devoted to studying some specific theme concerned with the organization of production, work with personnel and marketing, and for the rest of the week the trainees will spend time in companies where what they have heard can be checked in practice. Then they will return to the USSR and work for 6 months under the supervision of our instructors, after which they will again return to us for another 14 days. During this next stage the necessary correction will be made in theoretical training. Then another 6 months again in the USSR. And finally, the last trip to Reinecke Castle to sum up results and receive their diplomas as managers. A total of 240 people will be trained in this manner."

"And with this diploma will they be able to apply for work in companies in the FRG?"

"Theoretically yes, but they would have to overcome one last barrier. First and foremost a language barrier, for on our course everything will be done through an interpreter. Moreover, our training is customized to take into account the conditions of the Soviet economy, but these are only the first steps in a specified plan."

Latin America & Caribbean

Cuba Prepares for 2-5 April Gorbachev Visit

Cuban Official Previews Visit

LD2903213589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1135 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Excerpts] [No dateline as received] Hector Argiles, director of the International Press Center in Havana, stated in a conversation with TASS correspondents that Cuba is giving a great deal of attention to the forthcoming visit of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Cubans have received with immense gratification the news of the visit of the Soviet leader, whose personality and foreign policy conceptions have attracted the attention of the whole world. The fraternal contacts between our countries have a 30-year history. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the selfless assistance of the Soviet Union to the Cuban revolution. The Cuban people are sure, stressed Argiles, that the forthcoming visit will provide a fresh impetus to the development of the indestructible ties of friendship, fraternity, and all-around cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of Cuba. [passage omitted]

The lull in Soviet-Cuban trade, which is an important component of bilateral relations, has been overcome and in 1988, bilateral trade amounted to R7.567 billion which represented an increase of R3 million compared to 1987, according to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. The protocol signed late last week envisages an even more marked growth—up to R9 billion.

The Soviet Union accounts for 70 percent of Cuba's entire foreign trade turnover. On its part, Cuba ranks sixth among the USSR's trade partners after the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. Due to various reasons, the Soviet Union has become Cuba's main supplier of a number of goods, primarily raw materials, fuel, machinery, and equipment. Thus, Soviet deliveries fully satisfy the Freedom Isle's requirements in oil and petrochemicals. Over 90 percent of fertilizers and cereals, 70 percent of rolled ferrous and nonferrous metals, trucks, and cars, and about 40 percent of buses come from the USSR. For 1986-1990, the growth of goods turnover is planned at 32 percent on the previous 5-Year Plan—up to R45 billion.

Changes are taking place not only in volumes of trade; the structure of exchange between the countries is also improving. Thus, machinery and equipment, sets of items, and chemical output occupy a great proportion of Soviet deliveries. It has been planned to extend the range of Cuban goods purchased by the USSR, by including coffee, certain kinds of tinned fruits, juices, etc.

It is important for the development of mutual trade that Soviet organizations buy Cuban raw sugar, nickel, and citrus fruit at preferential prices, thereby promoting the development of the national economy. An accord was attained during the coordination between the USSR and Cuba for this 5-Year Plan, to the effect that prices for Soviet goods supplied both within the framework of trade exchange and following economic and scientific and technical cooperation would remain steady for 5 years at the 1985 level. The same applies to the prices for Cuban raw sugar. Measures ensuring the renewal of the range and the improvement of the quality of deliveries were described in documents on bilateral trade and economic cooperation.

Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit on Cuba and his meetings with Fidel Castro will impart a new impetus for developing bilateral trade and economic relations. Documents opening further prospects for developing this cooperation are expected to be signed as a result of the talks.

'Resolute' Support of Cuba Noted

LD2903111989 Moscow TASS in English 1039 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—"Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Cuba is bound to reaffirm the Soviet Union's resolute backing of that country in face of any encroachments upon its people's right to advance along the road they have chosen, on its place in the world", it is believed by corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Viktor Volskiy, director of the Latin America Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In an interview he gave to TASS correspondent Stanislav Vargulevich the Soviet scientist noted that, in his opinion, attention would also be drawn during the visit to the problem of the external debt incurred by countries of that region. Moscow and Havana are known to advocate a political settlement of the issue.

"Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Cuba", Viktor Volskiy continued, "is at the same time his first visit to Latin America in general. It will touch not only on bilateral problems but also on questions of the Soviet Union's multilateral cooperation with the whole of Latin America".

"The recent visits to Moscow by the presidents of several Latin American countries including such major states as Argentina and Brazil, have shown that there is much ground for cooperation between the USSR and those countries, that relations between them could be much broader, much more constructive and mutually-advantageous, much more friendly", the Soviet scientist stressed.

News Conference on Visit

LD3003064389 Moscow TASS in English 0635 GMT 30 Mar 89

[Text] Havana March 30 TASS—An international press centre has opened in Havana to provide coverage of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit. Representatives of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, Cuban Foreign Ministry and the Soviet ambassador to Cuba, Yuriy Petrov, addressed the first news conference devoted to the event. They told newsmen about the programme of the visit that will take place from April 2-5.

The Cuban people are looking forward to the Soviet leader's visit, deputy foreign minister Miguel Brugueras told TASS. Gorbachev is a great friend who has repeatedly shown his sincere feelings towards Cuba. We are sure that Cubans are going to welcome Gorbachev most heartily, he said.

In the course of the visit the leaders of the two countries will discuss key issues of bilateral relations and international politics including questions of concern to the whole world, Brugueras said.

The international press centre occupies several large halls in Habana Libre, Havana's laergest hotel. There is great interest in the upcoming visit. It is expected that over six hundred newsmen will converge on Cuba to cover the event.

Soviet-Cuban Media Cooperation

LD3003081989 Moscow TASS in English 0658 GMT 30 Mar 89

[Text] Havana March 30 TASS—The Soviet and Cuban radio and television networks will pool efforts to cover Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Havana in the first such major joint project.

More will come under a working protocol on cooperation in 1989 and 1990, which has just been signed here.

The signatories were Genrikh Algirdas Yushkyavichyus, deptuy chairman of the Soviet Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] agency handling radio and television broadcasting, and Ismael Gonzalez Gonzalez, president of the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television.

The programme aims to help strengthen friendship and solidarity between the Soviet Union and Cuba, increase the effectiveness of their cooperation, and cover various aspects of life in both countries more widely.

Focus will be on covering efforts to fulfil the decisions of the latest Soviet and Cuban Communist Party congresses and publicising the more important actions of the parties and governments in the two countries.

The protocol provides for exchanging radio and TV shows, training personnel, and annually arranging two TV and four radio "space bridge" programmes.

Preliminary agreement has been reached that the Soviet Union will help Cuba cover the Panamerican Games in Havana in 1991.

Decline in Soviet-Cuban Trade Reversed

LD2903110989 Moscow TASS in English 1019 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—The USSR Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations has reported that the process of decline has been reversed in the Soviet-Cuban trade, an important component of the two countries' bilateral relations. In 1988 the general turnover reached 7,562 million rubles, that is three million rubles higher than in 1987. A protocol signed last week endorses a still higher rate of growth, up to nine billion rubles.

The Soviet Union accounts for seventy per cent of Cuba's foreign commodity circulation. Cuba, in turn, takes the sixth place among the Soviet foreign trade partners after the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. On the strength of a number of reasons the Soviet Union became Cuba's number one supplier of raw materials, fuel, machines, equipment and some other commodities. Thus all Cuban requirements for oil and oil products are met entirely by the Soviet Union. It also supplies over ninety per cent of fertilizers and grain, seventy per cent of the ferrous and non-ferrous rolled stock, cars and trucks, and about forty per cent of busses. The rate of growth for the years from 1986 to 1990 was defined to exceed the previous five-year period by 32 per cent, and to reach forty five billion rubles.

Changes are taking place not only in the volume of trade but also in the structure of the exchange between the two countries. Machines and parts, chemical products and equipment figure ever more prominently in the Soviet deliveries. The list of goods imported by the Soviet Union from Cuba is also to be expanded by 1992 to include coffee, new kinds of fruit and juice preserves etc.

Of great importance for the mutual trade is the fact that the Soviet Union buys Cuban raw sugar, nickel, citrus fruits, at preferential prices which stimulates the development of the national economy.

In the process of plan-coordination between the Soviet Union and Cuba for the current five years, an agreement has been reached that prices for Soviet goods supplied within the framework of both trade exchange and also economic and scientific-and-technological cooperation will be kept stable at their 1985 level during this period. The same will hold for the prices on Cuban unrefined sugar.

The documents on bilateral trade and economic cooperation envisage measures securing the renewal of assortment and raising the quality of goods by both sides.

The upcoming visit of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to Cuba and his talks with Fidel Castro will provide a new impulse to the development of bilateral trade and economic relations. It is expected that as a result of the talks, new documents will be signed which will open up new perspectives for the development of these relations.

U.S. Contra Aid, C. American Peace Plan Viewed

LD3003032889 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Excerpts] Next we have a commentary by our news analyst Vladislav Kozyakov on the prospects of a settlement for Central America.

Some Western observers note a shift in the United States' policy towards Nicaragua. [passage omitted]

Still, the White House has again received the blessing of Congress for continued humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan contras. This is nothing new: The previous term allowed by Congress for such aid expires on the 31st of this month and under the agreement of five Central American presidents, a plan should be ready by mid-May to disband the units of contras and to have them settle either in Nicaragua or any other country according to their wishes. So the decision to extend American aid to the contras for 10 more months to the amount of $4.5 million a month goes counter to that agreement.

The secretary general of Nicaragua's Foreign Ministry, Alejandro Bendana, has remarked about it: Who appointed the United States as God's avenging angel? It cannot be judge, jury, and executioner of the Central American peace plan.

How much the American policy in that region is weighed down with the past can be seen from the rhetoric concerning the Soviet Union. Soviet aid is alleged to have destabilized the situation in the region and to have hampered an improvement in the Soviet-American relations. That was mentioned for instance by Vice President Dan Quayle in a talk with journalists on Tuesday. The Soviet Union, on its part, fully backs the peace plan of the five Central American presidents. The plan bans any aid to any nongovernment military forces. The Soviet Union is sending neither arms nor equipment nor any other supplies to the rebel forces in El Salvador, Guatemala, or any other country. Moscow also supports the plans of using United Nations' observers to monitor the compliance with the commitments on noninterference in Central America affairs. As to Soviet good relations with Cuba and Nicaragua, they are not aimed against the United States or any other country. The whole world will see that during the coming official visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Cuba.

Political & Social

Gorbachev, Others Meet Media on Elections

LD2903153789 Moscow TASS in English 1532 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev today met with media executives and talked to them about the results of the March 1989 Plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee election campaign.

Yegor Ligachev, Vadim Medvedev and Georgiy Razumovskiy also took part in the meeting, held at the Central Committee.

Gorbachev's remarks will be published in the press.

Election Results, Ramifications Reviewed

Papers Round Up Results

PM3003114389

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 March 1989 Second Edition carries on page 1 a series of reports from PRAVDA correspondents on the preliminary results of the elections to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies from various parts of the country under the heading "Mandates to Power".

A report from Leningrad notes that Yu. Boldyrev, engineer at the Shipping Electrical Engineering and Technology Central Research Institute was elected, defeating A. Gerasimov, first secretary of Leningrad CPSU City Party Committee [gorkom].

The following failed to secure the necessary majority: Yu. Solovyev, first secretary of the CPSU oblast party committee [obkom]; A. Fateyev, second secretary of the CPSU obkom; M. Popov, chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee [oblispolkom]; V. Khozyrev, chairman of the Leningrad Soviet; and A. Bolshakov, first deputy chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet.

A report from Vilnius notes that nine out of 42 candidate deputies failed to be elected. The following were reportedly elected: in Territorial Okrug No. 685 A. Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; in Tauragskiy National Territorial Okrug V. Berezov, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; I. Kubilyus, rector of Vilnius V. Kapsukas University; and V. Velikanis, chairman of Panevezhskiy Rayon's "Ramigala" Collective Farm [kolkhoz].

V. Zhebryunas, secretary of the republic's Union of Cinema Workers, lost to V. Statulyavichyus, vice president of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Academy of Sciences and director of the Mathematics and Cybernetics Institute.

A report from Dushanbe notes that K. Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee, beat his rival teamleader U. Orlov, according to preliminary results, by winning more than 60 percent of the vote.

A report from Tula notes that the following were elected as people's deputies: In Tulskiy National Territorial Okrug—Tula, Ryazan, and Lipetsk Oblasts—A. Aleksankin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Nonchernozem Zone State Agro-Industrial Committee [Gosagroprom]; in Tula's Tsentralnyy Okrug Colonel General N. Moiseyev, chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany Political Directorate; and Yu. Litvintsev, first secretary of Tula CPSU Obkom.

A report from Kemerovo notes that the following "received a vote of confidence from the people of the Kuzbass": Yu. Golik, dean of a juridical faculty; Yu. Kaznin, associate professor in a medical institute department; S. Nevolin, hospital chief physician; V. Medikov, pro-vice chancellor at the Siberian Metallurgical Institute; state farm [sovkhoz] directors N. Bashev and N. Yermilov; and T. Avaliani, deputy director of the "Kiselevskugol" Association Capital Construction Administration, "renowned for writing a letter to L.I. Brezhnev at the height of the stagnation period suggesting that he resign."

The report notes that the following failed to be elected: the CPSU obkom first secretary; the oblispolkom chairman; the party gorkom first secretary; the leader of the largest coal administration and his subordinate—the association's general director; and the chief of the Kemerovo railroad.

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 March in its Second Edition on page 1 carries a series of reports on the preliminary results of the elections to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies from various parts of the country under the rubric "In the Electoral Okrugs."

Own correspondent V. Pinigin reports from Gorkiy that Aleksandr Fedorovich Khokhlov, rector of the university, was elected deputy.

Own correspondent N. Fokin reports from Irkutsk that the following were elected: G.I. Filshin, chief of the USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department Institute of Economics and Industrial Production Organization Regional Economy Department; I.A. Sumarkov, director of the Sovkhoz named for the 60th anniversary of the USSR and honored agricultural worker; writer Valentin Rasputin; and V.I. Potapov, first secretary of the party obkom.

B. Moskalenkov reports from Astrakhan that no one received an absolute majority in Electoral Okrug No 124 and a runoff will be staged 9 April.

I.N. Dyakov, first secretary of the party obkom, the only candidate, received an overwhelming majority in Electoral Okrug No 122.

Moscow TRUD in Russian on 30 March carries on page 1 a series of reports from TRUD correspondents on the preliminary results of the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies under the general heading "This Is What the Voters Decided."

A report from Baku notes that no fewer than 97 percent of Azerbaijan's voters took part in the elections. Worker candidates are reported to represent more than 30 percent of the deputies elected. The report records the following as having been elected: petroleum workers A. Amanov, S. Vezirov, and S. Muzafarov; seamstress L. Barusheva; and "other representatives of the republic's working class."

The report also records the following elected: "all the state and party candidates"; a number of enterprise leaders; and "representatives of the peasantry and the intelligentsia", including Azeri writers M. Ibragimov and "Anar."

A runoff will reportedly be held in only one of the republic's 58 okrugs where three candidates stood for election and none succeeded in gaining more than half of the vote.

The report notes the following were elected: V. Matyukha, leader of a team of construction workers from Nefteyugansk, who was also the only candidate in Tobolskiy Okrug and received more than 90 percent of the vote; and V. Russkikh, a worker at a timber procurement establishment (Urayskiy Okrug No 327), who beat the rayispolkom and gorispolkom chairmen.

The report notes that in Nizhnevartovskiy Okrug No 323 V. Grayfer, deputy minister and chief of the Main Administration for Petroleum and Gas in the Tyumen Region, lost to S. Seleznev, a teacher at a construction association's educational center. Writer Ye. Aypin from Khanty-Mansiysk beat the rayispolkom chairman in Khanty-Mansiyskiy National Territorial Okrug No 747. "Some other leaders also failed to win election." In Tyumen itself A. Volzhakov, a worker at the Automobile and Tractor Electrical Equipment Plant, is reported as having conceded defeat to S. Vasilyev, postgraduate and secretary of the university's Komsomol committee.

A report from Volgograd notes that the following succeeded in getting elected: V. Kalashnikov, first secretary of Volgograd CPSU Obkom (Krasnoarmeyskiy Territorial Electoral Okrug No 138); and A. Kiselev, second secretary of the Komsomol obkom in the RSFSR's National Territorial Electoral Okrug No 4, defeating writer Yu. Bondarev.

TV Shows Vote Counting

LD2903212489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Mar 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Telegrams on the preliminary results of the elections of the USSR People's Deputies have arrived at the Central Electoral Commission from the country's constituencies. [video shows people voting, election results being sorted]

On 26 March 1,225 deputies were elected. The struggle will be continued for 293 mandates. Of 1,500 constituencies, elections took place in 1,497 constituencies. In three Armenian constituencies, less than 50 percent of registered voters came to the ballot boxes. Repeat elections will be held in 199 constituencies. In keeping with the law, a repeat ballot will be held in 76 constituencies by 9 April.

Public organizations and the USSR Academy of Sciences are still due to name 18 deputies. [video continues showing vote counting].

Commission Outlines Runoff Elections

LD2903142289 Moscow TASS in English 1412 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—New elections will be held on May 14 in 199 electoral districts, in which neither of the two candidates running for parliament seats won the majority, as well as in electoral districts where voting was annulled. This announcement was made on Wednesday at a meeting of the Central Electoral Commission.

Nomination of candidates for people's deputies in these districts should be held not later than April 13, their registration not later than April 16. Meetings with constituencies will be held from the day of registration till May 13. A second ballot will be held in 76 electoral districts, which were contested by three and more candidates but none of them managed to win the majority. It will be held on one of Sundays within two weeks starting from March 26. [sentence as received] The names of two best placed candidates in the March 26 voting will be put on ballot papers. The one who receives the majority of votes will be considered elected in the run-off election.

The existing electoral commissions, which will have the same composition, will be in charge of organising new and run-off elections. Voting in the new elections will take place at the same polling stations in accordance with the lists of voters compiled before the national polls.

Overall, there are 750 territorial and 750 national territorial electoral districts. One candidate was registered in 384, two in 953, while three and more in 163 districts.

Further on Procedures

PM2903155789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 1

["Own Information" report: "At the Central Electoral Commission on the Election of USSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] A routine session of the Central Electoral Commission on the Election of USSR People's Deputies was held at the House of the Unions in Moscow on 29 March. It examined the question of holding repeat elections for USSR people's deputies in certain electoral okrugs.

A decision was made on the basis of Article 61 of the USSR Law "On the Election of USSR People's Deputies" to hold repeat elections on 14 May 1989 in electoral okrugs where no more than two candidate deputies stood and neither was elected and also in electoral okrugs where the election was ruled invalid. The previous okrug and ward electoral commissions are instructed to conduct the repeat elections. The following sequence for holding the basic preelection measures has been determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in the USSR Law "On the Election of USSR People's Deputies":

Nomination of USSR people's deputies for electoral okrugs for repeat elections will be carried out until 13 April 1989; registration of nominated candidate deputies will be conducted until 16 April 1989; meetings between the candidate deputies and the electorate will be organized from the day of registration of the candidate through 13 May 1989; voting in repeat elections will be carried out within the same electoral boundaries and according to the electoral roll established for the conduct of the general election. The electoral rolls will be available for general consultation from 3 May 1989.

The following took part in the commission sesssion: A.I. Lukyanov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; T.N. Menteshashvili, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and representatives of the mass media.

PRAVDA Editorial on Results

PM3003163989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Mar 89 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "The People Have Made Their Choice"]

[Text] All this week we have been living under the impression of the election of USSR people's deputies. Emotions are giving way to serious analysis and reflections. It seems that everyone is unanimous that never before have there been such elections in our country. After April 1985, 26 March 1989 will occupy a special position in the country's history. The elections of USSR people's deputies which were held are an important watershed of restructuring, a major landmark in the reform of the political system. They convincingly demonstrated yet again the potential of socialism and our democracy.

The people really became conscious participants in the political process in the loftiest sense of the word. Let us cast our minds back to the beginning of the election campaign. Let us recall the turbulent discussion of candidacies in labor collectives. We rejected the stereotypes of the times of stagnation, when decisions on who was to be elevated to the organs of power were made behind closed doors. The outcome was the nomination of thousands of candidates.

Each one of us had an opportunity to even propose himself as a candidate. As a matter of fact, people took advantage of this right. The total of 1,500 deputies' mandates in territorial and national okrugs were contested by more than 7,500 people. For the first time 750 seats in the supreme organ of power were assigned to public organizations. Their plenums discussed 2,049 candidacies.

The final election results will soon be published in the press. But local reports testify to citizens' high activeness on election day. Activeness in the real sense of the word, not the one that was previously expressed by the figure of 99.9 percent. About 90 percent of voters performed their civic duty in most okrugs. These are not cooked figures; they are figures reflecting the real picture. This time nobody chased after percentages, nobody tried to persuade anybody else, nobody dragged anybody almost by force to the polling places.

People from different professions and different nationalities are among those who won the people's mandate of trust. Leningrad engineer Yu. Boldyrev from the Central Scientific Research Institute for Shipbuilding Electrical Equipment and Technology and Kemerovo agronomist A. Chernykh, Kharkov driver L. Sukhov and famous Kiev physician N. Amosov, Vilnius University Rector Y. Kubilyus and machine operator S. Usyan from the "Nairit" Science and Production Association in Armenia, writer V. Bykov and many others.

But to be honest, the elections also produced many surprises. One of them is the fact that some mandates are still vacant. Repeat elections will be held in 199 electoral okrugs in which not more than 2 candidates ran for election but neither won the requisite number of votes, and in electoral okrugs where they were deemed invalid. Incidentally, the date for these elections has been set—14 May 1989.

Runoff elections are due to be held in 76 electoral okrugs where three or more candidates ran and none won more than 50 percent of the votes. In conformity with the law, they will be held during the 2 weeks immediately following 26 March.

Yes, this time we had a choice. And it is obvious that candidate deputies felt more sharply than the voters that they were being chosen. Even the fact that some ballot papers listed just one name was no consolation. Competitiveness was present until the very last. This was our first experience. An experience which, it must be said, is invaluable. We are only just assimilating it, learning it by trial and error, but it is already in existence and has become an asset of restructuring. We will value and develop it.

We have plenty of food for thought today. Why, for instance, did serious support for a candidate deputy by the party committee result in a failure to collect enough votes in a number of places? Why did reluctance, again on the part of the party committee, to see someone with whom the apparatus does not sympathize become a deputy suddenly result in powerful support from people (the case of B.N. Yeltsin)? Why were some party oblast committee [obkom] first secretaries not elected deputies when they had no rivals in the final stage of the election campaign and theirs were the only names on the ballot papers? Why did some workers, military men, and scientists fail to obtain a majority of votes? There are many such questions. They must be pondered and analyzed, including by party committees, and conclusions must be drawn for the future.

But one of the conclusions concerning party workers is obvious and was merely crystallized by the elections. People believe action, not words. Wherever they see the first changes for the better, even if these are only small, concern for them, attention to their daily needs, and a desire to implement the principle of social justice, they fully support those who advance the Cause while relying on people's opinion, experience, and will. For instance, the day before yesterday PRAVDA published a conversation with Astrakhan CPSU Obkom First Secretary I.N. Dyakov. He has not been in that post very long. Some time ago our newspaper reported the harsh criticism by the oblast's inhabitants of his predecessor, who was forced to go. The "legacy" might have affected the voting. But the fact remains that the obkom first secretary got over 90 percent of the votes. As could be seen from the conversation with him, the party obkom leader does not wall himself off from people. This is probably the main thing.

The preliminary data on the elections attest that the people supported the Communist Party's policy, the course of restructuring, democracy, and glasnost. They supported it at a very difficult time for the country. A crucial time, when the results of this policy have not yet fully made themselves felt, for both the reform of the political system and the economic reform are only taking their first steps in blazing a trail, and the Food Program, the improvement of finances, and a great deal else cannot be resolved overnight. But people believe in this policy and supported it in the elections. These elections can be described with total justification as a nationwide referendum in favor of restructuring.

There is yet another lesson that can be mentioned today, without waiting for the final results. It is that people will not accept bureaucratism, indifference, inaction on the part of the apparatus, administrative-edict pressure, and pressure on public opinion. More than ever before, the people feel themselves to be the genuine master whose voice counts for a very great deal. They are no longer afraid to uphold their opinion or looking over their shoulder at the authorities. And this also constitutes a gain for restructuring and good shoots in the field of democracy.

At the same time it is impossible to turn a blind eye to the fact that certain party organizations sustained definite "losses." When an obkom first secretary does not obtain sufficient votes to be elected, it is grounds for serious reflection. Of course, no tragedy has occurred. The party itself proposed the system of competition, of the competitive selection of candidates. Nevertheless, to call a spade a spade, the defeat of a party leader in the elections means that he must change his style of work and take a critical look at himself. It is possible to speak of other factors—they cannot be left out of account—but people elect individuals, not posts, to be people's deputies. Therefore a choice has been made in favor of individuals. Restructuring needs them. It has got them.

Gorbachev Seen as Strengthened

PM2903144889 London ITV Television Network in English 1900 GMT 28 Mar 89

[Interview with IZVESTIYA political correspondent Melor Sturua in Moscow by news presenter Nicholas Owen in London; date not given—recorded; monitored in progress]

[Text] [Owen] ...Melor Sturua, the political correspondent of the Soviet newspaper IZVESTIYA. I asked him—from Moscow—if the vote against the party conservatives was an expression of deep disenchantment with the existing system.

[Sturua] Of course that's quite understandable that the conservative forces—the forces of dogmatism—were rejected by the majority of people, and I think this is a very healthy development. And Mr Gorbachev, in his talk to journalists during the election day, also stressed that nobody's above criticism, nobody is sacrosanct, if this politician is against the new development, new kind of democracy, which was introduced by perestroyka in our country. That's why I think we must accept the results of elections in Leningrad and other parts and cities of the Soviet Union.

[Owen] Do you think those forces of conservatism that you talked about—do you think they will make their power, their presence, felt? For example, in the new Congress of Deputies, will it really have any power? Won't it be what we just call a "rubber stamp" body?

[Sturua] Well, nothing happens without fight, but if this fight is a democratic fight in the framework of law—democracy in the framework of a new constitution and new amendments to this constitution—I think this is a proof of our pluralism, that we have several opinions and several representatives of these several opinions, and I think this is very healthy.

[Owen] Some of the candidates, at least, in this election, either overtly or by implication, talked really about a multi-party future for the Soviet Union. Now, Mr Gorbachev, of course, has ruled that out, but do you think those sort of voices can be stilled forever?

[Sturua] I think that in the foreseeable future there is no real foundation for the multiparty system in the Soviet Union, and I think that it would be artificial to create a new party just to show the outside world that we are developing toward democracy, because the socialist pluralism gives us a possibility—and the elections are an example of it—that we can develop pluralism inside one party. It doesn't mean that everybody will talk in the same way and with the same voice, but nowadays I think that socialist pluralism gives a good framework for the development of democracy in the Soviet Union.

[Owen] Do you think Mr Gorbachev's position has really been strengthened by all this? Aren't there real dangers for him now that he's unleashed forces that will be beyond his control?

[Sturua] Well, well, I don't think that it would be productive to talk in this personal way because this is a development of a country of almost 300 million people; but if you ask me about Mr Gorbachev himself, I think that the results only strengthen his position, because these results show that his philosophy of perestroyka and democratization works—that his philosophy has a real future. That's why I think the results just strengthen his political position.

[Owen] Finally, from the outside, we have a situation here where the existing state machinery doesn't work very well. Some of the reforms that Mr Gorbachev has brought forward, they are in trouble too and have had to be revised. Now the electorate has voted a huge protest vote. Let's face it: Doesn't that really mean that the Soviet Union is in a very unstable position just now?

[Sturua] Well, I think that democracy creates stability, not instability; and of course we are in a ferment, in a way, because we are in a transitional period from one situation towards another one which is quite different, because we are now preparing the foundation of a state which is based on law. And that's why I think you have to talk not about instability, but about stability: More democracy, more perestroyka gives more stability to the country and to its development. On the contrary, there is no danger of instability.

[Owen] Melor Sturua, the political correspondent of IZVESTIYA.

Yeltsin Denies Differences

LD3003092189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2020 GMT 29 Mar 89

[From "The World Today" program, presented by Vladimir Tsvetov]

[Text] Correspondents from the U.S. CBS and CNN television companies reported from Moscow that Boris Yeltsin can rightly be called one of the most popular political figures in the Soviet Union. When interviewed at work, Boris Yeltsin rejected the opinion that had been voiced that there were serious differences between him and other Soviet leaders on the main issues of Soviet policy. I do not belong to any opposition, Yeltsin stressed. [video shows U.S. television presenter, Yeltsin on a walkabout; Yeltsin speaking to correspondent in his office]

Ukrainian Results Raise Questions

LD3003093989 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 29 Mar 89

[From the "News From the Ukraine" program]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] We begin this program on a highly topical theme. The elections of USSR people's deputies have taken place. The results were rather unexpected as, indeed, they probably were in other republics. This unexpectedness lies in the fact that in not a few constituencies the candidates failed to gain sufficient votes to be elected as deputies. This was particularly noticeable in those constituencies in which one or two candidates were nominated.

The central press figures have not yet been published by the local press, but I can say that Shcherbitskiy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian Central Committee, gained more than 72 percent of the electorate's votes in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast; Shevchenko, chairman of the republic's supreme soviet presidium, was supported by almost 77 percent of the electorate in Kiev Oblast; and Masol, chairman of the republic's council of ministers, was supported by more than 75 percent of the electorate in Donetsk. Thus they have all been elected people's deputies of the Soviet Union.

However, in many other constituencies there will have to be run-off elections, and in some cases even repeat elections. I asked Vasiliy Birzov, a Ukrainan radio commentator, to give us some of his thoughts on these facts. He is here in the studio. Please go ahead.

[Birzov] Yes, of course, the consequences of the elections provide much food for thought. For example, why in Kiev alone did more than 250,000 voters not go that day

to the polling stations? Why were more than 38,000 ballot papers spoiled, and why did the voters fail to elect the city's leaders? And there are many other things of which there was no need to think, say, during previous elections. On 26 March the people were given the right to decide. People were given the right to choose, although not a few voters used another legal right and refused to vote. While acknowledging their right to do this, one cannot fail to say, of course, that they simply excluded themselves from the political life of the country at such a crucial moment. Many ballot papers were declared to be spoiled. Say, for example, in the Minsk constituency, there were more than 14,000.

[Announcer] That's in the city of Kiev?

[Birzov] Yes, in the city of Kiev. This is evidence not only of the indifference of some voters who, from habit, simply put their ballot papers in the ballot boxes without crossing out candidates. It is also evidence of the fact that candidates for people's deputy failed to interest and attract people with their programs. This is probably why neither of the two candidates in the Minsk constituency of Kiev managed to gain the required number of votes, and no deputy was elected here.

But most questions are raised by the fact that Masik, first secretary of the Kiev city party committee, and Zgurskiy, chairman of the city executive committee, also failed to gain half the votes. This was reported today by PRAVDA. It is difficult, of course, for me to make any conclusions as to why this happened. No doubt, above all, the city's leaders themselves need to think about this. It seems to me that they failed to gain support not only because they were the only candidates in their constituencies. Evidently, the way their lone candidacy was ensured during the election campaign also had an effect. I was present at many meetings at work collective and constituency level and I can say that the mechanism which worked well in past years did much harm. Candidates themselves are probably to blame for the fact that they did not stop in time the powerful wave of their nomination which swept from its path those candidates whom work collectives tried to nominate without instructions from above. Yes, if at the final stage the election campaign had had to be carried out with several candidates, then even the defeat would have been more honorable.

[Announcer] And maybe even it would have meant victory.

[Birzov] Possibly. So, out of seven constituencies only four USSR people's deputies were elected. They are Amosov, the well-known surgeon; Talanchuk, rector of the polytechnical institute; Ryabchenko, head of laboratory of the institue of physics; and Shcherbak, the writer. [passage omitted]

'Lessons' Learned in Leningrad

LD2903165689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1600 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Leningrad, 29 March (TASS)—TASS correspondent Mark Monusov reports:

Today the newspaper LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA was sold out in a matter of minutes at kiosks. It contained a report from the constituency electoral commissions about the USSR people's deputy election results for the city, which is the second largest in the Soviet Union, and for the constituencies in Leningrad Oblast. Only 9 of the 21 deputy seats have been filled. Who will receive the remaining 12 mandates is to be determined in a repeat ballot and reelection.

All nine elected deputies are CPSU members. Among them workers, representatives of the intelligentsia, and major economic leaders who are included in elective party bodies. For instance, Boris Gidaspov, chairman of the Board of "Tekhnokhim", one of the first socialist industrial concerns, was recently elected to the composition of the bureau of the CPSU oblast committee. He is vigorously carrying out the policy of the CPSU for radical reform of the economy, and for improvement of the social and communal living conditions of the population.

The fact is widely being discussed in the city that some leaders did not manage to get more than half the votes which are needed to be elected. Aleksey Bolshakov, the deputy mayor of Leningrad, the former general director of a large industrial enterprise only needed another 2 percent of the votes. Being 6 percent of the votes short left Yuriy Solovyev, first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast CPSU Committee beyond the bounds of the supreme body of power.

"One should not dramatize the situation, we were ready for it to a certain extent," Vladimir Khodyrev, mayor of Leningrad and member of the bureau of the CPSU oblast committee, told me. He explains the reason for the defeat of some leaders at the elections by the fact that the population was poorly informed about their activity. And sometimes it happens that people are swayed by rumors and gossip.

The mayor, for whom the elections ended favorably, overcame his rival, a major manager of the economy; he is convinced that people should know exactly how one leader or another works, what he is concerned about, and his suggestions for solutions to problems.

Well now, many people are thinking about the lessons learned from today's elections. But that is exactly how it should be: you see, restructuring teaches one to think and act in a new way.

Estonian People's Front Leader on Elections

PM3003082589 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Mar 89 p 2

[Estonian People's Front leader Tiit Made article: "The Soviet Election Carousel"]

[Text] They are saying that for the first time in the history of the Soviet state, its citizens can now choose between several candidates. Gorbachev has set in motion a political reform. Part of this reform consists of the election of an independent body which is to represent the whole union and which is called the Congress of People's Deputies. From this congress 500 deputies will be sent to the Supreme Soviet, which will function as a parliament and meet in session for 7 to 8 months every year.

At the local level a predetermined number of deputies to the congress will be elected, but it remains to be seen which of them will have seats in the parliament. It is also difficult to select such people. Which of us has political experience?

Reformist leaders in Moscow hope that this complicated system will make it possible to have more decisionmakers who advocate perestroyka, or at least to reduce the numbers of perestroyka's opponents. Perhaps they are right.

However, the party was being too kind when in advance it allowed all sorts of candidates. With the passage of time, a number of men and women were found to be unacceptable as decisionmakers. The old quota system disappeared immediately: so many party members and so many nonparty people, so many men and so many women, so many workers and so many farmers, and a few intellectuals and young people. The candidates' weight and eye color were no longer important. In more general terms: People who were positive about perestroyka were nominated.

I am riding round on this carousel myself. It is difficult to say whether I really want to devote myself to the parliament in Moscow for 7 or 8 months, and besides, is there any real point? But anyway, I was nominated as a candidate in the Rakvere region, where problems of phosphorus and oil shale loom large, where the Soviet Air Force is polluting the environment, and where spring water glows in the dark. My name was put forward by 18 labor collectives. I have 4 rivals, including a political lieutenant colonel who has lived in Estonia for 18 months.

As has already been mentioned, the party does not approve of all candidates. Rakvere party boss Toomas Kork tried to persuade me to stand down as a candidate, because he—that is, the party—had his own candidate. But since I am an old sportsman, I wanted to compete, and so did not follow the party's advice.

In the Estonian press and radio there has recently been much talk to the effect that the party is stopping at nothing in trying to control the selection of candidates. This is like giving something with one hand and taking it away with the other.

There are 4 local electoral okrugs, each with 250,000 voters, in which 8 candidates have been nominated. There are also 32 national territorial electoral okrugs with a total of 118 candidates. Thirty-six deputies will thus be sent to Moscow from Estonia. There is an average of 3.5 candidates per electoral okrug. In three districts the result will be known even before election day, 26 March, since in accordance with good old tradition only one candidate is running in each of them. In the city of Parnu at least, the party made every effort to ensure that no candidate other than television commentator Juhan Aare was nominated.

In 12 okrugs all the candidates are Estonians; in 4 okrugs all the candidates are Russians. In the remaining okrugs Estonians and Russians are competing. According to preliminary estimates, it can be assumed that Estonians will be elected in all the four local okrugs. In the national territorial okrugs the ratio is 24-8 in the Estonians' favor.

I have been asked time and time again if there is any point to sending Estonia's foremost talents to Moscow. Bearing in mind the additions to the draft constitution of 16 November 1988, it might seem that we decide our own affairs here in Estonia. There have also been calls to boycott the elections, since the existing electoral law really cannot be said to be democratic. If, however, we want to change our relationship with the central power base and make clear what we want, we cannot disregard this power base. It is unwise to make enemies and ignore central power. We know only too well the ambitions of the Kremlin leaders and their bureaucratic machine.

We have to win allies in Moscow, establish personal contacts with the decisionmakers, and get them used to the idea that Estonia wants to proceed more independently.

We have to win allies among the people who are sent to the parliament from other parts of the Soviet Union. The votes of 36 delegates are irrelevant in this "parliamentary community of friendly and fraternal peoples in which all have equal rights."

We have to make the notion of self-determination and sovereignty attractive to other federal republics. That is why I believe that it would be useful to do something for the benefit of the Estonian people in Moscow, or at least to try to do so.

To begin with, in my view, the Baltic deputies' foremost task should be to fight for the annulment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. After that, negotiations on altering the Baltic states' status could follow. The pact aimed at dividing up the world, and had a colonial stamp. If it is

annulled, we can discuss the question of occupation and incorporation with the central power base and confront people with a choice. The idea of a federal state is gaining ground in the Soviet Union. It is bound to be discussed in the new parliament.

It is also important to fight for democratization. As long as the one-party system exists, it is pointless to talk about democracy. We must seek and find allies who would support the establishment of a multiparty system in the Soviet Union. Then there would be real choice and competition. Only then can we assume that society will move forward.

For the Estonians it is important to achieve first prosperity and then freedom. The capacity of our economy and its close integration with the all-union system make it very difficult to achieve independence. Above all the local economy must be made independent of Moscow. Questions relating to this should be decided in Tallinn, not in Moscow.

Promulgating the idea of economic sovereignty throughout the Soviet Union should, in my view, be the third main task of the parliamentarians from Estonia.

Let us see what the 26 March elections give us. Up to now we have voted as a family.

'Disorder' in Armenia, Delayed Voting Noted

Armenian Ministry Appeals for Order

NC3003084489 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 29 Mar 89

[ARMENPRES headline: "From the Armenian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs"]

[Text] Yerevan, 29 March, ARMENPRES—On 26 March, thousands of Yerevan residents went to polling stations to carry out their political duty by participating in the elections for the peoples' deputies of the USSR. Many of them rightly link the elections for the USSR's supreme body to the future implementation of reconstruction, to the consolidation of the process of democratization and of glasnost in the country, to the solution of the accumulated socio-economic problems in the republic, and to the improvement of the moral-ideological atmosphere.

However, regrettably there were those who, contrary to law and sound judgment, tried to organize an unauthorized march in the streets of Yerevan with politically harmful and inflammatory slogans and calls. The disorder was initiated once again by the so-called "National Self-Determination" group which was created by Paruyr Ayrikyan, well-known (?anti-Soviet) who has been tried several times, was deprived of his Soviet citizenship, and was ousted from the USSR. The said group's ultimate goal is for Armenia to leave the structure of the USSR.

By ignoring the militia's regulations for order, the organizers of the said group displayed strong aggressiveness and audacity. However, these acts were obstructed by public order forces, and the organizers of the disorders and the most active instigators were detained by the bodies in charge.

The Armenian Ministry of Internal Affairs draws the attention of the citizens to the fact that such provocative actions can have extremely grave consequences. It appeals that order be strictly safeguarded, that wisdom be displayed, and that individual irresponsible elements not be allowed to upset the situation by resorting to disorderly acts in the city with the intention of fulfilling their own interests.

Election Hours in Yerevan Extended

NC3003075189 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 30 Mar 89

[Text] An ARMENPRES correspondent asked the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to clarify the reasons behind the extension of the elections for the USSR people's deputies in Yerevan City.

On 26 March, reports received at the Yerevan election okrug commissions indicated that some of the city's citizens, whose relatives were killed in the national disaster, had gone to Leninakan, Kirovakan, and Spitak cities and to other areas in the quake zone, as well as to cemeteries in Yerevan City, in order to take part in memorial ceremonies, according to national tradition. Thus they did not have the opportunity to attend the elections on time.

In view of the aforesaid, the commissions of the Yerevan City election okrugs applies to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, requesting that the Central Elections Commission for the USSR people's deputies be asked to allow the elections to be extended by 2 hours in Yerevan City.

The republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium applied to the Central Elections Commission for the USSR people's deputies, and, taking into consideration the special situation created in the republic as a result of the quake, as well as the Armenian people's ethnic traditions, the commission agreed to the request and extended the elections for the USSR people's deputies in Yerevan City until 2200.

Moscow Rallies, Militia Activity Reported

Militia Maintains Order

LD2903121589 Moscow TASS in English 1117 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—By TASS correspondent Nikita Demidov:

The past week was the "most tranquil in 1988 and 1989" with only 62 crimes, 3 per cent of them serious, reported in the city of nine million, a militia spokesman told a briefing today.

The spokesman said that in the run-up to the elections for USSR people's deputies and on polling day the militia paid increased attention to maintaining order in the capital. In those days, they recalled, huge election rallies were held in Moscow. For example, three meetings, unsanctioned by city authorities, took place in Gorkiy Park on March 19 attracting more than 10,000 people. In another development 20,000 people converged on Sovetskaya Square outside Moscow City Hall on March 22, while the March 25 rally in Luzhniki attracted 40,000. All these events passed without interference from the militia. Only during the rally on Sovetskaya Square had it to restrict access, because road traffic was disrupted in the city's centre. Eight people were detained on that day on charges of breaching public order.

On the same day an anonymous caller told the Moscow militia that a bomb would be exploded during the rally on Sovetskaya Square. But experts with sniffer dogs failed to find any explosives.

MVD Official Interviewed on Rallies

PM2903143789 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 89 p 4

[TASS correspondent L. Kislinskaya report on interview with Lieutenant General P.S. Bogdanov, USSR deputy minister of internal affairs and chief of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Main Administration for Internal Affairs, under the rubric "Unauthorized Rallies": "Democracy Is Not To Be Confused With Anarchy"; place and date not given]

[Text] Last Sunday [19 March] proved to be one of the most turbulent days in the capital in the whole election campaign. The operational situation in the city on 19 March prompted quite a few false interpretations. This is precisely why TASS Correspondent L. Kislinskaya asked Lieutenant General P.S. Bogdanov, USSR deputy minister of internal affairs and chief of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee [Gorispolkom] Main Administration for Internal Affairs, to comment on the events which occurred here.

[Bogdanov] There were two unauthorized rallies held simultaneously in Moscow 19 March. One was held in the M. Gorkiy Central Park for Culture and Recreation, the other at the Krymskiy Rampart. Large crowds gathered here, and virtually everyone who wished to speak managed to do so. Despite the fact that the rallies were not authorized, our comrades did not obstruct the speakers. But some individuals with extremist leanings started calling on people to march to the city center. At that point militia staffers took measures to explain that a march by a crowd of thousands along streets carrying heavy traffic could not be allowed. But the instigators of the demonstration remained deaf to these calls.

The crowd made its way along Sadovoye Beltway and Kalinin Prospekt, took Bulvarnoye Beltway, and then reached Gorkiy Street. While this march was in progress, militia staffers were forced to halt traffic between Pushkin Square and the Central Telegraph Office for a lengthy period of time. Traffic was also halted by the Moscow City Soviet building, where law enforcement organ staffers once again appealed to citizens' sense. Those assembled were also addressed by Moscow Gorispolkom Secretary Yu. Vinogradov. He also asked them to keep calm and maintain order. But this was also met with lack of understanding. Moreover, there were slogans inciting people to take rash actions and inflaming unhealthy emotions. Insulting actions were attempted against the representatives of legitimate authority. It must be said to the credit of our staffers that their restraint and observance of socialist legality prevented any further aggravation of the situation.

I think that it is worth saying a few words about the situation in the city. It still remains alarming—there has been a significant increase in the number of crimes, especially those committed by out-of-town "visitors." There have been quite a few robberies involving use of edged weapons and firearms over the last few days. A "guest of the capital" armed with a grenade was detained 20 March.

There has been an increase in the number of crimes, especially street crimes. The criminals' actions are becoming increasingly impudent and dangerous. We encounter increasingly frequent and daring actions by organized gangs of criminals. An armed gang from Georgia and Rostov-na-Donu was recently detained, and from it we confiscated a "Browning" pistol, two "Nagan" revolvers, a "Beretta" pistol, a Sudayev submachinegun, a large quantity of cartridges, as well as four grenades with fuses, three smoke pots, and a sizable quantity of edged weapons.

The results of the "Law and Order" operation mounted in the city a few days ago offer no consolation, either. The implementation of our measures resulted in the detection and detention of 6,805 lawbreakers.

This is why the militia is seriously worried about the maintenance of order and calm in the city. As for the irresponsible calls repeatedly heard in the capital last Sunday, they obviously aggravated the already complex situation. I think that some people again confused the ideas of "democracy and glasnost" with "anarchy and total license."

I received a statement at the end of that turbulent day. It was written on behalf of A. Muzykantskiy and L. Shemayev, agents of candidate USSR people's deputy B.N. Yeltsin. Let me cite it in full:

"On behalf of Comrade Yeltsin, candidate USSR people's deputy, we declare that neither he nor his agents are any way associated with the rally in Sovetskaya Square. We ask that the Moscow public be informed accordingly. At the same time, we ask that measures be taken to ensure public order at Comrade Yeltsin's scheduled meeting at the MAI [expansion unknown] House of Culture, in view of the fact that, according to rally participants' reports, calls were made at today's rally to organize an unauthorized rally at the entrance to the MAI House of Culture tomorrow."

I believe that this statement calls for no further comment. Those who exploited this name at the unauthorized rally have had the wind taken out of their sails.

In conclusion I would like to address the following appeal to Muscovites and visitors to the capital. The USSR Constitution guarantees the possibility of free and comprehensive discussion of the political, professional, and personal qualities of candidate people's deputies and the right to campaign "for" or "against" candidates at meetings, in the press, and on radio and television. Nevertheless, anarchist manifestations and breaches of legislative acts laying down procedures for the exercise of citizens' rights during the holding of meetings, rallies, street marches, and demonstrations cannot be allowed on the pretext of the election campaign. The procedure for holding such events is strictly laid down in the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree dated 28 July 1988. The legislation also covers responsibility for any breaches. Let me remind readers again that no campaign measures are permitted on election day. The Main Administration for Internal Affairs has elaborated additional measures to maintain reliable law and order in the city and to step up protection of polling places and documents there. Our task is to take the strictest measures against those who might try to influence the elections by unauthorized methods.

Zaykov Addresses Moscow Gorkom Session

LD2903212889 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Mar 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] An extended session of the Moscow gorkom bureau took place in Moscow today. The results of the work on the drawing-up of the Progress-95 complex territorial-industrial program for the intensification of the socioeconomic development of the city were summed up. Comrade Zaykov spoke at the session.

Soviet UN Officials Complain To Shevardnadze

AU3003101989 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 30 Mar 89 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Call for Help From Soviet UN Officials"]

[Text] New York/Geneva/Vienna—In an open letter to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, members of various Soviet UN missions and Soviet officials at various UN organizations complain about massive restrictions concerning their personal freedom imposed by the USSR authorities. Despite perestroyka and the fact that the Soviet Union has signed international human rights agreements, the situation of this group of Soviet citizens has remained unchanged, the letter, which was received by DER STANDARD from foreign sources, states.

Those who wrote the letter, and who do not want to reveal their identity for security reasons, are directly addressing Shevardnadze because previous petitions that passed through official channels have not so far been successful. They describe their situation as follows:

—They are suffering financial losses: A Soviet UN official has to supply to the state two-thirds of his salary and the full amount of the expense allowances for furniture, training, and journeys.

—They are not allowed to move freely: Even trips home or to socialist fraternal countries and official journeys as UN representatives are subject to approval by the Soviet authorities.

—They are facing legal uncertainty: In general, the UN organizations conclude 10-year contracts with officials. These contracts, however, can be terminated by the corresponding Soviet missions without the approval of those concerned, the open letter points out. At the same time, it is often very difficult for them to find adequate positions after they return to the USSR.

Finally, the letter also deplores overstaffing of the Soviet UN missions, which is not justified at all. The salaries and expenses that the Soviet officials have to supply to the state are apparently used to finance the huge apparatus. The writers of the letter believe that the costs could be reduced to at least one-fourth or one-fifth of the current level.

According to additional information, the protest is meeting with approval at all three UN headquarters—New York, Geneva, and Vienna. The letter to Shevardnadze ends with the following words: "We hope that you do not consider this letter a defamatory accusation."

'Restructuring Extremists' Behind Kishinev Rallies

PM2903134189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 89 Second Edition p 6

[Special correspondent A. Chernenko report: "Impatience and Intolerance. Thoughts on the Events in Moldavia"]

[Text] Kishinev—My notebook records a statement from a 15-year-old rural lad from Gratiyeshty, who was by chance in Kishinev 12 March 1989 and out of curiosity joined the crowd trying to reach the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee building: "I fell

because people behind were pushing; I stumbled and fell. Then people started to trample me underfoot.... While I was down someone struck or trod on my legs, back, and face...."

Thankfully, the lad was not trampled to death—he was given first aid and treated for shock in the ambulance that arrived.... But he was not the only one to need the paramedics' help. Several militiamen were hospitalized on that tragic day with serious injuries. And it was not just the "caprices and blindness of the crowd" that were to blame. An impassive video camera also captured the quite deliberate actions of one of the highly organized groups operating within the crowd. It literally dragged off a militiaman and gave him a systematic beating.

Some people are now trying to draw a veil over the 12 March events, claiming that they were a chance occurrence and a kind of emotional outpouring.

"It was a reaction to the 'deafness' of the republic's leadership, which has rejected direct dialogue with us on an equal footing," I was told by a "moderate member of an informal group", "for, after all, we demonstrated with slogans exclusively about restructuring."

May I make so bold as to claim that an unsanctioned 20,000-strong rally cannot be termed a chance occurrence, nor can the slogan "Down with the republic's government" be classed as "exclusively about restructuring."

"If you closely analyze the plans for such rallies," I was told by V. Voronin, the republic's recently appointed internal affairs minister (incidentally, he is a Moldavian with an excellent knowledge of Moldavian literature and is a wholehearted advocate of maintaining and developing the Moldavian national character and language) "some very stable structures can be discerned. There are 'slogan-chanting marshals'.... And in certain places 'thugs' such as those who gave a severe beating to our staffer. All this is quite serious, in short."

Incidentally, it is quite obvious even without professional assessment that 20,000 people do not just "happen" to form up into columns. The question of just what united a small and **deliberately aggressive** group of "marshals" and far larger groups of sincere, honest, and perhaps excessively emotional people on that day is another matter. It is vitally important to understand this, otherwise we will be unable to understand the essence of the now-traditional Sunday rallies in Kishinev.

"The starting point for today's difficult situation," N. Bondarchuk, secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, believes, "is the language problem. Stagnation had a very tangible effect in this area."

The secretary described in detail the key points of the problem. Yes, stagnation had a major effect: The Moldavian language was to a considerable extent ousted from the business sphere, higher educational institutions, and the mass media. In general this situation is typical—it has also affected a number of other regions. However, in Moldavia the problem also has purely local and specific overtones. Representatives of the creative intelligentsia believe that in order to maintain the language it is not enough to give it the status of state language. It is also necessary to change its actual script—to switch from today's Cyrillic script to the Latin script.

Incidentally, it is a matter for the people themselves to decide which script they need. It is another point that is worrying: These entirely natural problems have now become a kind of jumping-off point for various kinds of "restructuring extremists" [ultraperestroyshchik], who have been whipping up feelings and emotions, driving a more and more tangible wedge between the different peoples living in the republic.

Here is probably a very typical example. A rumor that seven Moldavians had been severely beaten (and even killed!) on ethnic grounds "before the militia's very eyes" flew around Kishinev. Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] organs rapidly launched an investigation. The newspapers printed an interview with A. Davydov, chief of the Kishinev Main Internal Affairs Administration, who cogently dispelled these—I emphasize—quite deliberately concocted rumors. However, that was not the end of the matter. Small, or at least not fundamental, inaccuracies in the interview which failed to refute the main point—that the rumors were false!—were used as the starting point for new provocations.... And things continued. The main thing was to constantly keep people at emotional fever pitch.

The impatience of most people trying to use the process of democratization and glasnost "to the full" is understandable. On this point I am not fully in agreement with N. Bondarchuk—it is not just language problems that are worrying thousands and thousands of urban citizens (and peasants too). This impatience is linked with issues that have built up in the sphere of social justice and in the economic mechanism. It is also linked with people's concern about the difficult ecological situation. The critical situation in the law enforcement sphere also gives rise to extreme irritation: The crime rate in the Moldavian SSR is high, and people have reason to believe that corruption flourishes there; nor are the accusations groundless that a number of staffers in the law enforcement sphere have contacts with criminals. Incidentally, even the minister of internal affairs himself has unambiguously stated that the question of cadre improvement is a priority.

But the impatience of some people and the aggressive intolerance of others are by no means one and the same thing. Intolerance and even extremism have clearly flourished in a certain milieu of people who have declared themselves to be fighters for restructuring. And it must be frankly admitted that at a certain point conditions in Kishinev were quite favorable for the

dubious phenomenon of "restructuring extremists"—who were infected, apart from everything else, with the virus of nationalist narrow-mindedness—to flourish.

The first, and one of the most substantive, reasons is that the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee took too long to find its feet in an increasingly complex situation, clearly underestimating the dynamics and disposition of the forces of the public movement. Measures to analyze the demands raised were seemingly being taken. But measures are primarily specific methods. These were worked out according to old and often purely administrative blueprints. What people wanted—a dialogue—did not come about.

For a very long time, it seems to me, both the "democratic movement" and the "A. Mateyevich Club"—the two main informal organizations—were seen by the republic's leadership as chance occurrences that were part and parcel not so much of restructuring as of the "price of glasnost." Meanwhile their ranks were joined not just by self-seeking windbags but by active advocates of the political concept of restructuring and social renewal, demanding more resolute action from the Central Committee and the government.

Naturally, this did not come about without some emotional outbursts, but in principle there were people to work with! And they were expecting a concrete, active dialogue from the "political Olympus," while it maintained a patronizing monologue. However, politics abhors a vacuum: The emergent situation gradually began to be exploited by "opportunist leaders" using biting phrases and thundering "bold" slogans. They put the banner "Down with the mafia" alongside a banner stating "Down with the government" and carried them above the columns of people. They were already starting to "take the Central Committee itself by storm"....

The second fundamental and undoubtedly favorable point conducive to extremism was the political dilettantism and the certain omnivorous quality displayed by the leaders of the informal movements themselves. They simply failed to realize the full danger of the growth of intolerance within their sphere. A well-known kind of stereotyped thinking was at work: Political neophytes often fall prey to their own illusions, since they initially gear themselves primarily to those who applaud them loudest and skillfully play up to them, while quietly sowing interethnic discord and striving to achieve their own dubious authority by exploiting noble sentiments. The members of informal groups have not yet been able to develop antidotes against them within their own sphere.

The third point not only provokes alarm but also gives pause for serious thought.

The position of certain Moldavian judicial officials seems strange, to say the least. A considerable proportion of those who blatantly instigated the disturbances have so far escaped with no more than a slight fright. Moreover, they consider themselves heroes of some sort and miss no opportunity to demonstrate their "suffering for their ideals"—even though this suffering usually amounts to a minimal fine of R20-50.

It is by no means a question of arresting and jailing people—the fact that the range of fines is very wide, running into many hundreds of rubles, is sufficient. However, the leniency of the bench raises certain questions.

There is no point hiding the fact that this legal liberalism is seen in certain quarters as some kind of gesture of encouragement. Has the tragic experience of the Transcaucasus really taught us nothing? Why is responsibility again (seemingly deliberately) being off-loaded onto the USSR Prosecutor's Office, which has been forced to send into the republic a group of investigators tasked with "investigating criminal actions of a nationalist nature together with the local investigative apparatus"? Are the Moldavian judges and prosecutors really incompetent? Or perhaps they lack something else—a state, political, international, and, ultimately, moral standpoint?

All this was highlighted Sunday 19 March, when two demonstrations—this time **sanctioned**—involving many thousands of people were held in Kishinev's Park of Culture and Rest. One was held under the auspices of the Mateyevich Club, the other under the wing of the "democratic movement."

Having taken up a position with our guide and translator near the stage of the "Green Theater"—which was being used by the organizers of the demonstrations—we heard the following conversation:

"The republic leaders are supposed to be here...."

"You're a bit optimistic! They won't show up without the militia!"

We looked round. Indeed, there was not a single militia uniform among the thousands and thousands of people in their Sunday best. However, the skeptics were wrong. First, the leaders did come and sat quite democratically among the people. Second, they came, of course, without the militia. And this at first immediately made for a quite friendly and, it struck me, sympathetic attitude toward them. People were curious and wanted to hear directly, face to face, the views of the Central Committee secretary, the president, and the premier....

Meanwhile, however, everything was being done on the stage, it seemed, to ensure that the atmosphere reached fever pitch. There was a speech by a staffer recently fired from the militia who, pale with the emotion of his boldness, read out a "top secret document" from the Moldavian SSR MVD. There was then an angry diatribe by a member of an informal group who had recently been quite rightfully arrested. Kids carrying tricolor flags soon took the stage....

"Statements" by some people were mixed up with "statements" by others and exposes of "intrigues" by ATEM [Moldavian Telegraph Agency] and the militia.... Fuel was added to the fire by the groundless and absurd statement that "special units have been sent to Kishinev from Moscow." Meanwhile the previously prepared banners abusing the republic's leaders fluttered over the sea of human heads....

One wondered what the point of it all was. And how far removed it was from a meeting of members of a music and literature club. I am sure that had Mateyevich (a subtle and amazingly multitalented poet, true intellectual, and internationalist who translated Pushkin, Lermontov, Chekhov, and Gorkiy into Moldavian and died tragically young) been alive he would have been by no means pleased to hear the shouts and whistles in his name.

How difficult it was for S. Grossu, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee; I. Kalin, chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers; and other republic leaders, appearing simultaneously before people for the first time, to answer questions in this atmosphere. They undoubtedly did have things to say. But there was a feeling that this dialogue was too late, that it should have been started sooner, when the mass demonstrations were not yet being directed by various demagogues and "extremists"; when the visits to the republic by representatives—essentially emissaries from the various "fronts" in other regions, sharing their experience of holding such rallies—had not yet become frequent; when the first print run of 60,000 publications in the Latin script had not been printed. And where did this happen? Not in Moldavia, but in the Baltic republics! (Which pleased the informal groups in that area).

There are very many of these "whens," but basically they amount to lost time and lost opportunities for conducting a constructive dialogue with people that would have benefited restructuring, for struggling for their souls, and for defending those souls from demagogues and political illusionists.

Yes, a meeting was held but, unfortunately, a dialogue did not result. And there probably could have been no other outcome, since such a dialogue today needs to learned both by people at the bottom and at the top. It is all the more distressing that there were actually people with whom a dialogue could have been conducted. Looking closely at people's faces, you could see that it was by no means the overwhelming majority who were shouting and whistling at some people in the leadership, only those grouped around the slogans and the tricolor flags. The fact that this background seemed to paralyze the will of very many people, who were undoubtedly thirsting for a more civilized discourse with the republic's leadership, is another matter. The disappointment showed clearly on their faces when a sensible phrase was cut short by a piercing whistle. However, they had to submit to the rules of a farce being played out by others.

The entire complexity and, to a certain extent, the drama of the present moment is that the social creativity of the upper and lower echelons of society has for the time being become disjointed. The goals seem to be the same, and people seem to be moving in the same direction—but they proceed in parallel, separately, without contact. And the space between these parallel lines is being filled by politickers, ambitious, self-seeking people, and plain unstable and socially immature people, whipping up feelings and sowing the poisonous seeds of interethnic discord.

Different peoples—Moldavians, Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, and Gagauzes—have been mixed up in the historic melting pot of Moldavia. With such a complex multinational structure, intolerance of each other is unthinkable—it spells tragedy from the outset. The responsibility of those who made so bold as to lead today's ethnic public associations is colossal. But precisely because not all of them seriously recognize this responsibility (as has been demonstrated by events) the level of responsibility of those currently at the helm of the republic is growing immeasurably. Administrative arrogance in attitudes toward social movements is just as impermissible as flirting with people who are preaching nationalist egoism and playing with fire with no thought to the consequences. We cannot agree with "legal flimflam" when it is necessary to apply existing laws in full measure. Nothing in politics is as costly as inconsistency and lack of resolve.

I still cannot forget the story of that rural lad's miraculous survival. Yet the people who trampled him underfoot had been demonstrating that day with slogans about restructuring.

Ukrainian Official Reviews Chernobyl Cleanup

PM3003100189 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 89 p 1

[Article by Ye.V. Kachalovskiy, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers: "Chernobyl. Three Years Later"; first paragraph is KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] The story is told by Ye.V. Kachalovskiy, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, who heads the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers permanent extraordinary commission to deal with the consequences of accidents, catastrophes, and natural disasters.

Kiev—It is nearly 3 years since the accident. Our commission was created the third day after the great calamity.

Proceeding from the degree of radioactive pollution, four zones were immediately earmarked. Some 92,000 people were evacuated from the first two —the exclusion zone and the temporary evacuation zone (and that includes 72 population centers). A further 136 population centers formed part of the fourth zone—the zone of

permanent monitoring—while periodic observation has been organized for 40 population centers. Today attention is being focused on precisely those population centers where people continue to live. Incidentally, about the 30-kilometer zone—today it is no longer the radius of a circle drawn around the station. Its form has changed: New territories have joined, it while others, conversely, are being studied in detail to decide whether it is possible to put them into economic circulation.

What had to be done first of all? Evacuating thousands of people and providing them with temporary accommodation. A study of the radioactive situation, however, showed that a rapid return to the exclusion zone was impossible. A "tail" of pollution extending to the Southwest was also revealed here, in Zhitomir Oblast. We had to immediately resolve problems of providing all the evacuees with permanent housing, of providing work for people, of paying financial compensation for houses, fruit plantations, and lost property, and of moving them to their resettlement sites.

But perhaps our main concern was how to create normal living conditions for the evacuees. Housing was not everything. We had to construct schools, stores, and sociocultural establishments. We were concerned with ensuring that each school had a canteen and buffet and that the school pupils were fed free three times a day. And how many kindergartens and paramedical and midwifery centers we had to construct.... All this required large additional material and financial resources.

We were not left alone in the calamity which befell us. The whole country came to our assistance. Even in 1986 the republic was allocated R395 million from account 904, into which funds had been put to render aid to the victims of the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station [AES]. In addition, R210 million were earmarked from the country's state budget. This was truly fraternal aid from all peoples of the country.

The country did not help us with money alone. How many volunteers came from all the fraternal republics to eliminate the consequences of the accident!

Despite all the complexity and magnitude of the solution of the entire package of tasks connected with evacuation, the problem of stabilizing the radiation situation in regions a considerable distance from the Chernobyl AES—including the north of Kiev, Zhitomir, Chernigov, and even Rovno oblasts—proved no less complex.

The 1986 radiation survey showed the need to introduce stringent monitoring of the content of the radionuclides (in practice these are cesium 137 and cesium 134) in locally produced food, both in the public sector and on private auxiliary farms. From the first days through to the present, attention has been focused on milk; where the cesium content exceeded the norm set by the USSR Ministry of Health, milk is purchased from the population and processed into butter, to which only an insignificant content of radionuclides is transferred.

The import of milk, meat, and vegetables from "clean" regions has been organized to feed the population. We pay the inhabitants of these villages R30 a month per person to acquire imported food. In addition, the wage rates (remuneration) of workers have been raised 25 percent.

With a view to reducing people's internal radiation, which occurs through the ingestion of radionuclides with their food, a resource-intensive program is being implemented which provides for the detailed study of all arable land, pastures, and fields with a view to restricting the passage of radionuclides into plants. Lime and mineral fertilizers are being applied to the soil, meadows and pastures are being radically improved, and a package of technical crop cultivation measures is being implemented. A large amount of work has been done to decontaminate the territory of population centers and provide them with amenities; central streets and sidewalks have been asphalted; and about 1,000 km of hard-surfaced roads have been laid.

Every house, every barn, yard, and garden has been checked. Roofs have been replaced, and fences—tens and hundreds of kilometers of fences—have been taken down. Earth has been moved from yards and streets. The situation has been complicated by the fact that the radioactive dirt fell in patches. I myself have frequently driven with specialists to the villages. One day they checked all the yards—everything seemed to be normal—but then they drove 200 meters from the village and saw a single tree and decided to take readings—they went off the scale. Of course, the tree was dug up and the earth surrounding it was taken away and decontaminated.

Specialists and scientists are constantly generalizing the results of the studies of the radiation situation and the population's health, adding details to their recommendations. They have reached the conclusion that the radiation dose over 70 years for any inhabitant born in 1986-1990 should not exceed 35 rems. This means that a person's additional radiation as a result of the accident will be no more than the dose of radiation from natural sources (it averages 35 rems throughout the country as a whole).

It is not possible to observe this condition in all villages, even when special measures are taken. That is why in the next few years it is planned to evacuate several more population centers. People have varying attitudes toward this decision. Some say that they won't go anywhere, that they have no intention of living for 200 years—while on the other hand young people agree to move, and as soon as possible.

Or one more problem: As a result of excessively optimistic statements by a number of departments, to the effect that all was entirely well with the radiation situation in a

certain part of the evacuation zone, over 1,000 people returned without authorization to their villages, from which the population had been evacuated. Here people do not consider factors like the territories' proximity to very high levels of radiation and the great variation in contamination over the territory of the population centers themselves. These reasons and the lack of a social infrastructure in these population centers make it impossible to ensure safety and to create normal conditions under which people, and especially children, could live. We are performing the relevant explanatory work and taking steps to prevent further unauthorized returns.

One of our serious concerns consists in the temporary centers for the burial of radioactive waste formed during decontamination work in the exclusion zone. There are several hundreds of these centers, but for reliable burial the waste must be processed and reduced in volume. The question of constructing a special enterprise is being worked on to resolve this task. Naturally, under no circumstances can there be any question of processing waste from other nuclear power stations in the zone of the Chernobyl AES.

Work to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl tragedy is continuing. In 1989 an additional 138 km of hard-surfaced roads, 110,000 square meters of sidewalks, 214 km of water pipelines, 105 artesian wells, and 126 km of gas distribution networks will be constructed in the affected regions, and many other operations will be performed aimed at improving the population's living conditions and improving the standard of consumer, medical, and sociocultural services.

People's Front Leader on Estonian Autonomy
PM3003084389 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Mar 89 p 2

[Estonian People's Front leader Tiit Made article: "If Moscow Were To Give Estonia Its Freedom"]

[Text] If Moscow were to stop to think, and forget for a moment its superpower ambitions, it would give Estonia its freedom. This could represent a significant economic and political gain. Moscow knows very well that the Estonians are eager to be free. The leaders in Moscow are unwilling either to accept the talk of occupation or to understand that Estonia has been colonized by them. Progressive historians, scientists, and public figures, however, have described the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact as a mistake. Consequently, the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet empire is also a mistake.

There are plans for an independent Namibia, and within 10 years Hong Kong will be freed from Great Britain's iron grasp. In New Caledonia a referendum on independence is to be held. The world's peoples have set out along the road to self-determination and self-rule.

Once this has been achieved they will be ready for peaceful cooperation. The Baltic countries still remain as the last vestige of a colonial system. And what do democratic countries such as the United States and Sweden, large organizations like the United Nations and the European Community, think about this? They have all fought eagerly for independence for Namibia and New Caledonia.

But, when all is said and done, why should Moscow offer the Estonians self-determination? An empire is never dissolved intentionally. There have only been temporary retreats, and they have been followed by new full-scale attacks. Afghanistan, too, was a retreat. Whether this can be viewed as the first sign of an empire's collapse is another question.

Is it possible that the interests of the Soviet central power and Estonia could coincide, so that we would be able to go our separate ways peacefully and in friendship?

In an economist's eyes, there are actually parallel interests. The Soviet Union's economy is in deep crisis. This superpower can no longer be described as an equal partner on the international stage, except perhaps in the field of arms production. From year to year living standards are slipping toward the abyss. There can be no suggestion that the Soviet Union is an industrially developed country; the correct term is a "country in a state of mediocre development."

According to UN statistics, as far as living standards are concerned the Soviet Union lies somewhere between 60th and 70th in the world. Despite the Soviet Union's enormous territory and considerable natural resources, its economic performance is poor, its labor skills and competitiveness low.

The situation is made worse by the fact that people can no longer support themselves satisfactorily. Russia once exported food; now the country is a major importer. As in the past, the development of agriculture is held in check by the four seasons and by world imperialism.

Estonia borrows food from Lithuania, buys potatoes from Cuba, and feeds its cattle on corn from the United States and Canada. The Soviet Union is not a world power, and the Russians are not a world people. Their economy is falling behind and will soon be inferior even to that of China.

What can Estonia do about this? How can it help the Russian giant? Under the present circumstances, within the framework of give and take, Estonia can do hardly anything. We are already being robbed most shamelessly; food is in short supply, and the stores are empty. That is why we are not interested in working—because initiative is punished. It is prosperity and not poverty that is being combated.

I am sure that if this article is read at the Soviet Embassy or is translated into Russian there and sent to Moscow, the first reaction will be:

Estonia is actually living at the expense of big brother. Without us the Estonians would be nothing; they would have neither food nor clothing. Only the support of all, and international aid, make it possible for the Estonians to keep body and soul together.

This is nothing new. In December 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev said that Estonia receives oil and oil products at prices below world prices. However, he said nothing about the fact that there is also a mutual exchange of goods at prices below those current on the world market. To take one example:

Estonia's imports of oil, oil products, fuel oil, and lubrication oil should, according to the 1988 prices on the world market, cost $39 million. But we provide the Soviet Union with meat, which at London prices would bring in $148 million. How would things be if one compared and set side by side the exchange of goods? This, however, is unacceptable to Moscow, because the image of central power and of big brother would suffer. Can this be called friendship between nations?

If Estonia could become free with Moscow's blessing, we would recover the desire to work. We would encourage initiative and pay people according to what they accomplished. Estonia would be able to produce considerably more food and consumer goods, which Leningrad, Novgorod, Moscow, Kostroma, Ulyanovsk, and other Russian cities need. We would be able to make a greater contribution to the Russian cities' food supplies. We would give the land back to the people, establish farmsteads and cooperatives, and raise the quality of food to its level of 50 years ago. The Estonians would resume coastal fishing and keep their waters clean.

At present this is impossible, because the policies of the all-union ministries are aimed at wasteful exploitation.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could form an excellent buffer zone between East and West. The Soviet Union is losing its middlemen in Finland, Austria, and Sweden who willingly bought goods in the West and sold them to the East. The Baltic states could take on this role. We have experience of what it is like to deal with Soviet trade bureaucrats. We have a European culture and are better equipped to establish contacts with people similar to ourselves in Sweden, Finland, Britain, and Canada. The Soviet Union can, if it really wants to become a world power, only gain from giving the Baltic countries their freedom.

The chauvinistic view that we are peripheral and are worth nothing without Moscow's help must be abandoned. Estonia could really become a window on Europe—something that was also the wish of Peter the Great, who, thanks to his imperialist ambitions, still enjoys great popularity in Russia.

What I have said above belongs to the world of wishful thinking. However, regardless of this, our course is clear: We give our wholehearted support to Gorbachev's ideas for a revolutionary reshaping of the Soviet Union. But the principles of equal rights and mutual understanding should be observed.

Estonian Party Paper Reports 14 March Rallies

PM2303125189 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 15 Mar 89 p 4

[ETA-attributed report by N. Grigoryeva under the general heading: "14 March: Tallinn, Kokhtla-Jarve, Tartu"]

[Text] Working people from the city of Kokhtla-Yarve's enterprises, organizations, and establishments gathered 14 March for a rally organized by the city's United Council of Labor Collectives under slogans like "No to priority of nations," "Long live Soviet Estonia!" and "We express mistrust in the republic's government!" The gathering honored with a minute's silence the soldiers who died liberating Soviet Estonia from the German fascist invaders and the victims of Stalinism.

The speakers at the rally voiced extreme concern at the prevailing political situation in the Estonian SSR, the distortion of the historic events of 1917-1920, and the role and significance of the republic's working class in establishing the first state system in Estonia.

"The Kokhtla-Yarve's United Council of Labor Collectives," worker Yu. Saykin said in his speech, "is on the whole in sympathy with the Interdvizheniye in Estonia, but does not adhere to certain extremist statements made from the Interdvizheniye Congress rostrum. We, the workers, believe that it is time to assess everything that has happened in the republic from principled, class positions."

"The ethnic division of the Estonian Communist Party seems dangerous to us. People talk to us about consolidation. But we cannot consolidate with anti-Soviet tendencies that are occurring within the republic," said B. Okun, a doctor at Kokhtla-Yarve's "Skoraya Pomoshch" Hospital.

"We support the Estonian people's desire to preserve their culture, individuality, history, language, and traditions," the address from the rally participants to the working people of Soviet Estonia says. "All of us who live in the republic need to pool our efforts today as never before to implement the party's decisions designed to restructure our entire society instead of exacerbating interethnic contradictions."

Despite concern at the political situation in the republic, the rally participants opposed ultimatums and strikes in favor of peaceful and thoughtful discussion and resolution of all contradictions.

Approximately 300 workers from Tartu's Instrument Plant gathered at the end of the working day 14 March for a rally in accordance with a decision of the party committee adopted jointly with the secretaries of party shop organizations in order to approve the "Elektrotekhnika" Production Association's appeal to the working class and all working people of the Estonian SSR, to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, to trade union central committee presidiums, to press organs, and to the mass media, and also to approve this collective's resolution (excluding items that mention the need to restore to enterprises apartments constructed at their expense in 1987 and 1988 and also the need to remove certain republic leaders from their posts). Many of the plant's workers voiced their opinion of the current situation in the republic at the rally.

Engineer I. Maloletko, who spoke at the rally, stressed that Russian- and Estonian-language collectives must work harmoniously—there is one working class. These collectives should not allow the mass media to drive a wedge between them; in this complex situation they should be guided by reason rather than by their emotions. A great deal of thought must be given before making any decisions.

A. Leonitskiy, secretary of the Komsomol organization, urged the plant collective to adopt a somewhat different program than that proposed in the Tallinn workers' address. The latter, in particular, mentions the need for a law on a republic referendum, a law on the press, and a law on young people, and returned a vote of no confidence in the current leadership of the People's Front, which does not accord with the demands of the movement's statutes.

Estonian Leaders Answer Yuriy Zhukov Article

PM3003105189 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 18 Mar 89 p 3

["Open Letter to Comrade Yu. Zhukov on His Article 'Guests Came to the Baltic....' in PRAVDA 11 March 1989"—SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA headline]

[Text] Esteemed Yuriy Zhukov!

We are following with attention and interest the way PRAVDA reflects the restructuring processes taking place in Soviet Estonia. The last article in this series was from your pen and was entitled "People Who Hamper International Cooperation." Your article in fact contains nothing new; it is couched in the best traditions of the time of stagnation, where all methods are permitted to achieve an aim. We are members of the same party as you, the Communist Party, and we live in the same country. But to "deliver a blow," you use the statements of an extreme right-wing French politician, gloat over them, and ascribe them to comrades in your party. These methods are not very widespread even in the West. Why, esteemed comrade, did you not ask us directly how and what and why?

The talk with members of the Europarliament group in the presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet was held to give them exhaustive information on restructuring in our country, on the policy of renewal which your party and ours has begun. We did not allow the stay in Soviet Estonia of this group of Europarliament members to proceed haphazardly, and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was informed of the program for their visit. Similar meetings have been organized in Lithuania and Latvia, which in our view was the only correct step on the eve of the official visit to the USSR by a European Parliament delegation at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

You found an "assistant" for writing your article in the French politician of extreme right-wing views, Philippe Malaud, but you could have clearly informed the Soviet reader of the statements of other members of the group, at least of their leader Hans-Joachim Seller, who frankly stated during their stay in the Soviet Baltic republics and after their return home that they see the future of the development of the Soviet Baltic republics as part of the USSR. But these social democratic assessments did not suit you, and the Tallinn council of the International Movement did not inform you of the fact, although they telegraphed to Moscow 3 weeks after the Europarliament group had left the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. In addition you could have familiarized yourself with information on this group's stay in the Estonian SSR available at the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Comrade Zhukov! The task of building "an all-European home" is indeed too important for the matter to be spoiled by political nearsightedness. And to resolve it we need constructive dialogue at the level of parliaments, and we must not be afraid of conducting a debate with representatives of different political forces, either. We will continue to promote cooperation and mutual understanding between Soviet parliamentarians and their counterparts from the Europarliament, with a view to detente and mutually advantageous cooperation. We knew without your "assistance" with whom we were dealing, but who, Comrade Zhukov, is still trying to hamper restructuring in international cooperation?

[Signed] With respect, A. Ryuytel, M. Titma, A. Gren.

Estonian People's Front Publishes Newspaper

LD2903111389 Tallinn SIRP JA VASAR in Estonian 17 Mar 89 p 15

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] On 15 March the first issue of the VABA MAA, the newspaper of the Estonian People's Front, appeared. The chief editor is Mart Tarmak, and Juri Nomm is acting editor. The following

comprise the editorial collegium: Kullo Arjakas, Ignar Fjuk, Arvo Junti, Ulo Kaevats, Siim Kallas, Tonu Karu, Marju Lauristin, Rein Raud, Edgar Savisaar, Mart Tarmak, and Rein Veidemann. The temporary address of the editorial board is 200 001 Tallinn, Uus 28. The print-run of the 8-page newspaper is 15,000, and the cost of each issue is 40 kopecks. [passage omitted]

Latvian Party Calls National Group Destructive

PM2903130189 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 18 Mar 89 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report: "At the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau's assessment of the political platform and goals of the Latvian National Independence Movement [LNIM] in connection with the documents adopted at that organization's congress (see CINA and SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA for 5 March 1989) evoked a broad public response. Many rayon party organizations, labor collectives, and public organizations are asking the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee to provide a broader roundup of the materials on which the Central Committee Bureau relied in its analysis, and also to show in more detail the actual process of discussion. Responding to these proposals, we publish a fuller account of the course of the Central Committee Bureau session on the question of the Latvian Communist Party's attitude toward the LNIM.

In discussing this question, the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau was guided by the fact that the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum held 5 January 1989 unequivocally gave a negative assessment of the LNIM's political views and actions. The Central Committee Plenum condemned the fact that LNIM members, occupying positions of political adventurism, attempt to inflame anti-Soviet and separatist sentiments, to deepen polarization and division among the republic's population, to repudiate the Latvian working people's historic choice in favor of socialism, and to declare the state system of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] to be illegal and subject to elimination.

The LNIM Congress was held in Ogra 18-19 February 1989 and adopted the movement's program and statutes and 11 different resolutions. After examining these documents, members of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau reached the conclusion that the Central Committee January plenum's assessments of the political complexion of the LNIM have not lost their topicality. The congress in Ogra made no substantial changes to the organization's political platform.

The participants in the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau session stressed that the LNIM's position is dominated by political demagoguery, appeals dictated by narrow national interests, and an irresponsible desire to portray as supposedly representative of the entire Lettish people extremist declarations that are in fact extremely out of touch with political and socioeconomic realities and the real interests of Soviet Latvia's multinational population. This clearly shows a desire to exacerbate interethnic relations, to idealize the model of bourgeois society, to counterpose the idea of regional isolation to the idea of the restructuring of the whole state, and to mount a campaign of denigration of the Latvian Communist Party and its leaders.

The participants in the Central Committee Bureau session assessed the increase in the activity of the LNIM recently as an open and direct attempt to form, under cover of general democratic restructuring slogans, a structure whose leaders make no secret of their ultimate goal—to create an organization with an anticommunist ideological and political platform in opposition to the policy of restructuring.

At the same time it is an incontestable fact that in implementing restructuring the Latvian Communist Party relies on broad, principled, and constructive dialogue and cooperation with any organizations or groups whose aims and methods of operation accord with the norms of the Soviet Constitution and the law and with the cardinal priorities of renewing socialism. Although the session participants, self-critically assessing the work carried out in this direction, stressed that the necessary dialogue is not yet deep and consistent enough, nevertheless, its initial results cannot be ignored.

It is precisely party organizations and Communists, along with the creative and scientific and technical intelligentsia and leading workers and peasants, who are persistently solving the republic's most important problems. In this connection mention was made of the problems of language, introducing republican economic accountability, preventing diktat by central ministries and departments, defending the interests of the republic's consumers, and many other specific questions. Problems of ecology, the continued de-Stalinization of society, and the strengthening of real democracy are also at the center of the Latvian Communist Party's attention. That the republic's population makes a high assessment of the party's contribution and Communists' activeness and purposefulness in resolving these questions is also shown by the fact that 86 Communists have been registered as candidate people's deputies in the republic, which is 89.6 percent of the total number of candidates.

The session participants noted that, unfortunately, a general trend is becoming increasingly evident in Soviet Latvia too. Namely, while recognizing the incontrovertible authority of the ideas of restructuring, the leaders of certain political groupings are trying primarily to "skim off the cream of political popularity" from the constructive programs put forward by the party and, on the other

hand, simply to omit to mention who was the author of those programs. This political plagiarism was a kind of pedestal for the LNIM also.

The movement's program certainly cannot be described as original. On the one hand it is characterized by a demand to ignore realities and the legal foundations of the present-day Latvian SSR and to restore bourgeois Latvia's constitutional principles, which operated from 15 February 1922 through 1940 and have been very familiar from the programs and actions of revanchist and conservative Lettish emigre forces throughout the postwar years. On the other hand, the document contains many ideas, demands, and approaches that have received total support from society and have been steadily featured for a considerable time now in the documents of both the party and the Latvian People's Front and other public organizations.

The participants in the session of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau noted that the LNIM Congress exposed the organization's course toward eliminating the Latvian SSR's existing socioeconomic system and political structure. A whole series of provisions of the LNIM program and the numerous resolutions adopted at the congress which attempt to slander the historical experience of Soviet Latvia, to discredit the processes of restructuring that are taking place under the party's leadership, and to denigrate the essential values of the socialist society serve to justify this aim. The hatred of Latvia as a Soviet Socialist Republic, of socialism as a system of social development, and of the policy of restructuring as a modern approach in overcoming the deformations caused in the past is so all-embracing that neither the LNIM Program nor the statutes say a word about these concepts. The movement's attitude toward the socialist society, its norms, and its principles is demonstrated most clearly of all by the fact, for instance, that neither the program nor the statutes contains even a hint of recognition of the Latvian SSR and USSR Constitutions or observance of socialist legality.

Bearing in mind the aforementioned "overriding task," it becomes clear that the LNIM regards Latvia's entry into the USSR as the ultimate cause of all the republic's problems. In turn, the elimination of this cause is the sole starting point envisioned for any solution. This is clearly stated in paragraph one of the "General Principles" section of the LNIM Program:

"The political, national, economic, and cultural crises in Latvia are consequences of the 5 August 1940 annexation which cannot be eliminated without restoring an independent Latvian Democratic Republic."

One characteristic feature of the LNIM documents is a negative attitude toward the national statehood as it really exists today. An attitude ranging from claims that the socioeconomic and political system is illegitimate and has no rights to exist, to special appeals to Western states' governments not to change "their" so-called "policy of nonrecognition" with regard to the Baltic states.

The LNIM regards only the Latvian state structure defined by the 15 February 1922 constitution—that is, the bourgeois parliamentary republic with capitalist organization of the economy—as the only legitimate and only possible one. The demands put forward in LNIM documents for the restoration of private ownership, the denationalization of industry and land, and the elimination of central planning should also be assessed from this viewpoint. The demands in question, which are voiced in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the LNIM Program, are formulated as follows:

—"to abolish petty interference by the state in the economy and centralized planning of the economy and to ensure opportunities for the equal development of all forms of ownership, including private ownership of means of production;

—" to ensure the radical implementation of an agrarian reform and to restore the right of private ownership of land."

The session participants also assessed the "Resolution on Alienation" as directly antisocialist and as aimed against the policy of restructuring. Here is its text:

"The LNIM regards the alienation of industry, trade, land, and other property as illegal and demands that it be abolished, and also that compensation be paid for the irrecoverable losses resulting from it. The advantages of the various forms of ownership are displayed only when there is free competition between private, cooperative, and state ownership."

The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau assessed the aforementioned postulates of the LNIM Program and the congress resolution as political declarations regarding the restoration of the capitalist state system and capitalist exploitation in Latvia. It was emphasized that such a posture has and can have nothing in common with the policy of restructuring begun by the party and with the revolutionary renewal of socialist society. The LNIM expressed its negative attitude toward the policy of restructuring openly and cynically, devoting just one sentence to it in its program. Namely: "The latest reform campaign—the weakening of centralization, the liberalization of power, and increased cultural autonomy—cannot radically improve the situation."

The Central Committee Bureau members also harshly condemned the resolution on citizenship in which, citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations, the LNIM hypocritically proposes a totally undemocratic, discriminatory way of solving citizenship problems and envisages retroactive effect of the law when defining priority citizenship rights for some of

the republic's indigenous inhabitants. Citizenship itself is regarded only as an attribute of the bourgeois state. In full, the text of the resolution is as follows:

"According to paragraph 15 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, no one can be willfully deprived of citizenship or of the rights to decide to change citizenship. Therefore the USSR Supreme Court resolution of August 1940 on granting USSR citizenship to inhabitants of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia is a crude violation of the norms of international law. Since de jure the Latvian Republic still exists, everyone who had Latvian citizenship before 17 June 1940 and their descendants, if they so wish, should be deemed citizens of Latvia. Only the legislative institutions of an independent Latvia are competent to decide on granting Latvian citizenship to other persons. Only citizens of sovereign Latvia have the right to elect and to be elected, but no restriction of human rights with regard to other persons is permissible."

The demand put forward by the LNIM Program that public organizations and parties alone have the right to nominate candidate deputies is a step backward compared with the present Law on Elections. The participants in the Central Committee Bureau session drew attention to the fact that the LNIM denies the legality and democratic nature of the elections of USSR people's deputies and the movement's leaders justify their participation in them solely by tactical considerations aimed at enhancing their own political popularity. The statement on the upcoming elections adopted by the LNIM Council back on 8 January of this year was mentioned in this connection. It said, inter alia: "Given the presence of military occupation forces and other USSR repressive forces, the elections cannot be legitimate, free, and democratic." A bit further on it said: "The question of whether there is any point at all in taking part in the elections arises in these circumstances. However, the struggle to regain Latvia's independence will be difficult and will require the use of various methods of political struggle, so we must not delay over the practical utilization of them." In this address the LNIM Council told its members to take part in the elections in order to master election campaign tactics and to use the election campaign to popularize the movement's ideas. This approach was condemned as a dishonest and demagogic maneuver on the part of the LNIM leaders prompted by a desire to satisfy their own ambitions, and also as an action having nothing in common with the processes of the democratization and renewal of socialist society. Ultimately this is irresponsible manipulation of ordinary members of the movement and its sympathizers and speculation on the positive processes of the revival of national awareness and on people's feelings of patriotism.

The participants in the Central Committee Bureau session condemned the LNIM's attempts to use the elections of people's deputies as a school of anti-Soviet and antisocialist struggle for certain political demagogues who, taking refuge behind the slogans of restructuring, entertain illusions of leading its processes into an impasse and restoring a socioeconomic system founded on private ownership in Latvia.

The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau also assessed the congress resolutions on mistrust of the government and on the movement's attitude toward the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee as politically extremist. The first of the resolutions declares: "Considering that the present Latvian SSR Council of Ministers after long delay has been unable to adopt laws on ending immigration and on the state language that are consonant with the people's interests, and also the fact that representatives of an organization hostile to the Lettish people, namely the International Front, were invited to take part in discussing these laws, the LNIM expresses mistrust of the present Council of Ministers." And the second contains the sentence: "The LNIM Congress condemns the position of the present Latvian Communist Party Central Committee regarding the LNIM, 'Helsinki-86,' and other progressive sociopolitical organizations."

Although the participants in the LNIM Congress described themselves without excessive modesty as members of a progressive sociopolitical organization, the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau arrived at the decision that the aforementioned resolutions are a further episode in the campaign of threats and political and economic blackmail mounted lately by antirestructuring forces. They are an open attempt to destabilize the sociopolitical situation in the republic and the attitude toward such remarks, from whatever quarter they emanate, can only be unequivocally negative and condemnatory.

The Central Committee Bureau also noted the fact that the resolutions adopted by the LNIM Congress deny most important essential principles of organization of Soviet society. For instance, the LNIM rejects the principle of universal military service. The resolution on military service says: "Latvia has been occupied since 17 June 1940. According to the norms of international law, the drafting of the population of such a territory for military service in the occupiers' armed forces is illegal."

In a special resolution the LNIM Congress spoke out against the strengthening of Soviet Latvia's international prestige. Now that even many Western states regard the "policy of nonrecognition" as a throwback to the cold war and are linking their plans with the strengthening of the policy of new thinking in international affairs, the LNIM Congress adopts the following resolution: "The majority of governments still do not recognize the annexation of the Baltic states by the USSR. This position favors aspirations toward restoring an independent Latvia. The LNIM calls on governments which have still not extended de jure recognition to the Latvian SSR not to change their attitude toward the legal status of the Latvian Republic."

Noting that only conservative Western circles continue not to recognize Soviet Latvia, the participants in the Central Committee Bureau session assessed the LNIM's position on this question as openly anti-Soviet.

The LNIM Congress expressed a negative attitude in connection with the initiative by the Latvian People's Front, other public organizations, and many inhabitants of the republic proposing that the red, white, and red flag and the song "God Bless Latvia" be deemed the state flag and anthem under the procedure envisaged by law. The relevant resolution says: "The LNIM Congress believes that the recognition of the red, white, and red flag as the state flag of the Latvian SSR and of the Lettish people's prayer 'God Bless Latvia' as the Latvian SSR national anthem is sacrilege. They can be used as the state flag and anthem only in a sovereign Latvian state."

This resolution reveals some more extremely characteristic features of the activity of the LNIM leaders—political demagoguery and deception of society in the interests of their own group. Namely: In the summer of 1988, when there was committed and keen debate of the problem of national symbols, the LNIM leaders also vigorously claimed that what was essential here was the national and ethnographic aspect, not the official state aspect. Moreover, they loudly and insistently attempted to label those who upheld the viewpoint that these symbols have official state overtones as "stagnationists" and "Stalinists." But not even a year later, the LNIM leaders have utterly swept aside any talk of national ethnographic values and leitmotivs. On the other hand they have stated unequivocally that these symbols are solely associated with the form of Latvian statehood and official symbols which existed before 20 June 1940 and which the LNIM regards as its goal to restore.

Having analyzed the LNIM Congress materials, the public statements of LNIM leaders, and other documents, the participants in the Central Committee Bureau session reached the conclusion that the LNIM is a group politically opposed to Soviet Latvia as a sovereign socialist state within the federation of sovereign Soviet republics and a group whose leaders' aim is not the revolutionary renewal of socialism but the restoration of a bourgeois capitalist society in Latvia.

The session participants also comprehensively analyzed questions of relations between the republican party organization and the LNIM, primarily determining the basic principles of Communists' attitude toward it.

It was stressed that lately the LNIM's activeness has been increasingly involved with explicitly antiparty, anticommunist propaganda activity. In their public statements, and also in their bulletin NEATKARIBA, the organization's leaders and activists counterpose to the party's policy a whole heap of propaganda materials that are not so much constructively critical as provocative and inflame antipathy toward the Communist Party and the organs of Soviet power. The authors deliberately display a primitive subjectivist approach that is essentially borrowed from the arsenals of Stalinism.

Naturally, the formation of such a stereotype requires not arguments and proof, but political squealing—heated emotions, lies, scathing epithets, and clusters of global generalizations. As a rule, the theme is extremely primitive, tried and tested by anti-Soviet propaganda over the years, and polished almost to the point of "brilliant simplicity." Namely: Wherever the Lettish people had a hard time or are having a bad time now, the party is to blame. All the problems stem only from the party's malevolence and criminal attitude toward the people. And the second method is this: to willfully ascribe to party leaders or organs remarks that they did not make and actions that they did not take, and then to publicly reproach them over this.

An article in the third issue of the LNIM bulletin, NEATKARIBA, entitled "The Lettish People Under the Leadership of the Communist Party: How Much Longer?" was cited as one of the most typical examples. S. Dums, the author of the article, describes the sufferings brought to the Lettish people by the Latvian Communist Party over the years of its existence. The author's extremely emotional and unscrupulous attitude toward the historical aspect of the theme is typical. He writes: "Among the people the word Communists is associated with mass deportations, brutal murders, and a barbaric attitude toward cultural values and toward reducing those employed in agriculture to the status of slaves." He continues in similar vein until the conclusion: "Does the Communist Party today have the juridical and moral right to lead the state? If the people still trust the bright vanguard after these years of lies and suffering, what are such a people worth? The state must be run by people who have earned the people's trust and who hold nothing more sacred than the people's interests. The time has come to be masters in our land."

The Central Committee Bureau session noted that this slander and bile could, of course, be left to the author's conscience and regarded as a kind of product for "internal consumption," except that a number of assertions suggest that this is the fundamental position of the LNIM leaders.

The speakers also recalled that E. Repshe, addressing the extraordinary congress of the Latvian SSR Journalists Union, explained that he was involved in journalism as the editor of the aforementioned bulletin NEATKARIBA—that is, the person who to a decisive extent determines and shapes the complexion and political orientation of the publication. On the other hand, LNIM board members E. Repshe and Yu. Dobelis have been registered as candidates for USSR people's deputy and the LNIM, under the leadership of its leaders, is fighting with all its strength for people's votes. At any rate, it is clear even at a glance that the aforementioned article and the antiparty position set out in it are a substantial

element in the LNIM election campaign. The LNIM's endeavors in general to stand in political opposition to the Communist Party are also obvious.

Speaking about the LNIM's oppositionism, the participants in the Central Committee Bureau session stressed that in essence it would be an exaggeration to speak of any opposition, for an opposition must envisage the existence of at least some kind of constructive program. The LNIM lacked such a program last year, and even the congress could formulate nothing in this regard.

Just one thought, one "idee fixe" continues to dominate—denigrating, banning, and slinging mud at Soviet Latvia and the party and doing this at any price, without troubling over the means, according to the principle: The worse, the better. There are still only calls to abolish and eliminate. In short, let us eliminate first, and then we shall see. This is a dangerous and destructive position that may have very tragic consequences. It is criminal to play with a people's history, fate, and future in this way.

After comprehensive discussion at the Central Committee Bureau session, the political assessments emerged which formed the foundation of the provisions of the decision that was adopted. Let us repeat here the most significant of them: The LNIM is a sociopolitical organization with an antisocialist and destructive platform; the LNIM is an organization whose actions are directed against the policy of restructuring and its implementation in Soviet Latvia; the LNIM does not recognize and repudiates the Latvian SSR Constitution and the socialist society's basic values; the LNIM political platform repudiates the socialist statehood of Latvia and the existing social system and puts forward the aim of restoring bourgeois statehood and with it the capitalist mode of production and exploitation; the LNIM is making efforts to form a political structure that would be in antagonistic opposition to the Latvian Communist Party; the LNIM's activity is dominated by political and national demagoguery, the giving of higher priority to the interests of its own group than to the interests of the people, and parasitizing on the beneficial processes of national rebirth and people's feelings of patriotism, which may substantially exacerbate and destabilize the sociopolitical situation in the republic.

The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau's viewpoint on Communists' attitude and tasks in connection with the activity and political complexion of the LNIM is set out in the special report on the Bureau session in the republic's mass media (see CINA and SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA for 5 March), so there is no need to repeat it here.

Latvian Scientist Comments on Economic Reforms

PM2903145689 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Candidate of Economic Sciences Sergey Dimanis by I. Litvinova in Riga: "The Cart Before the Horse?"; date not given]

[Text] Candidate of Economic Sciences Sergey Dimanis, a scientist from Latvia, reflects on the draft laws associated with economic reform.

[Litvinova] A group headed by you formulated one of the concepts of republican economic accountability in Latvia. Ideas are currently being tried out; many of them are contentious; and you yourself often participate in economic disputes. The published draft Law on Output Quality and the Protection of Consumer Rights made these disputes keener. How does the draft fit in with the new economic developments, particularly in Latvia?

[Dimanis] We have not yet succeeded in normalizing production relations. During the years of stagnation there was, instead of economic motivation, ideological pressure. And what now? Now we try to substitute legal relations for production relations. This is manifested in the new draft law, for instance in the chapter "Fundamentals of the System of Ensuring Output Quality in Socialist Production Relations."

Is this not an oversimplification—substituting an abundance of laws for a rule-of-law state? These laws are being created both where they are necessary and where we could do without them. Real economic relations that would ensure quality have not yet been established, but instead we have...a Law on Quality. In my view a rule-of-law state is defined not by the number of laws, but by the question of where you go when a problem arises—to an organization higher up the scale, or to the court.

[Litvinova] Well, fine: If it is not the law, what really influences quality today?

[Dimanis] I would identify three "mainstays": the economic concept, management stereotypes, and economic precedents that developed over the recent 5-year plan periods.

Let us begin with the concept. Despite endless assurances about the commencement of economic reform, the central organs of economic management are basically continuing to maintain the paramountcy of growth rates over balance and quality.

[Litvinova] Is the acceleration of the rate of production necessarily in conflict with other economic objectives?

[Dimanis] Theoretically, no. But in practice, everything else is sacrificed to growth rates. Throughout the world there is a different picture: Balance and quality take undisputed priority over growth rates. As a result, natural relations develop between sectors—growth rates depend on effective demand in the market, and not on pouring more and more resources into the economic system.

Sometimes one has the impression that high growth rates are necessary not so much economically as politically. Are we deceiving ourselves again? The incorrect concept leads to corresponding management stereotypes. Management organs customarily "set" growth indicators for sectors, sectors for associations, and associations for

enterprises. As a result each enterprise is given its percentage for the growth of production volumes. And although the indicator is supposed to be a control figure, people at the enterprise are very well aware of what people "up above" expect of them. The Law on the State Enterprise is overruled by "telephone law." I have more than once witnessed telephone conversations between enterprises' chief economists and ministries on the subject of the commodity output indicator. A lamentable sight.... The strong-arm tactics begin when, after adding up the contracts concluded with enterprises under their jurisdiction, the people at the ministry become convinced that growth targets will inevitably not be met. Things go particularly hard for those who produce consumer goods, because their output goes to make up a very important national economic relationship—the correlation between the population's financial income and expenditure. And so the directors have to decide which will result in the more painful consequences for them: low growth rates, or low quality?

[Litvinova] All the same, surely the economy needs legal norms?

[Dimanis] Of course it does. But we are turning everything upside down when we try to substitute juridical laws for the general laws of economics. What is the point, for instance, of the entry in Article 20 of the published draft: Prices should reflect output quality and be used as an active means of influencing its improvement? Of course they should! But this is such a complex economic problem that when you think about it you become instantly aware of the full extent of the inadequacy of your own economic education. This is not an article from a law, it is a quotation from a political economy textbook from the period of stagnation.

[Litvinova] Are you proposing something?

[Dimanis] Instead? In my view we need a USSR Council of Ministers resolution containing a thorough analysis of the economic impasse in the sphere of quality. (Incidentally, not so very long ago, on 12 May 1986, a resolution was adopted "On Measures To Radically Improve Output Quality." What became of it?) After all, we are supposed to have recognized that the problem of quality has its roots in the imperfections of the entire economic system, not in the lack of some laws or other.

[Litvinova] The economic mechanism and the law should help one another. That seems clear enough. What is unclear is—how?

[Dimanis] First, let me distinguish between the economic mechanism and the law. The former, in my view, forms the motivation of production components, while the latter imposes on economic behavior conditions and restrictions that are reasonable from the viewpoint of the public interest. If you look at the legal aspect alone, world practice shows that quality is ensured first and foremost through the concluding and the content of a delivery contract or contract of sale. On sale, goods should be defined as to quantity and quality. There are various ways of doing this: by samples, by description, by standards (and then the contract makes reference to the standard), or with the appendage of a specification to the contract, stipulating the variety and quality characteristics of the item being sold. The seller's responsibility for any hidden defects in the item is also stipulated. There are also general rules on the consequences of the violation of a bilateral contract and compensation for losses.

In world practice, the quality of goods is also ensured by antitrust laws, the law on unfair competition, legal norms governing responsibility for injury, and so forth. And it is no use shrugging this aside and saying: This is beside the point for us. In fact it is very much "to the point," because it follows from the general orientation of the economic reform that we are embarking on the path of forming a socialist market.

The political economy part of the draft law has lost sight of the basic idea: **The consumer should influence quality**. How? Through the development of the market and socialist competitiveness among producers of output. Instead of this, the draft incorporates this thesis: It (the enterprise) "is not entitled to seek to improve its economic position to the detriment of the quality of the output produced or to take action leading to the monopolization of production and detrimental to the consumer's interests." How simple—"not entitled." As if the large associations now being set up will observe this "restriction" without fail!

Or take the second chapter. It provides for the formation of groupings of consumer enterprises, with a view to overcoming the suppliers' monopoly. Again, this is the wrong way around: Instead of breaking down the producer into smaller units, it is proposed to amalgamate consumers into larger units. Groupings are useful as associations of enterprises for the purpose of the joint fulfillment of some economic task, such as breaking into the foreign market, deepening production sharing, or setting up joint production units. But setting up groupings in order to distribute goods in short supply? What is the point?

My opinion is that the main lever for improving quality can only be freedom to choose your supplier. One of the state's tasks should be to create parallel structures. How? There are various possibilities. They include breaking up associations that were set up earlier, promoting the diversification of production (for instance, through the free transfer of technical documentation to a potential competitor—this is done in some countries), and providing incentives for the setting up of small-scale production units. At the moment centripetal forces in the economy are intensifying, most lamentably in those sectors that produce consumer goods.

[Litvinova] Our republic has experienced for itself the consequences of indiscriminate amalgamation. The traditional, customary style of economic management, in which small enterprises played a significant role, was destroyed casually, thoughtlessly.

[Dimanis] Some economists think that at least 40 percent of our republic's manpower should work in small-scale production. I support this view.

[Litvinova] What is your opinion on the state's role in quality control?

[Dimanis] Judge for yourself—from the range of problems. The state's main task is the formulation of state standards and rules. Apart from that, it is the organization of a system of certification of output produced for export, as well as for any output that (if its manufacture is of poor quality) constitutes a danger to the ecology, to life, or to health. Let us add the organization of extradepartmental expert reports, and the broad discussion of ecologically dangerous regional and large-scale projects. No other supervision of autonomously operating enterprises is necessary. Let economic laws exert their influence—and consumers.

[Litvinova] A comprehensive quality control system was introduced in the republic at one time. Does the experience of its application have anything to teach us?

[Dimanis] I am tempted to make a wry joke: We have the system, but not the quality. And in this case the experience is, I think, negative. The system, like the draft new law, seemed to provide for everything necessary: a normative base incorporating a range of republican standards and standards for enterprises, methodological instruction manuals, and other documents, a system of industrial testing, and so on and so forth. But the most important thing was and is lacking—the incentive to produce good output. Instead of an incentive, the duty to work well is imposed... The same is true of the draft law we are analyzing: "It is the duty of every citizen participating in social production to work conscientiously and create good quality output by his labor." Again, you cannot take that to court.

[Litvinova] But let us come back to republican problems. Especially since another draft has also been published—the General Principles for Restructuring Leadership of the Economy and the Social Sphere in the Union Republics.

[Dimanis] As you know, regional economic accountability models are being developed actively in the republics.

In the course of formulation of the concepts, two approaches clashed. The first is to impose order by force of a local, authoritarian economic power. What does this require? The maximum number of rights and a great deal of money and material resources. Under conditions in which a unionwide market is lacking, it is planned to reassign a number of production units. How will the capacities thus released be used? For small-scale production of the output that the republic itself needs.

[Litvinova] And what about the enterprises' autonomy?

[Dimanis] This question is expressed in purely declarative terms in the concept. And that is understandable: A narrow, uncompetitive republican market can offer no real grounds for autonomy. True, the concept provides for all the external market attributes, a taxation economy. But it is already clear that the real economic conditions will inevitably reproduce the classical administrative decree system on a republican scale. Bringing leadership closer to the site of production will yield some benefits. But the move toward a subsistence form of republican economy will negate that effect.

The second approach is to base republican economic accountability on the autonomy of republican enterprises. Let them operate freely in the republican, unionwide, and foreign markets and earn money for the republic, which it, in turn, uses for resolving both production and social tasks. Experience shows that the first market relations, admittedly weak as yet, are appearing around those enterprises that have switched to lease conditions. It is not easy to create a market; it is a lengthy process, and it must be realized that the urgency of many republican problems will clearly predetermine the development of events according to the first scenario.

[Litvinova] Will it not follow that enterprises will cast off with difficulty the yoke of one bureaucracy, only to fall into the hands of another?

[Dimanis] It could very well happen. There is such a strong desire (for understandable reasons, on the whole) to protect our own little hypothetical republican order from the big, supposedly global unionwide disorder.... That is why some people are so attracted by the ideas of republican ownership and our own currency. Serious scientists appear to be giving people the illusion that economic separatism will make it possible in 10 years to achieve the condition of Finland....

For the development of republican self-management [samokhozyaystvovaniye] on a democratic model, it is highly necessary to make the unionwide economic model "work." But instead, I repeat, we get a draft law in the style of the good old bureaucracy, confusing legal and economic relations.

It seems to me that brakes are beginning to operate that could not only stop the reform, but put it into reverse. I do not want union departments to hold undivided sway in the republic, but I also do not like the idea of the local bosses turning the republic into something like a large farm (with, among other things, its own currency).

The experience of the 1965 reform and the last few years make it possible to draw a number of conclusions in principle. First, this: Once you have destroyed market relations, you cannot resurrect them on the full, desirable scale all at once. So, while trying to create "a little of the market" everywhere, at the same time you have to preserve the basic elements of traditional management.

[Litvinova] But surely the system of plan prescriptions and administrative decree methods of influence are in conflict with the market, logically in conflict?

[Dimanis] Let me add that the converse is also true: The market can only hamper the traditional approaches. The solution? In my view the economic system should be based on the principle of a "mosaic structure," where market and nonmarket sections of the economy coexist (you could also say competitive and noncompetitive spheres).

A market is not made, it forms. If, of course, the preconditions are created. The most promising in this respect are the lease system, cooperative ownership, communal ownership, municipal ownership....

The market emerges from a kind of primordial chaos. Unfortunately, this is not a popular idea. Nonetheless we have to go through the decline in production volumes, the differentiation of incomes, structural unemployment, and a major, multifaceted reform of pricing. With real, not merely ostensible, remuneration according to labor. We are not the first, nor the last. It is in payment for our past mistakes. In the first instance we will need a relatively wide range of various kinds of restrictions, subsidies, exemptions, and similar levers. There is no need to be afraid of them; after all, they are virtually elements of market management.

[Litvinova] We have gradually moved away from the law to the market; let us make the reverse trip in conclusion.

[Dimanis] It is a very short journey. The fate of the Law on Quality will, I fear, be similar to that of the Law on the State Enterprise. Now you see it, now you don't. I once said in conversation with some Western economists that the Law on the State Enterprise that we adopted is not being fulfilled, it is hanging in the air. They were astonished: The law is not being fulfilled? But this is, alas, what happens with a law that is divorced from reality, from its foundations. In such cases, the people have a saying: "Don't put the cart before the horse." Shall we listen to them?

Latvian Academics Differ With Draft Language Law
PM2903132589 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 12 Mar 89 p 2

[Readers' letter under the rubric "We Discuss Draft Law on Languages": "Referendum Essential"]

[Text] While supporting measures being taken on the legal protection of the Latvian language, we nonetheless cannot agree with a great deal in the draft law. Above all the need to know the literary Latvian language as an essential condition for work in all places where people deal with business correspondence, design estimate documentation, and so on is one of its basic unacceptable provisions. This is essentially directed at the further demarcation of the republic's working people along national and linguistic lines.

The requirement of Article 15 of the draft law that the language of technical draft documentation formulated in the republic must be Latvian is directed at qualitatively changing the composition of planners and designers and also corresponding engineering and technical subdivisions in enterprises and in construction organizations with a sharp reduction in them of the proportion of the Russian-speaking population who do not know the literary Latvian language or specialist technical terminology in Latvian.

It is virtually impossible to introduce the literary Latvian language in such a strictly regulated period in all spheres of state and public life and production without replacing a significant section of the present cadres with people whose only virtue is knowledge of the language required. We also see this in the example of the "Latgiproprom" Institute where out of a thousand workers about 75 percent are Russian-speaking workers.

The consequences of implementing the principle proposed by the draft law on the formation of collectives on a linguistic basis in a specific demographic situation in the republic when the Russian-speaking section of the population makes up about half of all the inhabitants are quite obvious. Such cadre policy will be a direct breach of constitutional norms proclaiming the equality of all citizens regardless of their nationality and language.

In our opinion, the draft law does not accord with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the USSR Constitution and the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Constitution, and also the resolution of the 15th Latvian Communist Party Plenum (January 1989), which indicates the need for the strict observance of Leninist principles to ensure real bilingualism and the recognition of any language's right to free and full development, and which indicates the inadmissibility of the slightest coercion or excessive administration in this work. It also contradicts the ideas of the 19th all-union party conference.

It is essential to base the formulation of the draft law on languages in the Latvian SSR on (after its adoption) the All-Union Law on the Free and Equal Use of Languages of the USSR's Peoples whose preparation is under way.

Taking into account the role of the Russian language as the means of interethnic communication, we consider it essential to build real bilingualism in the republic on the basis of recognizing Russian as well as Latvian as a state

language. Consequently, guarantees of the development of the culture of national minorities in the republic should also be constitutionally enshrined.

In connection with the importance of the law on languages the question of its adoption should be resolved not at a republic supreme soviet session but by a referendum of the Latvian SSR's entire population.

[Signed] "Latgiproprom" Institute officials G. Aliyev, R. Birman, V. Drozdov, V. Kaleys, S. Ruzhevichute, V. Shostak, V. Yuris, and others—a total of 240 signatures

Alternative to Latvian Language Law Proposed
PM2903140789 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 12 Mar 89 p 2

[Letter from industrial worker Yu. Zemel: "Setting Ambitions Aside"]

[Text] Such an important and sensitive issue as the language question cannot be resolved by administrative-edict methods borrowed from the recent and unlamented past.

Unfortunately, the commission on formulating the draft law ignored the results of the survey carried out by the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Party History Institute Center for the Study and Forecasting of Public Opinion, which states: "On average one in three of our respondents recognizes that the formal administrative approach in expanding the sphere of use of the Latvian language also causes complications in some cases. Incidentally, in this case Letts themselves are critical—43 percent of them mentioned this factor as provoking clashes" (SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 11 December 1988).

The draft law as published copies our neighbors' similar law without taking into account the peculiarities of the national composition of our republic, where non-Letts account for almost half the entire population. Why, instead of the existing practical bilingualism in the republic, does the language of half the population immediately become the state language, while the language of the other half of the population immediately becomes a "secondary" language which they "can use" in accordance with the new law?

Is it really correct to establish (regardless of the timetable for introduction) the Latvian language as that of official business in Latgale, where it is neither the native language of most of the population, nor the language of interethnic communication?

The switch to Latvian in the official business of union associations and enterprises looks absurd. This will lead to serious complications in their activity and to totally unjustified expenses, since most of these enterprises' ties are outside the republic—they have only a minimum inside it.

Paragraphs two and three of Article 6 of Chapter II constitute just as much of a "ban on professions" as the one for which we only recently used to criticize the FRG so zealously.

The draft law's numerous points supposed to guarantee the use of the Russian language will not work as such, since they are mostly rhetorical and difficult to monitor during implementation of the law.

A statute on two equal state languages—Latvian and Russian—can be the only alternative to the proposed draft law on language.

The language of official business in each organization, association, and enterprise should be chosen from the two by decision of the labor collective on the basis of national economic expediency, the collective's traditions, and its national composition. Organizations would answer in the state language in which the request was put. Each citizen living in the republic would have the right to address any official body in one of the state languages and to receive an answer in that language.

In the near future the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet will have to resolve a most important question in the republic's life.

To adopt the published draft law on one state language would be to take the next step toward exacerbating interethnic relations and thus to assume responsibility for the further consequences of that exacerbation.

To adopt a law on two state languages, thereby enshrining the bilingualism which objectively exists, would be to take a step toward reducing interethnic tension, a step toward consolidating the republic's peoples for restructuring.

It is to be hoped that common sense will prevail over national ambitions.

[Signed] Yu. Zemel, Latvian honored industrial worker

Lithuanian Unity Group Backs Brazauskas Report
PM2803145189 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 17 Mar 89 p 3

[P. Pavlov report: "They Expressed Their Support"]

[Text] A plenary session of the "Vienybe-Yedinstvo-Jednosc" Socialist Movement for Restructuring in Lithuania Coordination Council took place in Vilnius. Representatives of the organizations of Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaypeda, Shyaulyay, Druskininkay, and Snechkus, and of a number of other cities and rayons in the republic took part in it. The results of the 17th Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum were discussed at the session. A "statement," which was adopted unanimously, said in particular:

"The coordination council shares and supports the propositions and conclusions of the report by Lithuanian Communist Party First Secretary Algirdas Brazauskas 'On the Party Organization's Work To Rally Together the Republic's Public To Solve the Tasks of Restructuring.'

"The council appeals to all the movement's groups, and all its supporters to actively participate in political, organizational and educational work to rally the working people on the basis of the Appeal by the CPSU Central Committee 'To the Party and Soviet People' and the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Appeal 'To Communists, Working People, and All the Republic's Electors.'

"The council takes into consideration the critical remarks directed at the movement which were contained in Comrade A. Brazauskas' report, and will draw appropriate conclusions from them.

"The council appeals to the movement's groups and all supporters to effectively cooperate with party organizations, Soviet organs, and all public formations, which support socialist positions, in drawing up and promptly implementing specific economic and social solutions for deepening restructuring."

* Statute on Lithuanian State Flag Published

WA18000669 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 23 Feb 89 p 1

[Text] 1. The state flag of the Lithuanian SSR is the national flag. It is a piece of cloth consisting of three equal horizontal colored strips. The top one is yellow, the one in the middle is green, and the bottom one is red. The ratio between the width and length of the flag is 1:2.

This combination of yellow, green and red is the color representation of the historically established Lithuanian national symbols, embodying the national-historical statehood of the Lithuanian SSR.

It is accepted that the yellow represents the color of the sun. It symbolizes light, prosperity, nobility and honesty, and spiritual greatness. The green is the color of vegetation. It is the color of the beauty of nature, life, hope, freedom, and joy. Red is the color of the land and blood. It embodies love, daring, courage, and blood shed for the fatherland.

2. The state flag of the Lithuanian SSR will fly:
a. On the buildings of the USSR Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers, the local soviets of people's deputies and on the tower of Gediminas Castle in Vilnius and on buildings as stipulated by resolutions of the executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies, at all times;
b. On the buildings of ministries, state committees and departments, sections and administrations of executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, state and public agencies, enterprises, establishments and organizations and residential buildings, on 16 February, 23 February, 8 March, 22 April, 1 and 2 May, 9 May, 21 July, 1 September, 7 October, 7 and 8 November and 30 December. The state flag of the Lithuanian SSR may be hoisted also on said buildings and residential housing on other holidays and memorial days;
c. On buildings and means of locomotion of diplomatic missions and consular establishments of the Lithuanian SSR;
d. On ships aboard which the following officials may be present: the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet or his deputies; the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers or other individuals representing the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR and the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR;
e. On the masts of internal navigation ships;
f. By order of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

The state flag of the Lithuanian SSR may be hoisted and used also during ceremonies and other celebrations and measures sponsored by state and public organizations, enterprises and establishments.

Whenever the state flags of the USSR and the Lithuanian SSR are hoisted simultaneously, the state flag of the USSR must be hoisted on the left side of the building as one faces it, and the state flag of the Lithuanian SSR on the right side.

3. Regardless of size, the state flag of the Lithuanian SSR and its portrayal must always be consistent with the colors as stipulated in the present statute.

4. The local soviets of people's deputies, public organizations and mass information media must take specific steps in educating the citizens in a spirit of respect for the state flag of the Lithuanian SSR.

The desecration of the state flag will be punished in accordance with the law.

5. Regulations governing the application of this statute will be issued by the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers. *[Signed] Y. Guretskas*
Secretary of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Georgia Commission To Investigate Repressions

LD2903114489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Excerpts] An extraordinary session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet took place today. [passage omitted]

The session adopted a decision on the formation, under the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, of a commission on issues of the restoration of justice concerning victims of repression in the 1930's, 1940's, and the beginning of the 1950's, confirmed its composition, and also examined other issues.

Patiashvili, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, spoke at the meeting.

Russian Police Aid Armenian Law Enforcement
PM2903132789 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Mar 89 Second Edition p 4

[Nonstaff correspondent G. Bochkarev report: "'Children's World' Saved. Combined Detachment of Krasnodar Kray Soviet Executive Committee Internal Affairs Administration Assists Colleagues in Armenia"]

[Text] Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic—I met a man with a hunting rifle at the door of the rayon internal affairs department in the small Armenian city of Kalinino. He asked the duty officer for the rayon department:

"Where do I hand in my rifle?"

"Here...."

Weapons are being surrendered almost every day. This means that things are quiet in Kalinino, and life is returning to normal.

The city of Kalinino is in the very north of Armenia. It was barely affected by the earthquake, unlike Spitak and Leninakan. But other problems have arisen in Kalininskiy Rayon—at the end of last year disturbances flared up here on interethnic grounds. Two murders and several thefts and larcenies were committed. All this sharply exacerbated the operational situation. Things reached the point where armed self-defense detachments appeared in certain villages in the rayon. Whole families of Azerbaijanis began leaving Kalinino, and vice versa—Armenian refugees headed this way. Under these complex conditions the former leadership of the local rayon internal affairs department was unable to instill order. The chief of the militia department and the rayon prosecutor were dismissed. A combined detachment of Krasnodar Kray Soviet Executive Committee [Krayispolkom] Internal Affairs Administration [UVD] arrived in Kalininskiy Rayon in December. It included specialists of various subdivisions: criminal investigation, the State Automobile Inspectorate, the Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation Department, the patrol and post service, and investigators.

"Our task is to stop and prevent crime," Internal Service Lieutenant Colonel A. Pinchuk, commander of a Kuban militia detachment, said. "So far actions have been taken and proceedings initiated in 30 criminal cases."

The Krasnodar Krayispolkom UVD combined detachment is only helping its local colleagues now. Together they patrol the streets, together they are on duty at State Automobile Inspectorate posts. The curfew has already been lifted in the rayon. In general, life is being put to rights.

"We have full contact with the men in Krasnodar," Militia Major A. Maytesyan, chief of Armenia's Kalininskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department, said. "Party and soviet workers and leaders of our rayon department and the Krasnodar combined detachment go out to villages and hold meetings with the residents there. They answer questions and give people truthful information at first hand. There have been six such meetings already. Thanks to this, 90 percent of Azerbaijanis have now returned to the village of Kyzyl-Shafak, for example...."

But we have to face the truth: Not all the Azerbaijanis are returning to Armenia, and not many Armenians want to go back to Azerbaijan.

We went to the village of Saryar in Armenia's Kalininskiy Rayon. No one now lives in Saryar. People fled from the disturbances, leaving their homes and abandoning their things. Every house bears a brief notice: "Exchange."

The Krasnodar men are also guarding abandoned houses in the villages. They hope that the inhabitants will return.

Unforeseen circumstances can also occur. A household goods store caught fire in Kalinino one night. Next door were a "Children's World" store and a rayon consumer society base. The flames were first seen by a Krasnodar militia patrol comprising Aleksey Senyuk, Yuriy Pankevich, and Vitaliy Strelnikov. The guys threw themselves into fighting the fire. The entire detachment of Krasnodar militiamen responded to the alarm. Militia Major A. Fedorov, deputy commander, directed the operation to extinguish the fire. The militiamen contained the fire, preventing it from spreading to "Children's World" and the rayon consumer society base, until the fire brigade arrived. Goods worth R2 million and R6,000 in cash in the store till were saved....

By order of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic minister of internal affairs, 20 militiamen of the Krasnodar Krayispolkom UVD combined detachment were awarded testimonials and "For Excellent Service in the Internal Affairs Ministry" and "Excellent Militiaman" medals.

Azerbaijan Commission Makes Minority Provisions
PM2903123389 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 11 Mar 89 p 2

[AZERINFORM report under the rubric "Commissions at Work": "Implementing the Plans"]

[Text] How are decisions being implemented? This question was examined at a session of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Interethnic Relations and International Education conducted by its chairman, Deputy A.F. Dashdamirov.

The activity of the Ministries of Public Education and Culture and the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade in carrying out the

commission's decisions "On the State of and Measures To Further Improve Work With National Minorities on the Territory of the Azerbaijan SSR in the Light of the Decisions of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee 16 August 1988 Plenum."

Specific measures designed to meet more fully the social, consumer, cultural, and linguistic needs of the national minorities have been drawn up and are being implemented at local level. Last year saw, notably, an increase both in non-examination-based admissions to higher educational institutions of representatives of national minorities who will subsequently work in areas densely populated by those minorites and in the quantities of textbooks, teaching aids, methodological materials, and literature obtained from neighboring republics through exchange. The Kakhskiy, Zakatalskiy, and Belokanskiy Rayons have been allocated extra resources by the Ministry of Public Education to bolster the material base of schools and preschool establishments there. In the light of the local population's wishes it is proposed to introduce the teaching of the Avar language into the elementary classes of schools in the Zakatalskiy and Belokanskiy Rayons from the start of the upcoming school year.

The Ministry of Culture has organized special assistance for amateur artistic activity by national minorities, and extra staff have been allocated to cultural centers in rayons where there is a dense national-minority concentration. Twenty new rural clubs and libraries have been constructed in those rayons. Visitors to future exhibitions and competitions will be able to get acquainted with the creative work of the inhabitants of those areas.

The republic regularly publishes literature in the languages of national minorities. An editorial office for literature in Armenian has been set up at the "Azerneshr" Publishing House, and the "Yazychy" Publishing House plans to publish anthologies of works by Lezgin authors every year. A collection of Talysh folklore is also being prepared for publication. Azeri language textbooks for Armenian and Georgian schools have been published for the first time.

Deputies participating in the commission session—A.G. Akhmedov, deputy minister of public education; Z.I. Farzaliyev, deputy minister of culture; and V.A. Dzhafarov, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade—focused their main attention on outstanding problems. It was stressed that the slow resolution of questions concerned with satisfying national interests was generally due to sluggishness on the part of local soviets and their education and cultural organs.

The commission also discussed questions concerning the functioning of Azeri-Russian bilingualism. A working party was set up to study problems associated with this.

Deputies B.M. Bagabzade, I.K. Shikhlinskiy, Dzh.B. Guliyev, and V.M. Amrakhov addressed the session. S.A. Rustamzade, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, and N.S. Fataliyev, deputy chairman of the republic supreme soviet presidium, took part in the commission's work.

New Social Security Minister in Azerbaijan

NC2903083689 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0340 GMT 28 Mar 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The newspapers report that the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions held a plenum on 27 March. The plenum relieved Lidiya Rasulova of her responsibilities as chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions and member of the presidium because she has been appointed as minister of social security of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.

Agayev, member of the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions Presidium and general director of the Baku electrical (?livelihood products) [words indistinct], was elected as chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions. Meanwhile, Murat Aliyev and (?Seyranov) were relieved from their posts as members of the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions Presidium on grounds that they are being transferred to party work.

Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the plenum. Vagif Guseynov, chief of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Organizational Party Work and Cadre Affairs Department, participated in the work of the plenum.

Local Languages Used Officially in Kazakhstan

PM3003110989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with M.R. Sagdiyev, newly elected chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, by correspondent E. Matskevich in Alma-Ata under the rubric "Names and Events": "The Main Thing Is Concern for the Individual"; date not given; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] At the 12th session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, Makhtey Ramazanovich Sagdiyev was elected chairman of the republic's supreme soviet presidium.

He was born in 1929 in the village of Ondiris, North Kazakhstan Oblast.... He graduated from teacher training institute and the Alma-Ata Higher Party School, and from agricultural school after taking an extramural course.... He has worked as a director of studies and a school director, and served in the Soviet Army.... He was a rayon party committee [raykom] instructor and party bureau secretary of a machine and tractor station and a state farm [sovkhoz].... He was head of the "Afanasyevskiy" Sovkhoz and worked as first secretary of the

Sokolovskiy and Dzhambulskiy raykoms.... All this was in his native North Kazakhstan Oblast. In 1971 he became first deputy chairman of the Turgay Oblast Soviet Executive Committee [oblispolkom] and, in 1980, Kazakh SSR minister of the fish industry. Three years later, he was elected chairman of Kustanay Oblispolkom. Since January 1985, he has been first secretary of the Kokchetav Oblast Party Committee. [passage omitted]

[Matskevich] How is Kazakh-Russian bilingualism being introduced into official Soviet correspondence?

[Sagdiyev] People in the republic have long communicated in two languages. But that is not the only question. Official correspondence is now conducted in Kazakh in one in four local soviet executive committees, in Uigur in six rural soviets in Alma-Ata Oblast, and in Uzbek in 12 rural soviets in Chimkent Oblast. Republic supreme soviet sessions and some sessions at oblast level are conducted in the two languages, with simultaneous translation. Forms and documents for soviet executive committees are printed accordingly. [passage omitted]

Conference of Soviet Germans Opens in Moscow
LD2903142189 Moscow TASS in English 1326 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—A three-day constituent conference of the All-Union Society of Soviet Germans was opened here today. It is attended by more than 100 delegates from several compact German communities of the country. The conference will endorse the new organisation's charter and programme, and elect its leading bodies.

Center place on the agenda belongs to questions of preserving and developing national culture, language and traditions. Some delegates also advocate the restoration of a (?German economy) in the USSR.

Discussion of such questions would have been simply unthinkable but a few years ago. It is not without reason, therefore, that many conference participants note the favourable impact of the country's radical renovation, of perestroyka and glasnost on the solution of problems confronting the Soviet Germans. As stated by Hugo Wormsbecher, a Soviet German writer, who addressed the conference, "for us perestroyka heralds a comeback of a fair nationalties policy."

Many of the speakers noted the far-fetched nature of outside "concern for the welfare of Soviet Germans." As stated by Ivban Kronewald, cand.sc. (philosophy), "we are troubled by such facts as discussion of our problems in the FRG Bundestag.... We, Soviet citizens of German nationaliity, as all the peoples of our country, welcome, of course, the development of good business relations between the USSR and the FRG. But as to the solution of problems pertaining to Soviet Germans, we declare: We have one home, one country—the Soviet Union. We are in a position to resolve our own problems."

The history of Germans in Russia is more than two centuries old. Thousands of people have migrated from Germany in search of a better life, fleeing from feudal oppression.

During the years of Soviet power the country's German population has contributed notably to the establishment and development of the socialiast state. The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the Volga Germans was established in 1924. However, it was liquidated in 1941, when the Great Patriotic War broke out. Today there are 2.2 million Soviet Germans in the USSR. Almost a million of them reside in Kazakhstan. Germans hold 14th place in the country as regards numbers. Soviet Germans are fully-fledged citizens of the couontry. There are party, Soviet and economic officials among them, as well as several prominent scientists, authors and artists. Three newspapers are put out in German. There is a German drama theatre and a broadcast for Soviet Germans in their native language.

Role of Foreign Trade Ministry Considered
LD2903084889 Moscow TASS in English 0831 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—By TASS commentator Andrey Orlov:

The radical economic reform, now going on in the USSR, has not by-passed the sphere of foreign economic relations. The Soviet Government's latest documents have set the task of radically democratizing foreign economic activity. Most of the former restrictions in this sphere have been lifted and any state-run, cooperative or other Soviet enterprise has received the right to do business in the world market as of April 1st, 1989. The procedure of setting up joint-stock enterprises in the Soviet Union has been greatly facilitated.

Of course, some sort of a body was necessary in these conditions, capable of seeing to the observance of state interests, of coordinating and planning the sector's development on long range lines, in short a 'think tank' for Soviet foreign economic relations. On decision of the government these functions will henceforth be discharged by the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR, formed more than a year ago on the basis of the former Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR. On the last day of February, the Council of Ministers of the USSR ruled that the "Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR is their legal successor as regards international agreements signed by the USSR, and as regards commitments arising from civil rights agreements they had concluded with organisations and firms of other countries."

In the new structure of Soviet foreign relations this ministry is to serve as a link between the world and domestic markets. Studying and analysing international and domestic foreign trade practices, the Ministry for

Foreign Economic Relations will strive to make foreign trade contribute to the ongoing reform of the national economy. A no less important task of the ministry, it goes without saying, is to ensure conditions for the Soviet Union's broad participation in the international division of labour.

Many years of discriminative measures, taken by this or that state against the Soviet Union, were countered by retaliatory steps, more of a propagandistic than economic nature, however. The situation has changed now: The Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, in its new capacity, has the right to take retaliatory steps against such states, inlcuding effective non-tariff regulation, licensing and quota fixing, let alone other economic sanctions. Furthermore, the ministry will keep stock of foreign firms, resorting to restrictive business practices or failing to observe their commitments to soviet organisations.

The Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations has inherited the right of issuing permissions to foreign organisations and firms to open their representations in the Soviet Union.

Ethics Chairman Views Plan for Press Passes

PM2903154089 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Returning to an Earlier Topic": "More on Special Passes"]

[Text] The interview "Pass for Emergencies" published in issue No 44 for this year prompted a torrent of letters. The majority of people writing to IZVESTIYA express fears: Could the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] take advantage of the idea of introducing such passes for reporters, for its own purposes? Could an ordinary rally become an "emergency," so that press access would be strictly limited? People are worried that the new idea looks rather like another departmental offensive on glasnost. And in virtually every letter readers express support for the mass media, which are developing glasnost with their trenchant publications.

On that occasion, putting its questions to the USSR MVD, IZVESTIYA made no secret of its own concern—the accreditation of journalists had not yet acquired legal force, yet in Belorussia they were already trying to curb reporters by means of these accreditations. A familiar situation, alas....

All the same: What is now happening to the document entitled "Provision on the Procedure for Access and Attendance by the Mass Media at Sites of Implementation of Measures To Ensure Public Order"? We put this question to N.N. Chetverikov, chairman of the All-Union Council for Professional Ethics and Law and secretary of the USSR Journalists' Union.

[Chetverikov] The document is being finalized. But first of all let me note: The initiative for the mass media to receive accreditation cards giving them the right of free access to any "emergencies" or "special zones" came from the Journalists' Union. What were our reasons? The journalists' present situation, where departments are entitled to refuse to allow them to receive the necessary information (in this case, where the militia or Army subunits can refuse a reporter access to the scene of events), cannot be regarded as normal. I know from my own experience of work abroad that reporters obtain such cards from the police (I had one myself) for themselves and for their transport. And this also gives them privileges in their work.

But the task we set, which met with understanding among the USSR MVD leadership and the Defense Ministry leadership, became hedged about with rumors, on the one hand, and on the other was a little premature. What do I mean? The provision on the new form of work was approved before our Government signed the Vienna documents. These, as you know, come into force from the moment of their signing. And we, of course, suspended the operation of the joint document with the MVD and the Defense Ministry, so as to prepare a new version. This should be fully in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Vienna agreements.

This work was done in conjunction with Foreign Ministry specialists. In a few days the new version of the "Provision" will be examined at the Council on Professional Ethics and Law. Then, I hope, it will be discussed widely by the Journalists' Union. And only then will it be resubmitted for approval.

Finally, I would like to say again: I am sure there will be no discrimination against the press. What guarantee is there? The guarantee is that any editorial office receives two types of pass—a named one, with a photo of the holder, and one for the bearer. The newspapers, radio, and television are entitled to use these even to a nonstaff reporter if, of course, they deem it necessary. And the mass media will themselves determine the number of accreditation cards they need for on-the-spot work.

Man Sentenced in Attempted Airplane Bombing

PM2903134789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Mar 89 Second Edition p 6

[Report by own correspondent M. Odinets under the rubric "Courtroom": "I Wanted To Frighten My Wife"]

[Text] Kiev—Last fall PRAVDA reported how a man escorting his wife to catch a plane to Kuybyshev secreted a box containing an explosive device in her traveling baggage. The device was intended to go off once the plane was airborne. Fortunately for everyone who took that plane, the "infernal machine" failed to operate. After discovering the dangerous baggage during the flight to Kuybyshev, the woman took it to the police.

The trial of the man who planned this black deed has ended in Kiev.

The panel of judges found V. Grib guilty of the attempted premeditated murder of his wife and daughter by a means endangering the lives of many people (there were 168 passengers and 8 crew members on the aircraft), the attempted destruction of an aircraft, and the manufacture of an explosive device, and sentenced him to 13 years' imprisonment in an intensified-regime correctional-labor colony.

However, you ask how this could have happened. How did a homemade bomb get into the baggage? An interlocutory judgment was passed on the Ministry of Civil Aviation regarding the factors and conditions that allowed the crime to be committed.

Jamming Transmitters Switched to Broadcasting

PM2903134989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Mar 89 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent G. Lebanidze report: "On the Airwaves"]

[Text] Tbilisi, 25 Mar—By tuning their radio receivers to the 19.8 meter and 42.1 meter wavelengths in the short-wave band, Muscovites can now listen to Tbilisi radio call signs.

And even earlier, Moscow's radio listeners gained access to programs from the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, and the Baltic republics. And all this is being done with radio transmitters which were previously used to jam foreign radio stations broadcasting to our country.

* Improvements in Television Manufacture Assessed

WA18270070 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 12 Mar 89 p 2

[Interview with R. Varlamov, docent of the Moscow Technological Institute, by A. Yevgenyev: "Why the Screen Burned Out: Once Again, the Quality of Our Televisions"; date and place not given; first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Who could have thought that the small notice placed in our paper last May ("In the Center of GUM, at the Fountain, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA No 106) would evoke such a long and resonant echo? At fault for all of this is a single phrase uttered by V. Sokolov, deputy director of the Moscow Television Scientific Research Institute [MNITI], who replied with restrained dignity to a journalist's request to assess the quality of our television sets that "they approach world standards."

And did it flare up! The editorship was literally flooded with a heated stream of readers' letters, casting serious doubt upon the existence of the announced proximity. The most amazing thing is that this stream has not dried up to this day—the readership has proven to be people of sound memory. "I bought a Foton-Ts276 television made at the Simferopol factory," writes a reader from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk by the same name as the MNITI deputy director V. Sokolov (he headed his letter in journalistic style, "V. Sokolov vs. V. Sokolov"). "Within the first year, while still under warranty, the set broke down four times. It broke for the fifth time exactly one month after the warranty expired. Including what it cost to get it to the repair shop, I invested 50 rubles in the repair. There was nothing but to sign a service contract. Now, over 10 years, I will pay the price of the television. Recently, the screen went blank for the sixth time, although hardly over eighteen months have passed since the date of its manufacture. I am enraged: what kind of world standards are these?"

So, who is right, the representative of the institute capable of seeing the general trend, beyond the anecdotal cases, or the unlucky purchasers, who know little about global trends and judge by their own real life cases? Our correspondent A. Yevgenyev met with R. Varlamov, candidate of technological sciences, a docent at the Moscow Technological Institute of the RSFSR Ministry of Domestic Services.

[Yevgenyev] Rem Gennadyevich, your institution of higher learning trains both designers of domestic radio electronic apparatus and specialists to service it. The problem, as they say, is both inside and out. What is your point of view?

[Varlamov] Let us agree: any comparison must be correct. Today, Western industry offers buyers a broad range of consumer properties. Thus, the screen size ranges from 4 centimeters to 3.5 meters. Many sets have remote control. About three quarters of them have rectangular-shaped picture tubes, a flat surface, creating a cinematic effect. There are televisions using thick glass, up to two centimeters, with stereo or two-channel accompaniment, with add-ons for cable or satellite television, capable of receiving hundreds of channels. I can frankly say that for the time being, we can only dream about all that.

The variety of functions and the enviable range of quality are reflected in pricing. Their upper and lower limits, depending on consumer characteristics, are relatively about 1:20.

[Yevgenyev] You mean to say that our production and that of the television assembly plants of the West cannot be compared?

[Varlamov] No, of course not. There are common and fairly objective criteria. For example, reliability can be characterized by maximum accrued operating time. For ours, it's 7,500 hours, while for the televisions of the foreign firms, it's 10,000-15,000 hours.

[Yevgenyev] As far as I know, just a few years ago, we were satisfied with only 6,000. So have we grown?

[Varlamov] We are growing. But again, a note of caution here. We are really talking about different indicators. For accrued operating time, we think of the results of stationary trials, and they have in mind actual use, which is affected by a slew of supplementary factors—from the condition of the road you drive it home over to the consumer's inexperience. If we follow Japanese methodology, we should shorten our 7,500 hours by a factor of 1.5-2. Then we'll get quantities for comparison.

We can, however, comfort ourselves with the fact that a lesser share of TV sets with warranties wind up being repaired. According to the USSR Ministry of Trade, in 1987, 24 percent of black and white sets and 30 percent of color sets were under warranty, and in 1988, 20 and 22 percent respectively. However, even having figures like these at hand, I wouldn't exactly maintain that the quality of our television production is improving. Since the Ministry of Industrial Relations took over service, the main producer of televisions is a department where they started both overtly and covertly to conduct repair operations, beefing up the branch's statistics with such straightforward methods.

[Yevgenyev] On what basis can we declare our televisions to be close to world standards?

[Varlamov] What is at issue is by what indicators we are equating them. They have a lot by way of electronic radio apparatus. The weight of the television, its energy demand, you see, is not the last thing here, either. Until recently, we lagged behind here as well, but today, we are getting right up to foreign standards. But with televisions, the main thing is the picture quality. I already spoke about the rectangular picture tube. They give two to three times the brightness. Sunlight does not bother them at all, and their range of colors has been acknowledged to be ideal. In this sense, we have hopeless stagnation. Even worse, we are losing what we once had. Our picture tubes lasted 2-3 times longer 5-8 years ago. And today, even with the best of our native color televisions, the Lvov "Elektron" and the Kaunas "Shnlayalis," the faces look pretty strange.

[Yevgenyev] It is not hard to guess what they would tell us at the Ministry of Industrial Relations: "These weeds aren't in our garden. Picture tubes are the Ministry of the Electronics Industry's department."

[Varlamov] And it in turn will cite the obsolete equipment, the lack of space and everything else one is supposed to bring up in cases like this. And we will close by saying that we are deeply sympathetic. But if we dig deeper, the root is quite different. Those same picture tubes are the last thing on the electronics workers' minds; they have their more prestigious, more meaningful work. The departmental hierarchy works without misfiring. It is interesting: abroad, despite the obvious advantages of cooperation, the leading firms manufacture their own picture tubes for themselves—this is a very important component. Why shouldn't our television factories do this too? Of course, it doesn't always make sense to start new production from square one. But after all, an association of types of concerns could be organized which would take into its hands the manufacture of components, including picture tubes and assembly. I know that this idea has been tossed around by engineers for some time now; it has been proposed, and has not materialized. Why not? I think that the answer goes beyond the ossification of our economic structures. There is no real stimulus to break the existing structure. There is an incredible demand for televisions today. The buyer does not care about choice. In a flash, they buy up everything that appears on the selling floor.

[Yevgenyev] But where did this television deficit come from? After all, quite recently, in any department store they were selling two or three models of colors sets. And then it's as if a blinding sandstorm passed through, and there's nothing!

[Varlamov] It wasn't all that sudden. The year before last, the manufacturers really fell behind, and pulled out of it last year only by correcting the plan. But I am firmly convinced that even if there had not been these disruptions, we would have had a deficit sooner or later. Essentially, the industry itself set this up, squeezing rubles out of the "growth rate" and not taking the consumer into consideration. Take a look: currently, enterprises' offerings are full of color televisions with 61 centimeter and 67 centimeter screens (measured diagonally), even though they are not well suited to our apartments and pocketbooks. On the other hand, sets of lesser dimensions—37 centimeters and 55 centimeters—can't be found anywhere. They're cheaper, more economical, and from the standpoint of use of materials and energy demand, are in the long run more reliable. But it came out that the industry, by ignoring the actual demands of the market, painted itself into a corner.

[Yevgenyev] I would like to return to the inter-branch associations. If the concerns you spoke of are created, does it make sense to include the development engineers in them?

[Varlamov] Of course. After all, what is happening now? The enterprises are starting to put out fourth-generation colors sets—improvements over the previous models. But the transfer is terribly slow and painful. The Ministry of Industrial Relations blames the electronics workers for this, that they held up the supply of the component base for the new model. That's all well and good, but as there's enough blame to go around, the development engineers should swallow their share as well. Overseas, as a rule, renovations are phased: one unit is changed, then a second and a third, and after some time, a qualitatively new set comes off the assembly line. We usually shake up the entire system from top to bottom. The designers don't think about what will happen to the accessories: that's their problem. In the end, the assimilation of the innovations is a monstrously prolonged process. An association of the development engineers,

assembly workers and components suppliers could only be for the better. The role of the leading institute would change, and grounds for healthy competition would appear.

[Yevgenyev] And along those lines, in the long term, a move to the foreign market?

[Varlamov] Of course. We just have to learn to count carefully. Here in the press they praise Lvov's "Elektron" for earning hard currency for the country. In the meantime, this is hardly an average factory—it is fitted with Japanese equipment, and works partially with imported raw materials. And the bulk of the export production is sent to socialist countries. But nobody asks the question, is it earning the kind of foreign currency that it could, and should, earn?

[Yevgenyev] Yet the majority of our television enterprises aren't even thinking about this for the time being. The quality just isn't there. They've introduced state acceptance everywhere, but there has been no revolutionary turnover.

[Varlamov] And you expected a miracle? State acceptance is in no condition to catch every defect encased in a plastic box. The factory workers themselves can and should catch many of these. For example, the time for the thermal drive must be increased, but this requires supplemental area. But the television factory doesn't need extra hassles, when its defect is already paid for. We, the buyers, paid for it. Expenses for repair under warranty, as we know, are included in the price of the television.

[Yevgenyev] Our readers are expressing their disagreement with this system. That same Sakhalin islander, V. Sokolov, writes, "The manufacturing enterprise should be obligated to pay for repair of all breakdowns during the warranty period from its own khozraschet income. Only then will they have a genuine stake in work without defects."

[Varlamov] In principle, that's how it was at one time. You'll recall the good old KVN [Kenigson, Varshavskiy and Nikolayevskiy] models. When we began their production, nobody was surprised by such charitable warranties, that repair of all defects would be unconditionally paid for by the supplying factory. It seems that the radio technology of that time was so reliable that the principle of material responsibility was still 100 percent in effect. Yes, as far as design was concerned, it couldn't match the West, but not in reliability. Until the departments made a serious concession.

This happened with the right to exchange complex domestic appliances at the first breakdown, which in spite of Article 41 of the Fundamental Civil Legislation, is gradually being taken away from the purchaser. I should add that abroad, a television is guaranteed to work trouble-free for a full year without repair.

I admit that I had expected a lot from the Law on quality, hoping that it would put everything right, but its draft has disappointed me. If this document is accepted in its current form, it will serve only the departments and not the people.

[Yevgenyev] But you realize, after all, that they're not talking about peanuts, but about hundreds of millions of rubles upon the shoulder of industry. At the Ministry of Industrial relations, where I recently spoke about this, they stonewalled, why do they have to be extremists and answer for someone else's defect?

[Varlamov] It's clear, that again, they're nodding to the Ministry of the Electronics Industry. It would be simplest of all to break these troubles down to accessories. But is the Ministry guilty of everything? Objective data give this picture: one third of premature breakdowns are caused by design errors; one third by violations of technological discipline at the television factories, and finally, one third by the poor quality of the components. On the whole, the analysis indicates that today, the branch is equipped with the technology to get the maximum accrued operating time of our color televisions up to 8,000 hours. And that's not stationary trials, but actual use conditions.

But let me repeat that as long as the manufacturer has no economic interest, as long as it is openly allowed to live at the expense of the buyer, we can't count on any changes coming soon.

Economic

Gostev Discusses Government Finance Plan

LD2903210889 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1305 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow, 29 March (TASS)—"The Soviet Government's program to improve the state of finances in the country is of extremely great importance for accelerating the socioeconomic development of the Soviet Union," it was stated by the Soviet Finance Minister Boris Gostev at a news conference here today.

As the minister said, the urgency of the effective measures in this vitally important sphere is explained by the complicated and contradictory financial situation of the country. Over the last 3 years, certain positive changes have occurred in its economic development, among them progressive changes in the proportions of sectors and the more rational utilization of resources. The financial position of enterprises is becoming stronger. They had an additional R11 billion at their disposal in 1988. However, a radical breakthrough in production efficiency and, consequently, in the financial situation did not occur. Boris Gostev said that this is acting as a serious brake on the development of the economy and is having a negative effect on the psychological climate in society. He noted above all such negative phenomena as the destabilization of the consumer goods market, the

growth of inflation, and the growth in the budget deficit. As is known, the state budget for 1989 has been sanctioned with a deficit of R35 billion with another R63.4 billion borrowed from the USSR State Bank, which has led to a general imbalance of almost R100 billion. Circulation of money has become more complicated, which is largely connected with the galloping growth in wages compared to the growth in labor productivity. This has lead to the issuing of a large amount of money.

The program, the minister said, provides for the boosting of state revenues by almost R30 billion already this year. The point is to substantially increase the output of consumer goods, which is to grow at least at double the rate fixed for the production of machinery, equipment, and other means of production. Conversion of the defense industry will yield substantial funds, too. Plans have been made to float an internal state loan for enterprises, which will allow them to make use of the free funds at their disposal.

Envisaged also is a reduction of the volume of capital construction. There are now more than R150 million worth of uncompleted "frozen" construction in the country. Subsidies to unprofitable enterprises, which now run into about R11 billion, will be cut 30 percent already this year and it is planned to do away with their unprofitableness completely in 1990.

"Implementation of all these measures will mark only the beginning of the extensive efforts to improve the financial state of our national economy," Boris Gostev stressed. "It will take at least the entire 13th 5-Year Plan period (1986-1991) to balance out the finances completely," he noted.

Radical Reform of Domestic Pricing System Urged
LD2603132189 Moscow World Service in English 0210 GMT 26 Mar 89

[Text] In recent years, experts have launched a heated debate around the reform of prices and the system of price formation. Why is this reform needed now in the conditions of perestroyka? What is the attitude of leading economic experts to it? Here is our reporter's story:

For 60 years already beginning from 1929, the Soviet economy has practically been lacking normal market relations when the price of that or another commodity is determined by the seller and the customer. In keeping with the erroneous theory, government bodies alone act as mediators between the seller and the customer in establishing prices. But even a very large staff of officials is unable to fix well-substantiated prices for 25 million kinds of goods produced in the Soviet Union. It's the price formation system itself that is wrong. To set up a new system, a radical reform is needed. How do our economic experts see that reform? Dr Leonid Abalkin, head of the Institute for Economic Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, believes that complex measures are needed to improve the economic situation in the country. This is what he said: The problem should be approached from two sides. On the one hand, the spending on the unjustified number of projects under construction, on military and space programs should be cut down. All this requires a thorough stocktaking and economizing. There's a need to stop an absolutely unjustified rise in money circulation, because it doesn't solve the problem, but leads to an even further disbalance between the consumer demand and the supply of commodities and services on the market. On the other hand, measures are needed that would help give the market an additional amount of commodities and services through the expansion of cooperatives, the system of leasing, the conversion of the war industry, and import operations. Two or 3 years are required, Dr Abalkin said, to overcome the grim economic situation.

He also proposes that (?the) State Bank should give no more loans to cooperative and state farms and also industrial enterprises failing to work at a profit. According to economics experts, the price reform should consist of two stages—the reform of the wholesale prices and then of the retail prices. Here is the opinion of Dr Nikolay Shmelev:

[Begin Shmelev recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] The correlation of wholesale prices should be changed. It's necessary to raise prices on energy, raw materials, building materials. Prices of a large variety of machinery and equipment should be lowered. These changes are now going through their first stage, which is due to be completed by 1990. But while many goods and foodstuffs are still in short supply in the national market, the system under which prices are regulated by the state should not be given up. It will take no less than 6 or 7 years to build up our market. This means that the reform of the retail prices will lengthen in time. [end recording]

[Announcer] Dr Nikolay Shmelev:

[Begin Shmelev recording] The reform of the retail prices is inevitable. In the existing situation it should be prolonged as much as possible—for the whole of the 1990's as a minimum. We should move in this direction only as we begin to see that our market becomes full of goods. [end recording]

[Announcer] The price reform will be carried out in an atmosphere of openness, with the public discussion of all the projects proposed to the effect. The Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, stressed that on many occasions.

Abalkin Addresses Economic Conference
LD2903200289 Moscow TASS in English 1807 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—Attempts to completely replace market relations in socialist countries with administrative regulation invariably deform the economic system and result in disproportions and commodity shortages, a leading Soviet economist contended today.

Academician Leonid Abalkin was speaking in a debate on pricing and the role of banks in the course of economic reform in socialist countries, which opened at an international conference here on the subject "Market Elements in a Planned Economy".

The meeting, sponsored by the British FINANCIAL TIMES and the Japanese YOMIURI, is underway in the headquarters of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

It has been arranged by the international economists association, the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, and the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System.

The meeting is being attended by 60 scientists from 15 countries, including Hungary, Britain, India, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United States, West Germany, France and Japan.

Abalkin, head of the Institute of Economics, said that a consumer goods market is now being actively fashioned in the Soviet Union and that the first steps are being taken to create real markets of producer goods, securities and investments.

The socialist market, however, will be in a class of its own since government regulation by means of financial policy levers and taxation will stay put, the scientist added.

"Creating a socialist market will be a prolonged and difficult process.

"It can be assisted by a whole system of measures to turn the economy around, such as measures to eliminate the budget deficit and remove disproportions in production and imbalances in the sphere of circulation," Abalkin said.

Speaking at the meeting, Hungarian economist Janos Kornai argued against price reform by administrative means since, in his opinion, this will increase inflation.

Scientific

'Phobos-2' Radio Contact Problem Investigated

LD2903160689 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—An expert commission has been given a week to find out why radio contact has been lost with the unmanned space probe Phobos-2, according to the chief of the Soviet Space Agency Glavkosmos, Aleksandr Dunayev.

He told the daily IZVESTIYA that efforts to restore links with the craft are contining round the clock and the possible causes of the breakdown are being analysed.

Following the experts' recommendations, a plan of further action will be adopted and "we all hope for a favourable outcome", Dunayev said.

IZVESTIYA, reporting from the Mission Control Centre, said that the space probe was turned on March 27 to take television pictures of the Martian moon Phobos in order to specify the parametres of its orbit.

After the operations were completed, the information was to be beamed back to earth but mission control failed to establish regular contact with Phobos-2 despite repeated attempts.

Scientists Develop AIDS Vaccine Theory

LD2903125489 Moscow TASS in English 1224 GMT 29 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—By TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova:

Two Soviet scientists who conduct research in a small two-room flat have developed a theory which, they believe, could lead to the production of an AIDS vaccine within a year.

Moscow scientists Lazar Mekler and Rozaliya Idlis believe that a vaccine can be developed through the synthesis of certain types of proteins on the basis of a theory which they have worked out and which explains regularities governing the structure, development and changes of all living organisms.

The full title of Mekler's and Idlis's work is "Life and the Universe. The General Stereochemical Genetic Code—The Basis of the Origin, Functioning and Evolution of Living Cells and Organisms. A Theory of Self-Organisation of Biopolymers and Their Functioning".

The main provisions of the theory have been set out in the two latest editions of the "Scientific and Technological Revolution: Problems and Solutions" bulletin.

Professor Mekler, 68, told TASS that "our theory predicted the possibility of the emergence of a virus similar to the AIDS virus long before it was identified. The theory also explains the virus's ability to mutate and suggests measures to combat it". Mekler began working on the theory in 1953.

"The essence of the theory is", Professor Mekler went on to say, "that a general regularity governing the organisation of living matter, proteins and nucleic acids has been found. On the strength of it one can predict the development of the organism and control processes taking place in it". The Mekler and Idlis theory has prompted heated debates in the Soviet scientific community because many of its provisions run counter to the postulates of molecular biology.

However, numerous experiments performed in the Soviet Union at the institutes of molecular genetics, biochemistry, bioorganic chemisry and others seems to confirm its validity, Mekler believes.

The professor said that together with Rozaliya Idlis he found an anti-AIDS vaccine formula.

"I need a laboratory with equipment estimated at approximately two million dollars and a 28-member staff. Then I shall manage to synthesise the preparation within a year", he maintains. A project for this work has been submitted to the international foundation for the survival and development of humanity. "But so far we have nothing but moral support from a large number of scientific authorities", said the professor.

Mekler and Idlis do not want their vaccine to become the monopoly of one country. "We intend to hold a news conference for journalists and scientists of all interested countries to announce an anti-AIDS vaccine formula", Professor Mekler said.

Upon synthesising and testing it, scientists will be able to judge the preparation.

Seismologist Warns of 'Haphazard' Precautions
PM3003085789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Mar 89 Second Edition p 3

[Letter by T. Abakanov, candidate of technical sciences, senior scientific staffer at the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences Institute of Seismology, under the rubric "Science Desk's Mailbag": "There Will Be Further Earthquakes"]

[Text] As a specialist who took part in the inspection of the epicentral zone of the Armenian earthquake I can say with complete confidence that seismologists must also pay special attention to Kazakhstan, the kind of real attention that will allow the effective preventive measures to be taken that are not currently being carried out in the seismically active regions.

The southern and southeastern section of Kazakhstan is located in a seismically active zone, and Alma-Ata is situated in the zone of the greatest seismic activity. Catastrophic earthquakes of enormous force took place in Alma-Ata in 1887, 1889, and 1911. Certain facts force us to conclude that the seismic situation in the Alma-Ata region has worsened. It is difficult to imagine the consequences in the event of an earthquake, because no measures are being taken and conditions have not been established to ensure the uninterrupted operation of facilities. At the moment seismology as a science within the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences system is divorced from practical construction work and is not therefore able to tackle large-scale national economic problems. The issues of the theory and practice of earthquake-resistant construction are dealt with by departmental scientific research institutes and higher educational institutions in the republic, which not only have no links with the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences but have none among themselves. Their work is haphazard and uncoordinated in character.

It is essential to augment the academic system with subunits which could engage in in-depth research, coordination, methodological leadership, and the systematization and analysis of all work in the republic in the field of earthquake-resistant construction. Only the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences is capable of solving such tasks.

There is every justification and all the prerequisites are available for reorienting the work of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Seismology and restructuring it into an Institute for Earthquake-Resistant Construction and Seismology. One acceptable form would be to combine the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Seismology and a scientific subunit of the Kazakh Industrial Construction Scientific Research Planning Institute. This would produce a bigger practical return from both the republic's seismologists and its construction workers.

That would make it possible to speed up the solution of a fundamental scientific and global national economic problem—the problem of saving people's lives and ensuring the uninterrupted operation of the most important facilities during strong earthquakes.

So is it not better to take prompt measures to prevent a catastrophe than to engage in heroic, nationwide efforts to clear up its aftereffects?

Space Program Expenses, Secrecy Questioned
PM3003095989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Mar 89 Morning Edition p 2

[S. Leskov article: "Space and the Kopek. Cosmonautics Remains a Closed Bastion to Free Discussion"]

[Text] The unprecedented point about the need to reduce spending on space programs has appeared in the election programs of many candidate people's deputies.

This thesis naturally displeases many specialists working in cosmonautics and makes them annoyed with its authors. But, to get away from professional ambition, the very fact that topics once considered closed are now being publicly addressed can only be welcomed.

For decades cosmonautics was considered almost a national economic sacred cow the scale of whose sustenance it was sinful and unpatriotic to question. Responsibility for the common cause and a sense of involvement in what is happening in the motherland are now being revived everywhere. It is also true that the following fact has been noted. Certain candidate deputies promise their voters almost a land flowing with milk and honey. And the promises are not always backed up by precise figures and

specific knowledge. People can only complain that the cost of "Buran," "Phobos," or a crew's year-long stay on board an orbital station is still a state secret. You cannot be satisfied with the vague replies heard at news conferences about "our spending being comparable with the Americans'." If it really is comparable, why play at secrecy, why not name the sum directly? But when it is not named, you inevitably imagine astronomic appropriations which, when you look at empty store counters, you cannot help wanting to cut.

So we simply do not know whether it will be possible to save a lot or a little in cosmonautics. But it is not even a matter of this. Cosmonautics means advanced technology, and in no other sphere are scientific achievements introduced so quickly into practice. This is the reason why more and more states which you might think cannot yet dream of space travel are turning their gaze toward cosmonautics. Brazil, Malaysia, Australia.... Cosmonautics is the most profitable bank in which to deposit the latest scientific and technical achievements. And with correct organization it yields unprecedented interest.

For a very long time the USSR's space departments showed little concern to "come down to earth." A change for the better can now be observed in this respect. Unfortunately, the handful of positive examples has not yet become a system.

Concern at the rational running of the space sector is fine. But to achieve this goal it is hardly correct to speak of a mechanical reduction in spending. We have enough money, and there will be more—there will be no increase in sausages. We should think about orienting the achievements of a technically advanced sector toward the needs of the national economy. And not only space departments must show an interest in this. The clients themselves must show no less interest. But so far an extremely narrow circle of people knows about the potential of cosmonautics—we do not propagandize its potential in the best way.

Here is a final comparison, by no means in our favor. The U.S. craft "Discovery" only spent 1 week in orbit, but on one of the days earth dwellers were provided with a unique opportunity to listen in to the astronauts' conversations with the National Flight Control Service over the ordinary telephone for a very moderate charge. And not only U.S. citizens were able to do this but also inhabitants of any other country, including the USSR. Our crews are serving continuously on board the "Mir" orbital complex, and we would seem to have immeasurably greater opportunities, but we have nothing to boast of in this respect. Nothing fascinating has happened on board for several months. Many people gain the false impression that the "Donbasses" are on board the station only to keep it "going," pending upcoming expeditions....

The USSR Main Administration for the Creation and Utilization of Space Technology has repeatedly declared that it has adopted a policy of concluding commercial contracts with foreign partners to use Soviet space equipment. However, things are being run in such a way that the time has come to convince our own fellow citizens of the prudence of spending on cosmonautics.

New Complex Transmits PRAVDA to Alma-Ata

PM2903164189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Mar 89 First Edition p 6

[PRAVDA correspondent T. Yesilbayev report: "Gazeta-3"]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 29 Mar—For the first time in the country, today's issue of PRAVDA has been transmitted to the capital of Kazakhstan via a new phototelegraphy complex—"Gazeta-3."

As distinct from its predecessor, which until recently received photocopies of PRAVDA via satellite communications, it makes it possible to considerably improve the quality of the newspaper's photographic illustrations. Photocopies of other central newspapers will be transmitted to Alma-Ata from Moscow via the new complex. GDR printing workers have shown interest in this innovation, and have highly evaluated it.

Leaders Sign Academician Skryabin's Obituary

PM3003101989

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 29 March Second Edition carries on page 6 a 450-word obituary on the death of Academician Georgiy Konstantinovich Skryabin. The obituary is signed by the following:

M.S. Gorbachev, V.I. Vorotnikov, L.N. Zaykov, Ye.K. Ligachev, V.A. Medvedev, V.P. Nikonov, N.I. Ryzhkov, E.A. Shevardnadze, A.N. Yakovlev, A.P. Biryukova, G.P. Razumovskiy, G.I. Marchuk, B.L. Tolstykh, A.S. Kapto, V.A. Bykov, A.A. Nikonov, Ye.I. Chazov, Ye.P. Velikhov, V.A. Koptyug, V.N. Kudryavtsev, A.A. Logunov, Yu.A. Osipyan, R.V. Petrov, K.V. Frolov, I.M. Makarov, A.D. Mirzabekov, V.Ye. Sokolov, A.S. Spirin, A.P. Aleksandrov, A.A. Bayev, V.T. Ivanov, M.V. Ivanov, A.A. Imshenetskiy, A.A. Krasnovskiy, A.L. Kursanov, Ye.N. Mishustin, S.Ye. Severin, Ye.N. Kondratyeva, A.S. Khokhlov, V.A. Kubrin, A.M. Boronin.

Military

Students To Be Exempt From Conscription

LD3003100689 Moscow TASS in English 1000 GMT 30 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow March 30 TASS—From next autumn Soviet students will be exempt from conscription throughout the period of their studies, according to a ranking Soviet education official.

Speaking in an interview with the youth newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, which was published today, Gennadiy Kutsev, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Education, explained:

"The regulation applies to colleges both with and without military departments. Those with such departments will maintain reserve officer training programmes as before.

"Military training for female students, however, will continue only at medical colleges.

"Military training programmes for the new academic year will be substantially updated and trimmed down".

"I believe that in the new conditions it is even possible to set up inter-college reserve officer training centres which could cater also for students from colleges without military departments", he added.

"Their studies at such centres would be completely voluntary: Either you attend courses there and get reserve officer status after five year, or do a year's stint in the Army after graduating from college".

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